BILL VANCE, Justice.
In 1994, Richard Bryan Kussmaul was convicted of capital murder of two teenagers, a seventeen-year-old female and a fourteen-year-old male. The evidence at trial established that Kussmaul, and three others, raped the female victim. Kussmaul then shot her, and the male victim, at his home near Moody, Texas. Kussmaul's accomplices James Pitts, James Long, and Michael Shelton testified against him and admitted their participation in the sexual assault. A jailhouse informant also testified that Kussmaul admitted his involvement in the murder and admitted disposing of the murder weapon. During the investigation, a rape exam was conducted. Evidence from the scene of the crime included a paper towel, a blanket, a bed sheet, and carpet from the room where the murder was allegedly committed. Specimens obtained from the rape exam and the paper towel were submitted to a laboratory for DNA testing. Although the laboratory report indicated that none of the defendants' DNA matched that found in the specimens, Kussmaul did not present this evidence at trial. Kussmaul asserted his innocence throughout the trial; however, he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Kussmaul has now filed a motion for DNA testing and sought to have all evidence in this case including the swabs from the rape exam, the paper towel, the bedding, and carpet samples submitted for further testing. The trial court denied the motion for testing and adopted the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Kussmaul brings three issues on appeal. First, he argues the trial court erred in finding he did not meet the requirements of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 64.01 for motions for forensic DNA testing. Second, he argues the trial court erred in finding identity was not an issue in the case. Finally, Kussmaul argues the trial court erred in finding that exculpatory test results would not establish his innocence. STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing the trial court's decision, we generally give total deference to a trial court's determination of issues of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact issues that turn on credibility and demeanor. Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) ( citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). However, in the present case, the trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion for testing. The trial record, the laboratory report, and Kussmaul's affidavit are the only evidence supporting the motion. In this situation, the trial court is in no better position to make this determination. Therefore, we will review the issues de novo. Smith v. State, 165 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). DNA TESTING A court may order DNA testing under Chapter 64 if the movant meets several requirements. The movant must show, among other things, that "identity was or is an issue in the case" and he must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he "would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Finding that Kussmaul failed to meet one or more of these requirements, we will affirm the trial court's denial of the motion for DNA testing. Because we find Kussmaul does not meet the requirements for DNA testing, we need not decide if Kussmaul's motion was sufficient under article 64.01. IDENTITY Article 64.03 permits a trial court to order DNA testing if the court finds that "identity was or is an issue in the case." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(1)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2005). Kussmaul's motion states that identity was an issue in the case because he maintained his innocence throughout the trial and because the three accomplice witnesses who testified against him lacked credibility. Although Kussmaul's motion shows that his guilt was an issue at trial, it fails to show how identity was an issue at trial. Further, Kussmaul's affidavit fails to state that identity was an issue, nor does it state any facts regarding the case that would indicate that identity was an issue. At trial, evidence was admitted that Kussmaul confessed to a jailhouse informant that he participated in the crime. Additionally, the three accomplices all positively identified Kussmaul as the individual who murdered the two teenagers. The trial court found that identity was not an issue in this case. Based on the evidence presented to the trial court, we agree and find that the trial court did not err in finding that identity was not an issue in the capital murder trial. We overrule issue two. EXCULPATORY DNA TEST RESULTS Even if identity were an issue, Kussmaul failed to meet another requirement for DNA testing. Article 64.03 provides that the "convicting court may order forensic DNA testing . . . only if . . . the convicted person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the person would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). This language means that a reasonable probability must exist that exculpatory DNA test results will prove a convicted person's innocence. Skinner v. State, 122 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Kussmaul contends that the trial court erred because if DNA testing were to reveal the presence of any of the accomplice's DNA on the tested items in the absence of Kussmaul's DNA, this evidence would rebut the testimony of the accomplices and a reasonably probability would exist that he "was not involved." Although the presence of Kussmaul's DNA on these items could potentially indicate guilt, the absence of such DNA would not indicate innocence. Such evidence would only tend to show that he was not involved in the sexual assault of the victim, but it would not indicate innocence of the murders. Rivera, 89 S.W.3d at 60. Further, even if this negative test result implied an exculpatory inference, such inference would not outweigh the three accomplice witnesses' testimony, the evidence corroborating such testimony, and Kussmaul's jailhouse confession. Given this evidence and what DNA testing might possibly show in this case, no reasonable probability exists that exculpatory DNA test results would prove Kussmaul's innocence. We thus overrule issue three. CONCLUSION Having overruled Kussmaul's second and third issues, we affirm the trial court's order. We need not decide Kussmaul's first issue.