On December 9, 2002, a Family Court order of protection was entered against defendant requiring him, inter alia, to stay away from the complainant. The order stated that it would remain in effect until December 9, 2003. Following an incident on February 8, 2003, where the complainant alleged that defendant drove by a location where she was standing and stated to her, "I got you," defendant was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law § 215.50), which is committed when a person engages in "[i]ntentional disobedience or resistance to the lawful process or other mandate of a court except in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes as defined by subdivision two of section seven hundred fifty-three-a of the judiciary law." The charge was later reduced to attempted criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 215.50).
Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be given to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses ( see People v Gaimari, 176 NY 84, 94). The determination of the trier of fact should be accorded great weight on appeal, and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record ( see People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86, 88). Although there may have been some inconsistencies between the description of the incident by the complainant and by the other two prosecution witnesses, there was nothing so significant as would render the verdict against the weight of the evidence. Furthermore, the fact that the complainant had a volatile relationship with defendant did not make complainant's testimony incredible as a matter of law. Accordingly, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the trial court's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15).
With respect to defendant's argument that the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective because it failed to state that the crime did not arise out of a labor dispute, we note that in People v Santana ( 7 NY3d 234), the Court of Appeals held that the "labor disputes" clause of Penal Law § 215.50 (3) operates as a proviso which a defendant may raise in defense of the charge, rather than an exception which must be pleaded by the People in the accusatory instrument. Therefore, the People's failure to include that language in the accusatory instrument herein was not a jurisdictional defect.
Pesce, P.J., Golia and Rios, JJ., concur.