WEBSTER v. BELL, No. 5000865 (Sep. 22, 2006)

D. MICHAEL HURLEY, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.

This action arises out of injuries and losses allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs on or about July 8, 2004, during a motor vehicle collision that occurred in Lisbon, Connecticut. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff, Traci Webster, was the operator of the motor vehicle in which the co-plaintiff, Andre Rancourt, was a passenger. In the complaint dated April 6, 2006, the plaintiffs allege that the vehicle Webster was driving was struck at an intersection by a vehicle being operated by the defendant, T. Yahnima Bell, and owned by Yahnima and the co-defendant, Gregory Bell. The plaintiffs bring the present action in six counts. In counts one and two of the complaint, plaintiffs Webster and Rancourt, respectively, each allege a cause of action sounding in negligence against the defendants. In counts three and four of the complaint, plaintiffs Webster and Rancourt, respectively, each allege statutory recklessness against the defendant, T. Yahnima Bell, pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. In counts five and six of the complaint, plaintiffs Webster and Rancourt, respectively, each allege common-law recklessness against the defendant, T. Yahnima Bell.

On May 17, 2006, the defendants filed a motion to strike counts three through six of the complaint on the grounds that the counts fail to allege legally sufficient claims for statutory and common-law recklessness. In opposition, the plaintiffs argue that they have alleged sufficient facts to support statutory and common-law recklessness claims. Both parties have filed memoranda of law in support of their respective positions. Oral argument was heard on the matter on June 5, 2006.

"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to CT Page 17427 state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188(2003). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "The role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Szczapa v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 56 Conn.App. 325, 328, 743 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 950, 748 A.2d 299 (2000).

General Statutes § 14-295 provides: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle."

"Our appellate courts have not yet addressed the degree of specificity needed to satisfy the pleading requirements of § 14-295 . . . This court has previously recognized that [t]he trial courts of this state are split on the issue of whether a plaintiff must allege additional facts to support a claim of recklessness that are distinct from any claim of negligence in order to survive a motion to strike and seek double-treble damages under General Statutes § 14-[295] . . . A minority of courts continue to require a plaintiff to plead specific factual allegations, above and beyond facts pled in a negligence claim . . . The majority point of view, on the other hand, is that a plaintiff, in addition to pleading facts constituting negligence, need only make the general allegations mentioned in § 14-295: that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and that the violation CT Page 17428 was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries . . . [T]his court has adopted the majority point of view regarding what is necessary for a plaintiff to plead a statutory cause of action under § 14-295." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lindor v. Green, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 06 5000420 (August 4, 2006, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 775).

In Pizarro v. Couture, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 05 5000374 (September 18, 2006, Hurley J.), this court recently had occasion to consider and rule upon this issue of pleading requirements in a case factually similar to the present one. In Pizarro, the court found the plaintiff's allegations that the collision and resulting injuries "were caused by the reckless and wanton misconduct of the defendant . . . in that he violated § 14-218a . . . [and] § 14-222 of the . . . General Statutes . . ." to be sufficient to withstand a motion to strike. Id. See also Lindor v. Green, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 06 5000420 (where court denied defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's statutory recklessness claim where the plaintiff alleged violations of two of the nine statutes enumerated in General Statutes § 14-295); Chung v. Place Motors, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 560074 (February 11, 2003, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 140) (where court denied defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' statutory recklessness claim where the plaintiffs alleged violations of three of the nine statutes enumerated in General Statutes § 14-295).

There is no compelling reason for the court to reach a different result in this case where the plaintiffs allege, in counts three and four of the complaint, violations of two of the nine statutes enumerated in General Statutes § 14-295. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege in paragraph eight of counts three and four that the collision and resulting injuries were "caused by the reckless and wanton misconduct of the defendant, T. Yahnima Bell, in that she violated . . . § 14-218a . . . [and] § 14-222 of the . . . General Statutes . . ." Accordingly, the defendants' motion to strike counts three and four of the complaint and the corresponding prayer for double or treble damages pursuant to § 14-295 is denied.

"In order to establish that the defendants' conduct was . . . reckless, . . . the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action . . . [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Elliott v. Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998).

"Although there is a difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, a complaint is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and reckless misconduct are being asserted . . . [A] brief reference to recklessness, contained within a count which otherwise is clearly limited to ordinary negligence is [not] sufficient to raise a claim of reckless and wanton misconduct. Simply using the word `reckless' or `recklessness' is not enough . . . Some additional factual allegations are necessary to alter the nature of the conduct complained of from an action for negligence to an action for wilful and wanton conduct . . . If the plaintiff merely reiterates the facts from the negligence count and inserts the word `reckless,' a motion to strike is properly granted . . . If, however, the factual allegations in the negligence count are detailed and specific enough to support a claim of recklessness, the motion to strike may be denied . . . To state a claim of recklessness . . . the [plaintiff] must allege facts demonstrating both egregious conduct and the requisite state of mind . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connolly v. Reels, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 05 4004013 (May 2, 2006, Hurley, J.T.R.).

In the present case, the plaintiffs allege in counts five and six, inter alia, that the defendant, T. Yahnima Bell, with conscious disregard for the safety of others, operated her vehicle in a reckless manner by driving at an excessive rate of speed and failing to stop at a stop sign at an intersection during a time of day when the road is heavily traveled by motorists (approximately 1:00 p.m.). While this alleged activity certainly involves negligence, this court does not find that CT Page 17430 these allegations are specific enough to demonstrate both the requisite state of mind and the egregious conduct needed to support a claim of common-law recklessness. See Pizarro v. Couture, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 05 5000374 (where court granted defendants' motion to strike common-law recklessness claim, ruling that plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to raise the claim to a level of common-law recklessness); Cf. Connolly v. Reels, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 05 4004013 (where court denied defendants' motion to strike common-law recklessness claim, ruling that plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate conduct that constituted an extreme departure from ordinary care, namely that defendant was operating a commercial dump truck on a heavily traveled road while he was so tired he was falling asleep at the wheel).

In the present case, since the facts alleged in counts five and six of the plaintiffs' complaint do not rise to the level of common-law recklessness, the plaintiffs have insufficiently pleaded those counts. As such, the defendants' motion to strike the fifth and sixth counts of the plaintiffs' complaint is granted.

For all the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to strike counts three and four of the complaint and the corresponding prayer for double or treble damages pursuant to § 14-295 is denied. The motion to strike counts five and six of the complaint is hereby granted. CT Page 17431