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Docket Number

No. 24,669.

Attorney(S)

Maugridge S. Robb, for appellant. M.U.S. Kjorlaug, for respondent.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Rudolph A. Robertson v. William Roth, No. 24,669 (Sup. Ct. Minn. June 19, 1925)

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant (the wife) had been confined in a state hospital for the insane from December 1915 until paroled in March 1916 and discharged as cured in December 1916. Plaintiff met defendant in January 1919 and they married in August 1919. Plaintiff met defendant's parents in March 1919 before the marriage was planned; the marriage later occurred without the parents' knowledge. Defendant did not disclose her prior adjudication for insanity, and plaintiff made no inquiry that would have revealed it. The marriage produced a child who was about three years old at the time of the opinion. In November or December 1921 the defendant was again adjudged insane and committed to a state hospital, where she remained confined.

Plaintiff brought an action in district court (Hennepin County) to annul the marriage on the sole ground of fraud based upon defendant's concealment or failure to disclose her prior incarceration for insanity. The trial court (before Judge Baldwin) dismissed the action. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether concealment or failure to disclose a prior adjudication or confinement for insanity, where the spouse was not insane at the time of marriage and cohabitation followed, constitutes such fraud as will render a marriage voidable and subject to annulment under section 8581, G.S. 1923.
What sort of fraud or concealment is sufficiently fundamental to “go to the essence” of the marriage contract and support annulment—i.e., what misrepresentations or conditions destroy consent so as to justify annulment despite subsequent cohabitation and issue.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Behsman v. Behsman, 144 Minn. 95, 174 N.W. 611, 7 A.L.R. 1501	That when consent to marriage is obtained by fraud and there is no subsequent voluntary cohabitation, the marriage may be annulled.	Quoted together with the statute (Sec. 8581) as the governing rule for annulment based on fraud when there is no subsequent cohabitation; used to frame the general legal standard.
Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. 137, 23 L. ed. 124	That marriage, upon consummation, becomes a status or relation carrying duties and responsibilities in which the state has an interest.	Used to emphasize that marriage is more than a private contract and that public policy limits courts' willingness to annul marriages after consummation and cohabitation.
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605	Authority cited for the proposition that concealment of defects of character, morality, chastity, habits, and temper is not ground for annulment.	Included among authorities supporting the court's statement that accidental personal qualities are not a basis for annulment.
Richardson v. Richardson, 246 Mass. 353, 140 N.E. 73, 31 A.L.R. 146	Authority on the limitations of fraud as a ground for annulment; cited for the rule limiting actionable concealment.	Cited as support for the proposition that concealment of personal defects does not ordinarily justify annulment; later cited again as authority for the conclusion that failure to disclose past insanity is not ground on the facts here.
Leavitt v. Leavitt, 13 Mich. 452	General authority referenced among cases limiting annulment for concealment of accidental personal qualities.	Listed with other cases to demonstrate established precedent that personal defects ordinarily do not void consent to marriage.
Ryder v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158, 28 A. 1029, 44 Am. St. 833	Authority demonstrating what types of concealment are and are not grounds for annulment; also cited again as an example of fraud as to venereal disease.	Used both as support for the general rule that concealment of character is not a ground, and as an illustration (in an examples list) of concealment of venereal disease being material fraud going to the essence.
Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516	Authority cited among cases holding concealment of personal defects is not sufficient for annulment.	Listed as supporting authority for the court's statement on accidental personal qualities.
Davis v. Davis, 90 N.J. Eq. 158, 106 A. 644	Example authority that concealment of disease (tuberculosis or leprosy) may be material; also cited as authority limiting concealment of character.	Appears both among authorities limiting annulment for personal defects and in the illustrative list (as to disease) showing what types of falsehoods have been held material.
Wier v. Still, 31 Iowa 107	Authority cited in support of the limitation on annulment for concealment of personal qualities.	Included among cases supporting the court's general rule.
Varney v. Varney, 52 Wis. 120, 8 N.W. 739, 38 Am. Rep. 726	Authority referenced for the proposition that concealment of character is not adequate ground for annulment.	Listed with other cases to support the court's general rule.
Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N.W. 323, 9 L.R.A. 505, 20 Am. St. 559	Authority directly cited for the court's conclusion that the failure to disclose past insanity is not, on the facts presented, ground for annulment.	Cited as a controlling Minnesota authority to support the holding that non-disclosure of prior insanity (under the facts here) is insufficient for annulment.
Cummington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. 223, 21 N.E. 435, 4 L.R.A. 131	Massachusetts authority cited in support of the proposition limiting annulment for concealment of past insanity.	Used as supporting precedent for the conclusion that failure to disclose past insanity does not warrant annulment on the facts.
Crane v. Crane, 62 N.J. Eq. 21, 49 A. 734	Illustrative case: false representation as to freedom from syphilis held material and sufficient to justify annulment.	Included in the court's examples of concealments that do go to the essence of the marriage contract and justify annulment; distinguished from facts of the present case.
Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 50 N.E. 933, 41 L.R.A. 800, 86 Am. St. 440	Illustrative authority that false statements as to venereal disease (or similar conditions) may be material fraud.	Listed among examples of fraud that would justify annulment because they go to the essence of the marriage contract.
Sims v. Sims, 121 N.C. 297, 28 S.E. 407, 40 L.R.A. 737, 61 Am. St. 665	Authority indicating that insanity at the time of marriage is a ground for annulment.	Included in the court's list of examples showing what types of conditions or misrepresentations are sufficiently fundamental to vitiate consent.
Roether v. Roether, 180 Wis. 24, 191 N.W. 576, 28 A.L.R. 631	Authority addressing insanity at the time of marriage as a ground for annulment; cited with an explanatory note.	Listed as an example of a circumstance (insanity at the time of marriage) that would be material fraud going to the essence of the contract.
Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 88	Example authority that a woman being pregnant by another man at time of marriage is material fraud.	Used as an example of fraud that would support annulment.
Harrison v. Harrison, 84 Mich. 559, 54 N.W. 275, 34 Am. St. 364	Example authority that pregnancy by another man at time of marriage is material and may justify annulment.	Included among illustrative cases of essential fraud.
Anders v. Anders, 224 Mass. 438, 113 N.E. 203, L.R.A. 1916E, 1273	Illustrative case where the woman entered marriage with intent never to perform spousal duties—held material fraud.	Used as an example of concealment/deception so fundamental (intent never to perform duties) as to justify annulment.
Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63, 63 L.R.A. 92, 95 Am. St. 609	Illustrative authority where false representation of a child allegedly born to the spouses was held to be fraud material to annulment.	Included as an example of representations that go to the essence of the marriage contract.
Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N.H. 177, 106 A. 493	Authority noted for taking a broader view that actionable fraud need not be confined strictly to the essentialia of the marriage contract.	Cited to acknowledge other judicial approaches but the court concluded the present facts did not warrant finding fraud even under broader tests.
Smith v. Smith, 112 Misc. 371, 184 N.Y. Supp. 134	New York case whose facts were more persuasive (to the court) as an actionable fraud case than those before the court.	Cited for comparison: the court noted the instant facts were not as persuasive as those in that case and therefore did not support annulment here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the statutory and judicial rule that when consent to a marriage contract is obtained by fraud and there is no subsequent voluntary cohabitation, the injured party may seek annulment (Sec. 8581, G.S. 1923; Behsman). The court emphasized that while marriage originates as a civil contract, once consummated it becomes a status with attendant duties and responsibilities in which the state has an interest (Randall v. Kreiger).

The court then articulated a limiting principle: concealment or deception about defects of character, morality, chastity, habits, or temper are "accidental qualities" and do not ordinarily constitute grounds for annulment. Parties entering marriage are expected to inform themselves about such matters through acquaintance and inquiry; the state's interest in marital stability counsels against readier annulments after cohabitation and the birth of children.

Applying these principles to the record, the court observed: (1) defendant was not insane at the time of the marriage; (2) it did not appear she knew her condition was likely to recur; (3) plaintiff made no inquiry that would have revealed the prior adjudication; and (4) there had been full cohabitation and the birth of a child. The court concluded the failure to disclose the prior incarceration for insanity, under these facts, did not constitute the sort of fraud that destroys consent or imposes burdens at the time of marriage that are wholly unexpected and intolerable to society.

The court reviewed illustrations of fraud that do go to the essence of the contract (false representation of venereal disease, intention to abandon spousal duties, pregnancy by another, duress, impersonation, insanity at the time of marriage) and explained that annulment is appropriate only where the misrepresentation or condition is of that fundamental character. The facts here did not measure up to those examples.

Finally, the court noted that if the dissolution of marriage should follow incurable insanity, such a substantive change is a matter for legislative action rather than judicial expansion; the legislature defines the grounds and public policy for divorce.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of the district court dismissing the action to annul the marriage was AFFIRMED. The court held that, on the facts of this case, the defendant's failure to disclose a prior adjudication and confinement for insanity did not constitute actionable fraud warranting annulment.

Implications:

Direct effect: The plaintiff's action to annul the marriage was unsuccessful; the marriage remains valid under the court's adjudication.
The court reaffirmed the principle that only misrepresentations or conditions that go to the essence of the marriage contract—those which destroy consent or impose wholly unexpected, intolerable burdens at the time of marriage—justify annulment, particularly after cohabitation and issue.
The opinion signals deference to legislative authority to declare additional grounds for dissolution (for example, dissolution because of incurable insanity), thereby indicating the court will not expand annulment doctrine beyond established judicial limits and statutory text.
No new doctrinal rule was announced; the court applied existing statutory and case law to the facts and denied annulment on that basis.

Justice Holt was absent on account of illness.

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RUDOLPH A. ROBERTSON v. WILLIAM ROTH. Reported in 204 N.W. 329.

When marriage may be annulled for fraud.

1. When the consent of a party to a marriage contract has been obtained by fraud, and there is no subsequent voluntary cohabitation of the parties, the marriage may be annuled at the suit of the injured party.

Accidental qualities of one party not ground for annulment.

2. Concealment or deception by one of the parties as to defects of character, morality, chastity, habits and temper is not ground for annulment. These are accidental qualities which do not constitute the basis for the marriage relation.

Concealment of past insanity not ground for annulment.

3. Failure, under the circumstances stated in the opinion, to disclose past insanity is not ground for annulment of the marriage contract.

What fraud is ground for annulment.

4. In order to constitute such fraud there must be something that destroys the consent which blots out all semblance of contract — or it must impose, at the time of the marriage, upon the one wronged, burdens and obstacles wholly unexpected and of such character that they tend to the destruction of domestic happiness and promote humiliation disclosing a situation intolerable to society and detrimental to the marriage relation.

1. See Marriage, 38 C.J. p. 1348, § 121.

2. See Marriage, 38 C.J. p. 1302, § 64, p. 1303, § 67.

3. See Marriage, 38 C.J. p. 1287, § 17, p. 1302, § 66.

4. See Marriage, 38 C.J. p. 1301, § 61.

3. See note in L.R.A. 1916E, 1274; note in 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 996.

WILSON, C.J.

Defendant was confined in a state hospital for the insane between the months of December, 1915, and March, 1916. She was paroled in March, 1916, and discharged in December, 1916, as cured. Plaintiff met the defendant in January, 1919, and married her in August, 1919. He met her parents in March of the same year before the marriage was planned, and the marriage occurred without their knowledge. She did not disclose the fact that she had been adjudged insane. He made no inquiry that should have elicited this fact. As a result of the marriage there is a child three years old, and defendant in November or December, 1921, was again adjudged insane and committed to a state hospital for insane where she has since been confined.

This action is brought to annul the marriage on the ground of fraud based alone upon the concealment or failure to disclose the fact that she had previously been so incarcerated. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant. Defendant is represented by a guardian ad litem.

When the consent of a party to a marriage contract has been obtained by fraud, and there is no subsequent voluntary cohabitation of the parties, the marriage may be annuled at the suit of the injured party. Section 8581, G.S. 1923; Behsman v. Behsman, 144 Minn. 95, 174 N.W. 611, 7 A.L.R. 1501. Marriage is a civil contract. But immediately upon its consummation it automatically takes a status or relation which carries duties and responsibility over which the parties have no control and concerning which the state is interested. Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. 137, 147, 23 L. ed. 124.

Concealment or deception by one of the parties as to defects of character, morality, chastity, habits and temper is not ground for annulment. These are accidental qualities which do not constitute the basis for the marriage relation. Persons entering the marriage relation necessarily know that it is not a temporary matter and they must consider and decide for themselves. They must take the responsibility of informing and satisfying themselves by acquaintance and inquiry as to such matters before assuming the obligations of this extraordinary contractual relation. Of course plaintiff should have been fully informed. Defendant was not insane at the time of marriage. It does not appear that she knew that the nature of her ailment was of such character as to recur. It must also be remembered that upon an unknown path every foot is slow. Nor can we know what plaintiff would have done had she disclosed this information to him, but a guilty loved one is soon found innocent. We are all creatures at the mercy of circumstances. The policy of our state will not permit a marriage to be readily annulled with the unfortunate consequences, just such as would occur here, after cohabitation and a child is born, even though the marriage is void only from the time its nullity is adjudged. Mistakes and disappointments in personal qualities or character cannot be made the basis of a dissolution of the marriage relation. The individual desire must yield to the public welfare. Concealment in order to annul a marriage must go to the very essence of the contract. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605; Richardson v. Richardson, 246 Mass. 353, 140 N.E. 73, 31 A.L.R. 146; Leavitt v. Leavitt, 13 Mich. 452; Ryder v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158, 28 A. 1029, 44 Am. St. 833; Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516; Davis v. Davis, 90 N.J. Eq. 158, 106 A. 644; 1 Schouler, (6th ed.) Dom. Rel. § 23; 1 Bishop, Com. on Marriage and Div. c. 17; 2 Kent, (13th ed.) Com. § 77; Wier v. Still, 31 Iowa, 107; Varney v. Varney, 52 Wis. 120, 8 N.W. 739, 38 Am. Rep. 726; 9 Minn. L.R. 497.

The failure in the instant case to disclose the past insanity cannot, upon the facts in the record, be made the basis for an annulment of the marriage contract. Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N.W. 323, 9 L.R.A. 505, 20 Am. St. 559; Cummington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. 223, 21 N.E. 435, 4 L.R.A. 131; Richardson v. Richardson, 246 Mass. 353, 140 N.E. 73.

The following are some illustrations of what goes to the essence:

False representation with respect to freedom from syphilis. Crane v. Crane, 62 N.J. Eq. 21, 49 A. 734; Ryder v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158, 28 A. 1029, 44 Am. St. 833; Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 50 N.E. 933, 41 L.R.A. 800, 86 Am. St. 440. Same as to tuberculosis or leprosy. Davis v. Davis, 90 N.J. Eq. 158, 106 A. 644.

Where a woman goes through the marriage ceremony with an intention never to perform any one of the duties of a wife, but solely to bear the name of a married woman and, in that way, to hide the shame of having had an illegitimate child, intending to leave her husband at the church door and not see him again, which plan she carried into effect. Anders v. Anders, 224 Mass. 438, 113 N.E. 203, L.R.A. 1916E, 1273.

Where the woman falsely represents to a man that during his absence from the state she had given birth to a child of whom he is the father, and whom she purports to exhibit to him, no such child having been born. Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63, 63 L.R.A. 92, 95 Am. St. 609.

Insanity at time of marriage. Sims v. Sims, 121 N.C. 297, 28 S.E. 407, 40 L.R.A. 737, 61 Am. St. 665; Roether v. Roether, 180 Wis. 24, 191 N.W. 576, 28 A.L.R. 631, and note.

Where a woman is pregnant by another man at time of marriage. Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 88; Harrison v. Harrison, 84 Mich. 559, 54 N.W. 275, 34 Am. St. 364.

Duress and impersonation are other examples. In order to constitute such fraud there must be something that destroys the consent which blots out all semblance of contract — or it must impose at the time of marriage upon the one wronged, burdens and obstacles wholly unexpected and of such character that they tend to the destruction of domestic happiness and promote humiliation disclosing a situation intolerable to society and detrimental to the marriage relation.

The facts in the instant case are not so persuasive as were the facts in Smith v. Smith, 112 Misc. 371, 184 N.Y. Supp. 134. Other courts do not confine the actionable fraud to the essentialia of the marriage contract. Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N.H. 177, 106 A. 493. It is sufficient for the purposes of this case to say that the facts do not warrant the finding of fraud as contemplated by section 8581, G.S. 1923. The misfortune of plaintiff is no different than that of every married person whose spouse is committed to the hospital for incurable insanity. In fact, that may not be the case here, but it possibly is. If dissolution of the marriage contract is to follow incurable insanity it is for the legislature to make that a ground for divorce. That body, in its wisdom, defines the policy and grounds for divorce, with which the courts cannot interfere, and obedience thereto by the courts is both easy and a pleasing duty.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Holt absent, illness.

ROBERTSON v. ROTH