Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
An owner of real property, or a party in possession or control thereof, may be liable for a hazardous snow or ice condition existing on the property as a result of the natural accumulation of snow or ice only upon a showing that it had actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition and that a sufficient period of time elapsed since the cessation of the precipitation to permit the party to remedy the condition ( see Ronconi v. Denzel Assoc., 20 AD3d 559; Russo v. 40 Garden St. Partners, 6 AD3d 420; Gam v. Pomona Professional Condominium, 291 AD2d 372; McKeown v. Stanan Mgt. Corp., 274 AD2d 460; Reynolds v. Masonville Rod Gun Club, 247 AD2d 682; see also Simmons v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 NY2d 972).
The defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence that they lacked actual or constructive notice of the icy condition where the plaintiff fell ( see Ronconi v. Denzel Assoc., supra). Moreover, under the circumstances presented, the defendants established that a reasonably sufficient time had not elapsed after the precipitation that resulted in the icy condition ended to permit them to remedy the condition prior to the accident ( see Whitt v. St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 258 AD2d 648; Urena v. New York City Tr. Auth., 248 AD2d 377). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.