The appellant unreasonably delayed making her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3), in effect, to vacate stated portions of the order and judgment ( see Richardson v. Richardson, 309 AD2d 795, 796; Green Point Sav. Bank v. Arnold, 260 AD2d 543). Moreover, the appellant failed to establish that the plaintiff procured the order and judgment by fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [3]; Blumes v. Madar, 21 AD3d 518, 520; Badgett v. Badgett, 2 AD3d 379; Feldstein v. Rounick, 295 AD2d 398, 399; Caiola v. Allcity Ins. Co., 257 AD2d 586, 588; cf. Oppenheimer v. Westcott, 47 NY2d 595, 604). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant's motion.