Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion is granted.
Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes absolute liability on owners, contractors, and their agents for any breach of the statute that proximately causes a worker's injury ( see Panek v. County of Albany, 99 NY2d 452, 457; Bland v. Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452, 459). Where, as here, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of liability on a motion for summary judgment, the burden shifted to the defendants, the owner of the building and the construction manager of the work performed, to present evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was no statutory violation and whether the worker's own conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident ( see Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 289; Kijak v. 330 Madison Ave. Corp., 251 AD2d 152). Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The defendants did not offer any evidence, other than mere speculation and hearsay, to refute the plaintiffs' showing or to raise a bona fide issue as to how the accident occurred ( see Taeschner v. M M Restorations, 295 AD2d 598, 599; Schuler v. Kings Plaza Shopping Ctr. Mar., 294 AD2d 556, 558; Pineda v. Kechek Realty Corp., 285 AD2d 496, 497; Whalen v. Sciame Constr. Co., 198 AD2d 501; Figueroa v. Manhattanville Coll., 193 AD2d 778; Bras v. Atlas Constr. Corp., 166 AD2d 401; cf. Williams v. Dover Home Improvement, 276 AD2d 626; Nelson v. Ciba-Geigy, 268 AD2d 570). Therefore, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) should have been granted.