ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order dated October 11, 2005 of Administrative Law Judge Coughlin (ALJ) that found the claimant's claim compensable and made a general award of medical benefits. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order.
Under § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 2005, a party dissatisfied with an order "which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant a benefit or penalty," may file a petition to review. Orders which do not require the payment of benefits or penalties, or deny the claimant benefits or penalties are interlocutory and not subject to review. Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo.App. 1989). Furthermore, orders which determine liability for benefits, without determining the amount of benefits, do not award or deny benefits as contemplated by this statute, and consequently, are not subject to review. Oxford Chemicals, Inc. v. Richardson, 782 P.2d 843 (Colo.App. 1989) (order may be partially final and reviewable and partially interlocutory); CF I Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 144 (Colo.App. 1986).
We have previously held that orders which determine compensability and contain only a general award of medical benefits are interlocutory unless the record reveals that specific medical benefits were at issue. E.g. Gonzales v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, W.C. No. 4-131-978 (May 14, 1996); Tilton v. ABC Turf Care, W.C. No. 3-105-542 (August 18, 1994).
Section 8-42-101(1)(a), C.R.S. 2005, provides that respondents are liable for all emergency and authorized medical treatment which is reasonable and necessary to cure or relieve the effects of the industrial injury. Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1337 (Colo.App. 1997). "Authorization" refers to the physician's legal authority to treat, and is distinct from whether treatment is "reasonable and necessary" within meaning of § 8-42-101(1)(a), C.R.S. 2005. Accordingly, we have previously held that an order which determines a physician's "authorization" but does not award or deny payment for that physician's treatment is not a final order for purposes of appellate review. See Matthews v. United Parcel Service, W.C. No. 4-325-652 (December 15, 1997); Fernandez v. City and County of Denver, W.C. No. 4-122-784 (February 7, 1996); Churchill v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., W.C. No. (April 17, 1995). We adhere to our previous conclusions.
Here, the ALJ determined the claimant proved a compensable claim and his entitlement to reasonable and necessary medical benefits. The ALJ found the first right to select a physician to treat the claimant's compensable work-related injury passed to the claimant when the employer failed to offer or make a timely designation of a medical provider and consequently Dr. Petty is an authorized treating physician. However, the ALJ did not determine what treatment was reasonably necessary, and the parties did not stipulate to the reasonableness of any treatment. Consequently, the order does not award or deny the claimant any particular medical benefit and, is not currently subject to review. Director of Division of Labor v. Smith, 725 P.2d 1161 (Colo.App. 1986). Bollig v. Petco W.C. 4-625-226 (October 19, 2005).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents petition to review the ALJ's order dated October 11, 2005, is dismissed without prejudice.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ Curt Kriksciun
____________________________________ Thomas Schrant
Ronald Breidt, Conifer, CO, Home Depot, Golden, CO, Shirin Chowdhury, Sedgwick CMS, Greenwood Village, CO, Clifford E. Eley, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Claimant).
David J. Dworkin, Esq. and Bernadette Wasilik, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Respondents).