BARRY K. STEVENS, JUDGE.
The defendants seek a protective order from the deposition and production of evidence requested of John Esposito, an investigator, on the grounds that the information was prepared in anticipation of litigation. For the following reasons, this motion is denied without prejudice.
"[T]he court's inherent authority to issue protective orders is embodied in Practice Book § 13-5, which provides [in relevant part]: Upon motion by a party from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judicial authority may make any order which justice requires to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had . . . (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 221-22 n. 59, 884 A.2d 981 (2005). "Good cause has been defined as a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action . . . Good cause must be based upon a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Welch v. Welch, 48 Conn.Sup. 19, 20, 828 A.2d 707 (2003).
In the present case, the court finds that the defendants have failed to articulate sufficiently a particular and specific basis for their motion for a protective order. The crux of the defendant's allegations are that Esposito actions were done in anticipation of litigation at the direction or request of the defendants' insurer or counsel. These allegations are conclusory. The defendants make no attempt to distinguish the information obtained at the request of the defendants' insurance carrier from CT Page 16325 that information that was gathered at the request of the defendants' counsel.
While information and work product obtained at the request of counsel require the plaintiffs to show that they have a substantial need for the documents and that the substantial equivalent cannot be obtained elsewhere; Practice Book § 13-3(a); this protection does not extend to that portion of the discovery request aimed at material gathered on behalf of the defendants' insurance carrier, particularly when done prior to the institution of any litigation, as the insurer has a contractual obligation to investigate independent of litigation. "Reports and information prepared by insurance companies as part of their investigation of a claim prior to litigation are generally held to be discoverable and not subject to these privileges." Strom v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 01 0382312 (November 30, 2001, Stevens, J.) ( 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 725, 726).
Therefore "[i]t is clear that all the material requested is not protected by such privileges and the defendant cannot refuse to produce anything responsive to the specific discovery requests at issue simply because some of it may be protected. The burden rests on the defendant to establish that responsive information or documents are protected from production, and this burden cannot be met by broad, generalized claims that a privilege applies." (Emphasis added.) Strom v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 727.
The defendants' motion for protective order is therefore overruled without prejudice. The defendants have leave to reassert their objections, with particularity, as part of the defendants' responses to supplemental discovery.
So ordered. CT Page 16326