Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The key factors to be considered in determining whether to grant an application to serve a late notice of claim are whether the school district acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the statutory 90-day period, whether the petitioners had a reasonable excuse for the delay, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the school district in its defense on the merits ( cf. Matter of Bordan v. Mamaroneck School Dist., 230 AD2d 792).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the petitioners' application for leave to serve a late notice of claim. The petitioners established that the school district and its insurer had actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim within the 90-day statutory period, and will not be prejudiced in the defense of the claim on the merits as a result of the delay ( see Matter of Andrew T.B. v. Brewster Cent. School Dist., 18 AD3d 745, 748; Bovich v. East Meadow Pub. Lib., 16 AD3d 11, 20-21; Matter of Hunt v. County of Madison, 261 AD2d 695, 696; Matter of Affleck v. County of Nassau, 240 AD2d 569, 570). Under all the circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the application for leave to serve a late notice of claim ( see Hayden v. Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 103 AD2d 765, 766).