MILLER, GRANT H., J.
This case arises from an incident which allegedly occurred on March 19, 2006. The plaintiffs allege that they were both injured when a dog owned by defendants Winston and Williams attacked their leashed dog while they were on their own property.
Defendant Peter Sztaba owns the apartment building where the co-defendants lived with their dog. This building is located in close proximity to the plaintiffs' residence. Plaintiffs have sued defendant Sztaba in four counts. The Third and Fourth Counts allege that Mr. Sztaba is liable to them under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-357. In the Fifth and Sixth Counts, plaintiffs allege that the attack was caused by Mr. Sztaba's negligence, because he had prior notice "of the vicious propensities of [the dog], and said dog being allowed to roam at large by via (sic) numerous complaints from neighbors as well as a previous event in which said dog killed a dog belonging to a neighbor." Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Sztaba was negligent in that he allowed the defendant tenants to keep the dog despite a lease provision prohibiting dogs and by failing to warn neighbors of the dog's propensities.
Defendant Sztaba has moved to strike all four counts against him.
The motion to strike is granted as to the Third and Fourth Counts. A landlord is not a "keeper" of a dog "merely because a tenant owns a dog and keeps the dog on the premises." Stokes v. Lyddy, 75 Conn.App. 252, 267 (2003); Buturla v. St. Onge, 9 Conn.App. 495, 498, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 803 (1997). The Third and Fourth Counts contain no allegations that Mr. Sztaba exercised sufficient control over the dog to make him a "keeper" within the meaning of § 22-357.
In Stokes v. Lyddy, supra, our Appellate Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of a landlord who was sued by a nontenant bitten by a tenant's dog, with the incident occurring away from the leased premises. Although the Stokes court made it clear that this particular claim was CT Page 21846 not viable, and that such claims are not favored, the decision ultimately turned on the finding that there were no issues of material fact raised, in response to the motion for summary judgment, which would warrant allowing that case to be resolved at trial. Stokes v. Lyddy, supra, 75 Conn.App. 252, 279.
The court obviously looks at motions to strike differently than it looks at motions for summary judgment. Here, plaintiffs have alleged that
[p]rior to said incident, the defendant, Peter S. Sztaba, was made aware of the vicious propensities of said pit bull terrier dog, and (sic) said dog being allowed to roam at large by via (sic) numerous complaints by neighbors as well as a previous event in which said dog killed a dog belonging to a neighbor. (Complaint, ¶ 8, Fifth Count, ¶ 10, Sixth Count.)
If plaintiffs can establish, through the discovery process, that Mr. Sztaba had actual or constructive notice of the dog's prior misconduct, then it is entirely conceivable that this case would survive a summary judgment motion. I find that plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient, specific facts so that Stokes v. Lyddy, supra, is not controlling for purposes of this motion to strike, and the motion to strike the Fifth and Sixth Counts is therefore denied. CT Page 21847