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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Billy Elwood, employed as a courtesy clerk at a Kroger grocery store, was injured when a customer shut her vehicle door on his hand while he was transferring items from a grocery cart to the vehicle. Elwood had placed one hand in the vehicle's doorjamb and one foot on the cart to prevent it from rolling down a slope in Kroger's parking lot. A jury in the trial court found Kroger liable for Elwood's injuries, and the court of appeals affirmed this judgment. Kroger, as a nonsubscriber to workers' compensation, was challenged to prove that its negligence proximately caused Elwood's injuries. The court of appeals reformed the judgment to award Elwood 100% of the damages after concluding that contributory negligence instructions were improper for nonsubscribers. Kroger petitioned for review, arguing that there was no evidence to support the jury's verdict.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Kroger owed a duty to warn Elwood not to place his hand in a vehicle doorjamb while loading groceries.
  2. Whether Kroger breached any duty by failing to provide additional training, equipment, or assistance for safely performing Elwood's job on a sloped parking lot.
  3. Whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of Kroger's negligence and liability for Elwood's injuries.
  4. Whether contributory negligence instructions are applicable to nonsubscribers in a negligence action.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Kroger) Arguments

  • Kroger argued there was no evidence to support the jury's verdict that it was negligent.
  • Kroger contended it had no duty to warn Elwood of a hazard that was commonly known or appreciated by the employee.
  • Kroger maintained that no additional equipment or assistance was necessary for Elwood to safely perform his job.

Respondent (Elwood) Allegations

  • Elwood alleged Kroger provided inadequate training on maneuvering carts on the sloped parking lot.
  • Elwood claimed Kroger never advised him to take a second clerk to the sloped area.
  • He argued Kroger failed to explain how to avoid injury when loading groceries into vehicles.
  • Elwood asserted Kroger knew that carts often rolled into vehicles but failed to provide carts with locking wheels or wheel blocks.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1995) Requirement that a plaintiff establish duty, breach, and proximate cause in negligence; nonsubscriber must prove employer negligence. Used to frame the negligence standard and confirm no duty exists without evidence of breach or injury caused by breach.
Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. 2000) Contributory negligence instructions are improper for nonsubscribers in negligence claims. Supported the court of appeals' reformation of the judgment to award Elwood full damages.
El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987) Elements of negligence: duty, breach, and damages proximately caused. Reinforced the threshold inquiry of duty in negligence claims.
Van Horn v. Chambers, 970 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1998) Duty is a question of law and necessary for imposing liability. Supported the court’s determination that no duty existed here.
Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975) Employers owe ordinary care to provide a safe workplace, including warning of hazards and providing safety equipment if needed. Outlined employer duties but distinguished limits of liability.
Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1996) An employer is not an insurer of employee safety. Used to reject the imposition of duty to warn Elwood of a commonly known danger.
Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1993) Employers do not guarantee employee safety and owe no duty to warn of obvious hazards. Supported the conclusion that Kroger had no duty to warn about the doorjamb danger.
Nat'l Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Matherne, 987 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) No duty to warn of hazards known or appreciated by employees; no special training required for commonly performed tasks. Applied to hold Elwood had prior knowledge of the danger and no special training was necessary.
Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Warren, 934 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied) No duty to provide unnecessary equipment or assistance if not required for safe job performance. Supported the finding that Kroger had no obligation to provide carts with wheel locks or additional personnel.
Great Atl. Pac. Tea Co. v. Evans, 175 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1943) Employer not liable when employee performs usual work and the work is not unusually dangerous. Used to affirm no liability when Elwood performed regular tasks without unusual risk.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the elements of negligence, emphasizing that duty is a prerequisite to liability. It found no evidence that Kroger had a duty to warn Elwood of the risk of placing his hand in a vehicle doorjamb, a hazard that was commonly known and appreciated by Elwood himself before his employment. The court noted that Kroger had no obligation to provide additional training, equipment, or assistance because the task of loading groceries into vehicles on a sloped parking lot was neither unusually dangerous nor required special safety measures. The existence of prior incidents involving rolling carts damaging vehicles did not translate into a foreseeable risk of injury to employees. The court further reasoned that employers are not insurers of their employees' safety and owe no duty to warn of obvious dangers or provide unnecessary equipment. Consequently, the court concluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish Kroger’s negligence and reversed the court of appeals' judgment, rendering judgment for Kroger.

Holding and Implications

The court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and rendered judgment for Kroger.

This decision directly absolves Kroger of liability for Elwood's injury, holding that Kroger owed no duty to warn or provide special training or equipment for the task performed. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court reaffirmed established principles limiting employer liability where hazards are commonly known and no unusual danger exists in the work performed.

THE KROGER CO., Petitioner, v. Billy ELWOOD, Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Billy Elwood, a courtesy clerk at a Kroger grocery store, was injured when a customer shut her vehicle door on his hand while he was transferring items from a grocery cart to the vehicle. Elwood had placed one hand in the vehicle's doorjamb, and one foot on the cart, to keep the cart from rolling down a slope in Kroger's parking lot. In the trial court, a jury found Kroger liable for Elwood's injuries; the court of appeals affirmed the judgment. Because Kroger had no duty to warn Elwood not to place his hand in a doorjamb, and there is no evidence that additional equipment or assistance were needed to perform Elwood's job safely, we reverse and render judgment for Kroger.

Kroger is a nonsubscriber to workers' compensation; therefore, to recover damages Elwood must establish that Kroger's negligence proximately caused his injuries. See Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. 1995). Elwood alleges that Kroger provided inadequate training on how to maneuver carts on a sloped parking lot, never advised that he should take a second clerk with him to the sloped portion of the lot, and provided no explanation on how to avoid injury when loading groceries into customers' vehicles. Elwood also alleges that, even though Kroger was aware that customers' vehicles were often damaged by rolling carts in the sloped parking area, it never provided carts with locking wheels or wheel blocks.

A jury found Kroger liable for Elwood's injuries, but also determined that Elwood was forty percent negligent. The trial court reduced Elwood's judgment accordingly. A divided court of appeals affirmed the verdict, holding it was supported by factually and legally sufficient evidence. 2004 WL 2567069. Because nonsubscribers are not entitled to a contributory negligence instruction, the court of appeals reformed the judgment and awarded Elwood one hundred percent of the damages. 2004 WL 2567069 (citing Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. 2000)). Kroger now petitions for review, arguing that there is no evidence to support the jury's verdict.

To establish negligence, a party must establish a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. Werner, 909 S.W.2d at 869 (citing El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987)). Whether a duty exists is a threshold inquiry and a question of law; liability cannot be imposed if no duty exists. Van Horn v. Chambers, 970 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. 1998).

An employer has a duty to use ordinary care in providing a safe workplace. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1975). It must, for example, warn an employee of the hazards of employment and provide needed safety equipment or assistance. Id. However, an employer is not an insurer of its employees' safety. Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996); Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1993). It owes no duty to warn of hazards that are commonly known or already appreciated by the employee. See Nat'l Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Matherne, 987 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). It has no duty to provide equipment or assistance that is unnecessary to the job's safe performance. See Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Warren, 934 S.W.2d 433, 438 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied). And, when an employee's injury results from performing the same character of work that employees in that position have always done, an employer is not liable if there is no evidence that the work is unusually precarious. Werner, 909 S.W.2d at 869 (citing Great Atl. Pac. Tea Co. v. Evans, 142 Tex. 1, 175 S.W.2d 249, 251 (1943)).

In this case, there is no evidence that loading groceries on the sloped portion of Kroger's parking lot is an unusually dangerous job, nor is there evidence that other courtesy clerks sustained similar injuries while loading groceries on the sloped lot. Indeed, loading purchases into vehicles is a task performed regularly — without any special training or assistance — by customers throughout the grocery and retail industry. While there is evidence that grocery carts had rolled into vehicles due to the parking lot's slope and may have posed a foreseeable risk of damage to customers' vehicles, this is no evidence that the slope posed a foreseeable risk of injury to Kroger's employees. Elwood presented no evidence that his job required specialized training. See Nat'l Convenience Stores, 987 S.W.2d at 149. Elwood testified that, prior to working at Kroger, he knew it was dangerous to place his hand in a vehicle's doorjamb. Moreover, there is no evidence that carts with wheel locks or additional personnel were necessary to safely load groceries. See Allsup's Convenience Stores, 934 S.W.2d at 438.

Kroger had no duty to warn Elwood of a danger known to all and no obligation to provide training or equipment to dissuade an employee from using a vehicle door-jamb for leverage. Employers are not insurers of their employees. See Leitch, 935 S.W.2d at 117; Exxon Corp., 867 S.W.2d at 21. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment for Kroger. See TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, 60.2(c).

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KROGER CO. v. ELWOOD
(Sep 1, 2006)