Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15).
However, "[t]he admission of evidence of a witness's identification of an accomplice not on trial is improper, since it is not relevant to any material issue and cannot be used as a basis for evaluating the accuracy of that witness's identification of the defendant on trial" ( People v Samuels, 22 AD3d 507, 508; see People v Monroe, 40 NY2d 1096, 1098; People v Jenkins, 305 AD2d 287, 288; People v Garcia, 133 AD2d 704, 705). Contrary to the People's contention, the error was not harmless in this case ( cf. People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969, 970-971; People v Monroe, supra, People v Fields, 309 AD2d 945, 946).