Ordered that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
"[T]he question of whether inspection work falls within the purview of Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) `must be deter-mined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the context of the work'" ( Nelson v Sweet Assoc, Inc., 15 AD3d 714, 715, quoting Prats v Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 100 NY2d 878, 883). Here, the plaintiff, an inspector for the New York City Department of Design and Construction, was a "covered" person under Labor Law § 241 (6) insofar as his inspections were essential, ongoing, and more than mere observation ( see Prats v Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., supra; England v Vacri Constr. Corp., 24 AD3d 1122; Campisi v Epos Contr. Corp., 299 AD2d 4, 7; Reisch v Amadori Constr. Co., 273 AD2d 855; Aubrecht v Acme Elec. Corp., 262 AD2d 994; cf. Martinez v City of New York, 93 NY2d 322).
Nevertheless, the defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that Industrial Code regulations 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) and (2) were inapplicable insofar as the plaintiff allegedly tripped on an object that was an integral part of the work being performed at the site of his accident ( see McDonagh v Victoria's Secret, Inc., 9 AD3d 395, 396-397; Castillo v Starrett City, 4 AD3d 320; Schroth v New York State Thruway Auth., 300 AD2d 1044; Harvey v Morse Diesel Intl., 299 AD2d 451, 453; Beltrone v City of New York, 299 AD2d 306; Alvia v Teman Elec. Contr., 287 AD2d 421; Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Furino v P O Ports, 24 AD3d 502).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.