IN RE JOHNNY LEE W

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Docket Number

No. 26233.

Attorney(S)

Appellate Defender Eleanor Duffy Cleary, of Columbia, for appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, of Columbia; and Cecil Kelly Jackson, of Sumter, for respondent.

Judges

Justice MOORE:

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Johnny Lee W., a minor, was charged in January 2004 with disturbing school and threatening a public official. He filed a motion to quash the charge on constitutional grounds, challenging the statute as vague and overbroad, but the motion was denied. Later, in September 2004, appellant was charged with three counts of disturbing school for hitting students and again moved to quash on the same constitutional basis. He pled guilty to the disturbing school charges and no contest to threatening a public official. The trial court accepted the pleas, adjudicated appellant delinquent, and remanded him for evaluation. Subsequently, appellant was sentenced to commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice, with the sentence suspended and probation imposed for one year.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial judge erred by accepting appellant's guilty pleas conditioned on preserving the right to appeal the constitutionality of the disturbing school statute.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Appellant contended that his guilty pleas were invalid because they were conditional, preserving his right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged.

State's Arguments

The State conceded that appellant's pleas were conditional.
The State argued the issue was not preserved for review because appellant failed to raise it at disposition or move to withdraw his pleas, a contention the court found without merit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. Truesdale, 278 S.C. 368, 296 S.E.2d 528 (1982)	Conditional pleas are not recognized and disapproved in South Carolina; trial courts should reject pleas with conditions.	Supported the court's determination that the trial court erred in accepting conditional guilty pleas.
State v. Peppers, 346 S.C. 502, 552 S.E.2d 288 (2001)	A court cannot accept a guilty plea conditioned on the right to appeal the constitutionality of an indictment.	Reinforced the principle that conditional pleas are impermissible and invalidated appellant's conditional pleas.
State v. O'Leary, 302 S.C. 17, 393 S.E.2d 186 (1990)	A court cannot accept a guilty plea conditioned on the right to appeal the constitutionality of a statute.	Supported the court's ruling vacating the conditional guilty pleas.
In the Interest of Amir X.S., Op. No. 26219, 371 S.C. 380, 639 S.E.2d 144 (2006)	Held that the statute proscribing disturbing schools was not unconstitutional.	Referenced to affirm the constitutionality of the statute challenged by appellant.
State v. Peppers, 346 S.C. 502, 552 S.E.2d 288 (2001)	Conditional plea vacated despite no motion to withdraw plea.	Used to reject the State's argument about preservation of the issue.
State v. O'Leary, 302 S.C. 17, 393 S.E.2d 186 (1990)	Conditional plea vacated despite no motion to withdraw plea.	Also used to reject the State's preservation argument.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the nature of appellant's pleas, which were explicitly conditional upon preserving the right to appeal the constitutionality of the disturbing school statute. The court noted that South Carolina law does not recognize conditional guilty pleas and expressly disapproves of this practice, citing binding precedents. The trial court erred by accepting these conditional pleas. The court distinguished the conditional pleas from the other pleas entered by appellant, which were valid and not conditioned. Because appellant did not appeal his guilty plea to malicious injury to property and did not condition his no contest plea to threatening a public official, those pleas remain unaffected. However, the overall sentence was vacated because it combined all charges, including the invalid conditional pleas. The court remanded for resentencing and allowed appellant the option to re-plead without conditions or proceed to trial on the disturbing school charges.

Holding and Implications

The court's decision is VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.

The trial court's acceptance of appellant's conditional guilty pleas to disturbing school charges was erroneous and those pleas are vacated. The pleas to malicious injury to property and threatening a public official remain valid. Because the sentence was a combined sentence for all charges, it is vacated as well. On remand, the court may resentence appellant on the valid pleas and allow appellant to either re-plead without conditions to the disturbing school charges or proceed to trial on those charges. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing law prohibiting conditional pleas.

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In the Interest of JOHNNY LEE W., a minor under the age of seventeen,Appellant.

Justice MOORE:

In this appeal, we are asked whether the trial judge erred by accepting appellant's conditional guilty pleas. We vacate in part and remand.

FACTS

Appellant was charged with disturbing school and threatening a public official in January 2004. He filed a motion to quash the charge based on the unconstitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-420 (Supp. 2005), on the grounds it was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The motion was denied by Judge George McFaddin, Jr.

We recently held in the opinion of In the Interest of Amir X.S., Op. No. 26219, 371 S.C. 380, 639 S.E.2d 144, 2006 WL 3196260 (2006), that the statute was not unconstitutional.

Subsequently, appellant was charged with disturbing school in September 2004, by hitting two students, and disturbing school on the same date by hitting a third student. Appellant filed a motion to quash these two charges on the same constitutional grounds.

Appellant was also charged with malicious injury to property. He pled guilty and did not appeal that adjudication.

Appellant pled guilty to the three charges of disturbing schools. He entered a plea of no contest to the threatening a public official charge. Finding he was bound by Judge McFaddin's earlier ruling on the motion to quash, Judge R. Wright Turbeville found that the statute is not unconstitutional. Judge Turbeville adjudicated appellant a delinquent and accepted his pleas and remanded him to Reception and Evaluation for evaluation.

Appellant later appeared before Judge Turbeville for disposition and was sentenced to commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice for an indeterminate period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. The sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for one year.

ISSUE

Are appellant's guilty pleas invalid as conditional guilty pleas?

DISCUSSION

At the adjudicatory hearing, the following exchange occurred:

COUNSEL: . . . What I'm trying to do here is, in the interest of judicial economy and without putting the State to the task of a trial to prove that we engaged in conduct that would violate the statute if the statute were constitutional, is to simply stipulate to that, but continuing to maintain for and preserve our right to appeal.

THE COURT: To preserve your right to appeal Judge McFaddin's ruling.

COUNSEL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. The constitutionality of those statutes.

COUNSEL: That's the only thing we're trying to do today without having to take the court's time to hear conduct we essentially admit to, but just say that it's not illegal.

THE COURT: You stipulate to the fact that if that statute is constitutional, that his conduct violated it?

COUNSEL: Yes, sir.

Thereafter, Judge Turbeville accepted appellant's guilty pleas.

Appellant argues the judge erred by accepting his disturbing schools guilty pleas because they were conditioned on his right to appeal the issue of whether the statute proscribing disturbing schools is unconstitutional. The State conceded at oral argument that appellant's pleas were conditional.

The State argues, however, that the issue is not preserved (or review because appellant did not raise this issue at the later disposition hearing nor did he move to withdraw his pleas. This contention is without merit. See Stale v. Peppers, 346 S.C. 502, 552 S.E.2d 288 (2001) (conditional plea vacated although appellant had not moved to withdraw the plea); State v. O'Leary. 302 S.C. 17, 393 S.E.2d 186 (1990) (same).

A trial court may not accept a conditional plea. See State v. Truesdale, 278 S.C. 368, 296 S.E.2d 528 (1982) (conditional plea is a practice not recognized in South Carolina and a practice of which this Court expressly disapproves; if an accused attempts to attach any condition or qualification to a plea, the trial court should direct a plea of not guilty). See also State v. Peppers, 346 S.C. 502, 552 S.E.2d 288 (2001) (court could not accept guilty plea where appellant conditioned guilty plea upon right to appeal constitutionality of indictment); State v. O'Leary, 302 S.C. 17, 393 S.E.2d 186 (1990) (court could not accept guilty plea where appellant conditioned guilty plea upon right to appeal constitutionality of statute).

Accordingly, the trial court erred by accepting the conditional pleas to the charges of disturbing school and those pleas are vacated. Appellant argues that because all of his pleas were entered together and the sentence reflects a combination of the pleas, each of his pleas and sentence should be vacated. However, appellant did not appeal his guilty plea to malicious injury to property, therefore, that plea is unaffected by his entering conditional pleas to the disturbing school charges. Further, appellant's nolo contendere plea to threatening a public official was not entered as a conditional plea; therefore, it is not vacated.

Although there are two valid guilty pleas, appellant's sentence is vacated because it was a combination sentence for all of the charges against him. On remand, the court may resentence appellant on the charges of malicious injury to property and threatening a public official. If appellant chooses to re-plead to the disturbing schools charges without placing conditions on those pleas, then appellant may also be sentenced on those charges at that time, or he may choose to proceed to trial on those charges. Accordingly, the decision of the trial judge is

VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.

TOAL, C.J., WALLER, BURNETT and PLEICONES, JJ., concur.