Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3126 and for an award of an attorney's fee are denied.
While the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter of discretion for the court ( see Castellano v. Mainco El. Elec. Corp., 292 AD2d 556; Polanco v. Duran, 278 AD2d 397), an order of preclusion should only be imposed where the moving party establishes that the failure to disclose is willful and contumacious ( see Mangiapane v. Brookhaven Beach Health Related Facility, 305 AD2d 642; Klutchko v. Baron, 1 AD3d 400). Here, although the Supreme Court's apparent effort to move the action promptly toward trial is commendable, since the plaintiff did not show that the defendant's failure to disclose was willful and contumacious, the court's determination to preclude the defendant from offering testimony at trial concerning certain categories of documents, to resolve issues concerning those documents in favor of the plaintiff, and to award an attorney's fee to the plaintiff was improvident ( see Mangiapane v. Brookhaven Beach Health Related Facility, supra; Klutchko v. Baron, supra; Pascarelli v. City of New York, 16 AD3d 472; cf. Kivo v. Kivo, 193 AD2d 585).