Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Although departures from the presumptive risk level determined by the risk assessment instrument are the exception rather than the rule ( see People v. White, 25 AD3d 677; People v. Dexter, 21 AD3d 403, 404), a departure is warranted where clear and convincing evidence demonstrates the existence of an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, not otherwise adequately taken into account by the guidelines ( see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [1997 ed]; People v. White, supra; People v. Hines, 24 AD3d 524).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in upwardly departing from the presumptive risk level adjudication ( see People v. White, supra; People v. Dexter, supra; People v. Stevens, 4 AD3d 786).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improperly assessed him points under risk factors 5 and 7 is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. Sinclair, 23 AD3d 537, lv denied 6 NY3d 707; People v. Burgess, 6 AD3d 686; People v. Oquendo, 1 AD3d 421, 422; People v. Roland, 292 AD2d 271, 271). Further, the argument made in Point Two of the defendant's brief is not properly before us on this appeal.