HENRY WILHOIT JR., District Judge
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 32]. The Court, having reviewed the parties' submissions to the Court as well as the record, finds that the Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("hereinafter "Experian") is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I. FACTS
The pertinent facts are as follows: in 1999, Plaintiff Willie Lewis purchased a truck from Defendant Kentucky Freightliner for use in his logging business. In order to purchase the truck, Plaintiff obtained a loan through Daimler-Chrysler Financial Services of North America, LLC (hereinafter "Daimler Chrysler") and paid off the loan sometime in 2000. However, in June of 2000, a William A. Lewis, purchased a truck from Defendant Kentucky Freightliner. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Kentucky Freightliner fraudulently used Plaintiff Willie Lewis' good credit raring to secure financing for William A. Lewis. William A. Lewis ultimately defaulted on the loan and the vehicle was surrendered to Defendant Kentucky Freightliner in August of 2000.
The Complaint alleges that at that time, Daimler Chrysler reported William A. Lewis' default on Plaintiff Willie Lewis' credit report through Defendant Experian as well as two other agencies, Equifax and Trans Union Credit.
In the autumn of 2000, Plaintiffs learned that Mercedes Benz Credit was attributing an unpaid debt to Plaintiff Willie Lewis. The debt was associated with Defendant Kentucky Freightliner.
The Complaint lists numerous denials of credit, both personal and commercial, between March 2001 through 2003.
In April 2002, Plaintiffs contacted Defendant Experian to inquire about the Kentucky Freightliner account. Following an investigation, Defendant Experian deleted the reference from Plaintff Willie Lewis' file.
On June 2, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, et seq. against Experian, Kentucky Freightliner Trucks, Inc. and Daimler-Chrysler Financial Services of North America, LLC. With regard to Experian, Plaintiffs allege that the single, allegedly inaccurate tradeline on Plaintff Willie Lewis' credit report resulted in various credit denials and caused them emotional distress.
By Agreed Order entered on September 30, 2004, Daimler-Chrysler Financial Services of North America, LLC was dismissed as party to this action [Docket No. 11].
Defendant Experian now seeks summary judgment as to the claims asserted against it.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard for summary judgment in a trilogy of cases: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), Celotex v. Cartett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Following this precedent and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when "[t]he pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Summary judgment is mandated against a party who has failed to establish an essential element of his or her case after adequate time for discovery. In such a situation, there is no genuine issue of material fact as the failure to prove an essential fact renders all other facts irrelevant. Celotex v. Cartett, 477 U.S. at 322-323.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has interpreted the United States Supreme Court's trilogy as requiring the nonmoving party to produce enough evidence, after having had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery, so as to withstand a directed verdict motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs' allege three instances of liability on the part of Experian: denials of their efforts to obtain commercial credit from June 2002 through 2003, their September 2002 attempt to refinance their personal automotive loan and the March 2002 credit denial relating to their fishing boat.
With regard to Plaintiffs' attempts to obtain equipment and working capital for their business, they cannot maintain their claim against Defendant Experian pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (hereinafter "FCRA"). It is well settled that the FCRA pertains to credit transactions for a consumer's personal use. See e.g. Cheatham v. McCormick, 1996 WL 662887 at *3 (6th. Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Although the actual language of the FCRA lacks crystal clarity, most courts have declined to read a cause of action for denial of commercial credit into the language of the Act. In choosing to limit the FCRA's application to personal credit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted:
Our sister circuits have rebuffed efforts, based on expansive interpretations of § 1681b, to extend the Act beyond its original purpose of consumer protection.
See Mone v. Dranow, 945 F.2d 306, 308 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Reports used for business, commercial, or professional purposes are not within the purview of the statute");
Ippolito, 864 F.2d at 452 ("In enacting the FCRA, Congress sought to regulate the dissemination of information used for consumer purposes, not business purposes");
Id. at 451 ("Evaluating prospective franchisees . . . does not fall within the definition of the term `consumer report'");
Matthews v. Worthen Bank Trust Co., 741 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that a credit report on a prospective lessee of commercial real estate was not subject to the Act).
Id.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, "[w]e see no reason to question the understanding of the Act reflected in these opinions." Id. Following the Sixth Circuit, this Court finds that the FCRA does not apply to Plaintiffs' claims stemming from denials for commercial credit.
In their response, Plaintiffs wax poetic about the need for legal redress in this context but fail to provide any authority, statutory or otherwise, which would provide them with the relief they seek. However, unsupported arguments are not enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Given the lack of legal basis, Plaintiffs' claim for damages relating to the denials of commercial credit fail as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs seek damages based upon two claims for the denial of personal credit. The first relates to their application to refinance their personal automotive loan in September 2002. Although the FCRA applies to this type of transaction, again, Plaintiffs' case falls short. There is simply no evidence in the record that Defendant Experian had a hand in Plaintiffs' failed effort to refinance their automobile through Farm Bureau Bank. Plaintiffs offer no evidence which demonstrates or even suggests that the Farm Bureau Bank retrieved, much less relied upon, an Experian Credit report. To the contrary, the lender's denial letters provide a litany of valid reasons for its decision, including accurately reported debts. Without any evidence of Experian's involvement in this instance, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden as to this claim.
Plaintiffs' third claim against Defendant Experian relates to the denial of credit for a Procraft bass boat by Auto Livery. Plaintiff Willie Lewis testified that he applied for credit from Auto. Livery on March 5, 2002 [Docket No. 32, Exhibit A, pg. 42]. The application was denied. However, the following week, Auto Livery approved Plaintiff's application for the same boat.
Defendant Experian argues that this claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Court agrees. The statute of limitations in this context is two years. 15 U.S.C. 1681. Plaintiffs's filed their Complaint on June 2, 2004, more than two years after Auto Livery's denial. As such, this claim is time barred. Thus, Defendant Experian is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Finally, with regard to Plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress, the record provides no basis for the award of damages for the same. First, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that their alleged emotional distress resulted from the conduct of Defendant Experian. Further, they have proffered no evidence of medical or psychological treatment for their alleged emotional distress.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that with regard to Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Experian, there are no genuine issues of material fact which remain to be tried and that this Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 32] be SUSTAINED.