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Docket Number

No. 2D05-416.

Attorney(S)

Robert L. Moore of Kanetsky, Moore Deboer, P.A., Venice, for Appellant. Jeffrey A. Rapkin, North Port, for Appellee.

Judges

Craig C. Villanti

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: The Meadows Community Association, Inc. v. Louise Claire Russell-Tutty

Factual and Procedural Background

The Meadows Community Association, Inc. (the "Association"), a Florida homeowners' association, filed suit against unit owner Louise Claire Russell-Tutty seeking clarification of its rights under the Association's governing documents. The Association alleged that Ms. Russell-Tutty's adult son resided with her in her condominium, repeatedly violated posted speed limits, and engaged in unsafe and reckless driving on the Association's private roads. The complaint asserted that local law enforcement declined to enforce the alleged traffic violations on the private roads. The Association sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Ms. Russell-Tutty to require her invitee (her son) to comply with the Association's rules. The complaint was later amended to add the son as a party (claims against the son are not at issue in this appeal).

Ms. Russell-Tutty answered and moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice after a hearing and denied a motion for rehearing; neither order included an explanation. The Association appealed. The District Court of Appeal (Second District) reviewed the dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the amended complaint filed by the homeowners' association states a cause of action for declaratory relief under chapter 86, Florida Statutes, and the authorities governing declaratory judgments.
Whether the amended complaint states a cause of action for injunctive relief (including theories based on deed restrictions and abatement of a nuisance) sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (The Meadows Community Association, Inc.)

The Association argued it had sufficiently pleaded a cause of action based on alleged violations of restrictive covenants in the Association's Declaration and sought a judicial determination of its rights under those documents.
The Association maintained it was in doubt as to its rights and sought declaratory relief and an injunction requiring Ms. Russell-Tutty to require her son to comply with the Association's traffic regulations on private roads.

Appellee (Louise Claire Russell-Tutty)

Ms. Russell-Tutty moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action and, as articulated in the motion and defense, argued that enforcement of traffic laws is within the sole province of law enforcement and courts cannot enjoin criminal behavior.
She argued the amended complaint failed to allege a factual nexus between herself and her son's conduct and that she could not be ordered to control the actions of another individual.
On appeal, her brief contended there was no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the requested injunction (which the appellate court observed conflated the merits of injunctive relief with the threshold question whether the complaint stated a cause of action).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lutz Lake Fern Road Neighborhood Groups, Inc. v. Hillsborough County, 779 So.2d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)	Principle that on review of a dismissal the appellate court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true and that the question whether a complaint states a cause of action is one of law (de novo review).	The court relied on this precedent to frame the standard of review: accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and review de novo whether the complaint states a cause of action.
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters, 246 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1971)	Rule that a complaint containing sufficient allegations to acquaint the defendant with the plaintiff's charge should not be dismissed for vagueness; a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action does not reach defects of vague or ambiguous pleading.	Used to support the proposition that dismissal was improper if the complaint sufficiently informed the defendant of the claims, and that vagueness is not a proper ground for dismissal under a Rule 1.140(b)(6)-type motion.
Fox v. Prof'l Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So.2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (quoting Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc.)	Principle that courts should not speculate on truth of allegations and that the question is whether, assuming allegations true, plaintiff would be entitled to relief.	The court invoked this principle to emphasize that the trial court must assume the complaint's allegations true when deciding a motion to dismiss and should not consider factual disputes or merits at that stage.
Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 681 So.2d 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)	Supporting authority for the proposition quoted in Fox regarding assessing pleadings by assuming allegations true.	Used as supporting authority for the standard that the complaint must be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss.
May v. Holley, 59 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1952)	Sets out elements required for a declaratory judgment action (bona fide present need for declaration; present ascertainable state of facts; rights dependent on those facts; adverse interests before the court; relief not merely advisory).	The court recited these elements and applied them to conclude the amended complaint sufficiently alleged the Association's interest and doubt as to its rights under the Declaration, satisfying the elements for declaratory relief.
"X" Corp. v. "Y" Person, 622 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citing Platt v. Gen. Dev. Corp.)	Statement that the test for sufficiency of a declaratory judgment complaint is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights, not whether the plaintiff will succeed on the merits.	The court used this to emphasize that entitlement to a judicial determination of rights suffices to survive a motion to dismiss, even if the ultimate remedy may not be granted.
Platt v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 122 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)	Authority cited in support of the principle concerning the sufficiency test for declaratory judgment pleadings.	Referenced through "X" Corp. to reinforce that the threshold for declaratory relief is entitlement to a declaration, not immediate success on the merits.
Consuegra v. Lloyd's Underwriters at London, 801 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)	Rule that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is not a substitute for summary judgment and that the court is confined to the allegations within the four corners of the complaint.	The court applied this principle to criticize the trial court for going beyond the complaint's allegations and considering the merits or extrinsic matters when granting dismissal.
Ingalsbe v. Stewart Agency, Inc., 869 So.2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Morris v. Fla. Power Light Co.)	Statement that a complaint should not be dismissed unless the movant can establish beyond doubt that claimant could prove no set of facts in support of the claim.	The court cited this standard to conclude Ms. Russell-Tutty failed to demonstrate that no conceivable theory, assuming the complaint's facts, could support the Association's request for relief.
Morris v. Fla. Power Light Co., 753 So.2d 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)	Quoted to support the standard that dismissal is improper unless no set of facts could support the claim.	Used as the quoted authority in Ingalsbe to reinforce the pleading sufficiency standard applied by the court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court proceeded step-by-step as follows:

Standard of Review: The court stated that on review of a final order dismissing for failure to state a cause of action, it accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true and applies de novo review to the legal question of whether the complaint states a cause of action (citing Lutz Lake Fern Road).
Pleading Sufficiency Principles: The court reiterated that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is not intended to resolve factual disputes or substitute for summary judgment, and that dismissal for vague or ambiguous pleading is inappropriate where the defendant can intelligently respond to the charges (citing Fontainebleau and Consuegra).
Complaint Allegations: The amended complaint alleged that the son lived with Ms. Russell-Tutty, repeatedly violated the Association's posted speeds and engaged in reckless driving on private roads, and that local law enforcement declined to enforce the alleged violations. The Association sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief interpreting and enforcing the Association's Declaration to require Ms. Russell-Tutty to control her invitee.
Defendant's Motion: Ms. Russell-Tutty's motion and defense contended that traffic enforcement is the province of law enforcement, courts cannot enjoin criminal behavior, there was no factual nexus alleged between mother and son's conduct, and she could not be ordered to control another individual. The court observed these were defenses directed at the merits.
Application of Declaratory Judgment Law: The court recited the May v. Holley elements for declaratory relief and emphasized that the sufficiency inquiry asks whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights at all, not whether the plaintiff will ultimately succeed on the merits (citing "X" Corp., Platt).
Finding of Pleading Sufficiency: Applying the governing standards and assuming the complaint's allegations true, the appellate court concluded the amended complaint sufficiently pleaded the Association's interest and bona fide doubt as to its rights under the Declaration. Thus the complaint stated a cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Trial Court Error: The court determined the trial court erred by dismissing with prejudice because it went beyond the four corners of the complaint and focused on the merits (and possibly relied on an apparent belief that the son no longer lived with Ms. Russell-Tutty or unspecified case law). The appellate court held the availability or appropriateness of the remedy should be determined after a judicial determination of rights, not as a precondition to surviving a motion to dismiss.
Disposition: Because the complaint withstood the motion to dismiss standard, the appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court concluded that the amended complaint stated a cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief and therefore the trial court erred in dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice. The court's core ruling is: REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Immediate implications for the parties:

The trial court's dismissal with prejudice was vacated. The case is returned to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
The Association's claims (as pleaded in the amended complaint) survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, and the trial court may proceed to consider the claims on the merits or address any appropriate procedural matters in the normal course.

Broader implications: The opinion confined itself to the question of pleading sufficiency and did not articulate or establish any novel legal rule beyond applying established Florida law governing declaratory judgments and the proper standards for motions to dismiss. The opinion did not purport to set new precedent beyond its application of existing authority.

Additional procedural note from the opinion: Judge Wallace concurred. Judge Kelly dissented without opinion.

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The MEADOWS COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida not-for-profit corporation, Appellant, v. Louise Claire RUSSELL-TUTTY, Appellee.

VILLANTI, Judge.

The issues presented by this appeal are whether the amended complaint filed by a homeowners' association against a unit owner states a cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief and, therefore, whether the trial court erred in dismissing, with prejudice, the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. In reviewing a final order such as this, the appellate court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true. See Lutz Lake Fern Road Neighborhood Groups, Inc. v. Hillsborough County, 779 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). "Because the question of whether a complaint states a cause of action is one of law, the standard of review is de novo." Id. The amended complaint stated a cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, and therefore we reverse the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.

The Meadows Community Association, Inc., a Florida homeowners' association, filed an action against Louise Claire Russell-Tutty, a unit owner, seeking to clarify its rights under the Association's documents. The Association sought to compel Ms. Russell-Tutty to require her invitee to comply with the Association's rules, specifically to control her adult son's reckless driving on the Association's private roads. The complaint was later amended to add the son as a party. According to the amended complaint, the son resided with Ms. Russell-Tutty in her condominium, which is governed by the Association's Declaration of Maintenance Covenants and Restrictions; the son repeatedly violated the speed limits and engaged in unsafe and reckless driving; and the local sheriff's department declined to enforce the alleged traffic violations on the Association's private roads. The amended complaint sought both declaratory and injunctive relief involving the interpretation and enforcement of the Association's Declaration. These claims are necessarily interrelated, and each turns on whether Ms. Russell-Tutty can be directed to control her son's actions while he is her invitee on Association property.

This opinion does not address the claims against the son that were not dismissed and are not a subject of this appeal.

Although the amended complaint consists of only one count, it advances two theories to support the injunctive relief request — violation of certain deed restrictions and abatement of a nuisance. Ms. Russell-Tutty filed an answer and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Ms. Russell-Tutty did not move to dismiss on the ground that the amended complaint could not be understood or that it improperly mixed causes of action in a single count.

[W]here a complaint contains sufficient allegations to acquaint the defendant with the plaintiff's charge of wrongdoing so that the defendant can intelligently answer the same, it is error to dismiss the action on the ground that more specific allegations are required. . . . A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action does not reach defects of vague and ambiguous pleading.

Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters, 246 So.2d 563, 565 (Fla. 1971) (citations omitted). Indeed, the basis of the motion to dismiss here was Ms. Russell-Tutty's defense — that enforcement of traffic laws is within the sole province of law enforcement, that courts cannot enjoin criminal behavior, that the amended complaint fails to allege a factual nexus between Ms. Russell-Tutty and her son, and that Ms. Russell-Tutty cannot be ordered to control the actions of another individual.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. In dismissing the amended complaint, the trial court gave no explanation for its ruling. The trial court's order denying the motion for rehearing also failed to provide any explanation for its ruling.

On appeal, the Association argues that it sufficiently pleaded a cause of action based on Ms. Russell-Tutty's alleged violations of the restrictive covenants. We agree that the facts alleged in the amended complaint state a cause of action for injunctive and declaratory relief. Although not a model of clarity, the amended complaint essentially alleged that the Association was in doubt as to its rights under the Association documents and sought an injunction requiring Ms. Russell-Tutty to require her son to comply with the Association's traffic regulations.

It is not for the court to speculate whether the allegations are true or whether the pleader has the ability to prove them. . . . "The question for the trial court to decide is simply whether, assuming all the allegations in the complaint to be true, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief requested."

Fox v. Prof'l Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So.2d 175, 178 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (quoting Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 681 So.2d 859, 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)).

Declaratory judgment actions are governed by chapter 86, Florida Statutes (2004), which provides that a party claiming to be interested or in doubt as to its rights under certain documents, including those involved in this case, may seek a declaration of its rights in the trial court. The elements of such a proceeding are set forth in May v. Holley, 59 So.2d 636, 639 (Fla. 1952):

[I]t should be clearly made to appear that there is a bona fide, actual, present practical need for the declaration; that the declaration should deal with a present, ascertained or ascertainable state of facts or present controversy as to a state of facts; that some immunity, power, privilege or right of the complaining party is dependent upon the facts or the law applicable to the facts; that there is some person or persons who have, or reasonably may have an actual, present, adverse and antagonistic interest in the subject matter, either in fact or law; that the antagonistic and adverse interest are all before the court . . . and that the relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice by the courts or the answer to questions propounded from curiosity.

"The test for the sufficiency of a complaint for declaratory judgment is not whether the plaintiff will succeed in obtaining the decree he seeks favoring his position, but whether he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all." "X" Corp. v. "Y" Person, 622 So.2d 1098, 1101 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citing Platt v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 122 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)). In other words, once a cause of action for declaratory relief is sufficiently pleaded, the plaintiff is entitled to a judicial determination of the rights at issue. The prospect that the determination may not lead to the relief sought by the plaintiff will not thwart the action. "[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is not a substitute for a motion for summary judgment, and in ruling on such a motion, the trial court is confined to a consideration of the allegations found within the four corners of the complaint." Consuegra v. Lloyd's Underwriters at London, 801 So.2d 111, 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

The flaw in Ms. Russell-Tutty's argument is apparent from the manner in which her answer brief addresses the issue on appeal; her brief contends that there was no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request for an injunction. As stated above, the issue before us is whether the amended complaint states a cause of action, not whether the trial court should have issued an injunction. The Association sought a judicial determination of whether certain deed restrictions could be interpreted to require Ms. Russell-Tutty to prevent her adult son from recklessly driving and speeding on the Association's private roads in alleged contravention of the deed restrictions. The amended complaint sufficiently alleged the Association's interest and doubt as to its rights under the Declaration. Because the amended complaint's allegations stated a cause of action for a declaratory judgment, the trial court should not have dismissed it. The trial court went beyond the four corners of the amended complaint — it appears that the trial court was led to believe that Ms. Russell-Tutty's son was no longer living with her, which might have mooted the amended complaint, or that there was unspecified case law that would not have supported the granting of the relief sought. The availability of a remedy, however, is reached after, not before, the determination of a plaintiff's rights.

At the hearing, the trial court focused on the merits of the Association's case rather than the sufficiency of its amended complaint. "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action `unless the movant can establish beyond any doubt that the claimant could prove no set of facts whatever in support of his claim.'" Ingalsbe v. Stewart Agency, Inc., 869 So.2d 30, 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Morris v. Fla. Power Light Co., 753 So.2d 153, 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). Ms. Russell-Tutty simply did not meet her burden to demonstrate that there was no theory, taking the facts as true in the amended complaint, that would support the Association's request for relief.

We hold only that the amended complaint is sufficient to withstand an attack by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Because the amended complaint states a cause of action for injunctive and declaratory relief, it was error to dismiss it. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

WALLACE, J., Concurs.

KELLY, J., Dissents without opinion.

MEADOWS COMMUNITY v. RUSSELL-TUTTY