Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the compliance conference order dated March 10, 2004, cannot be deemed a 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216 since it gave the plaintiff only 89 days within which to file the note of issue ( see Delgado v. New York City Hous. Auth., 21 AD3d 522; Vasquez v. Big Apple Constr. Corp., 306 AD2d 465; Beepat v. James, 303 AD2d 345). Furthermore, the subsequent so-ordered stipulations between the parties which extended the plaintiff's deadline for filing a note of issue were also insufficient to constitute 90-day demands since they did not provide the required 90-day notice and failed to advise the plaintiff that the failure to comply with the demands would serve as the basis for a motion to dismiss the action ( see Delgado v. New York City Hous. Auth., supra; O'Connell v. City Wide Auto Leasing, 6 AD3d 682; Akpinar v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 302 AD2d 337). Since the Supreme Court was not authorized to dismiss the action on its own motion pursuant to CPLR 3216 ( see Schwartz v. Nathanson, 261 AD2d 527), the action was properly restored to active status.