In this action by a commercial tenant and two residential tenants of a loft building at 117-119 Hudson Street in Tribeca based upon their landlord's alleged oral agreement to convert the building to condominium ownership and to sell them their units at favorable below market prices, the motion court properly granted defendants summary judgment dismissing the residential tenants' causes of action for injunctive relief, specific performance and breach of the alleged agreement. The merger clauses in their leases and the parol evidence rule bar the residential tenants from relying on their claimed part performance to take the alleged oral agreement out of the statute of frauds. Moreover, inasmuch as neither of the residential tenants is entitled to protection under the Loft Law (Multiple Dwelling Law art 7-C), the granting of summary judgment on the counterclaims for ejectment as to them was also proper. Their leases had expired, each had received a notice of termination, and their only opposition to ejectment was that there could be no summary judgment on those counterclaims until their contract claims were dismissed.
However, inasmuch as the commercial tenant had no written lease containing a similar merger clause, there is no basis for barring its contract claim pursuant to the parol evidence rule or the statute of frauds. Nor is there any basis for the motion court's finding that the granting of specific performance would be impractical and would require judicial supervision over a long period of time. Ejectment should also have been denied as to the commercial tenant and the notice of pendency extended with respect to such claim. Since the lis pendens is being extended, there is no basis for requiring defendants to post an undertaking pursuant to CPLR 6515.
Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action for fraud should also have been dismissed as duplicative of their contract claims inasmuch as it alleges no factual basis for recovery other than defendants' alleged failure to keep their alleged promises and there are no damages sought that would not be recoverable under a contract measure of damages ( see Coppola v. Applied Elec. Corp., 288 AD2d 41, 42).
We have considered the parties' other points and find them unpersuasive.