RYA ZOBEL, District Judge
Plaintiffs Spectrum Health Systems, Inc. ("Spectrum") and John Doe ("Doe") bring this action against defendants, the Town of Weymouth (the "Town") and its building inspector, Jeffrey E. Richards ("Richards"), seeking temporary emergency injunctive relief granting Spectrum certain building permits to allow it to complete renovation and construction of property in Weymouth, Massachusetts. Defendants have informed Spectrum that it must obtain a special permit for the approval of less than the required amount of parking under the Town's zoning ordinances.
Spectrum has named as an additional plaintiff John Doe, a putative enrollee in its substance abuse program, discussedinfra.
I. Background
Spectrum is a nonprofit educational corporation that seeks to operate a residential substance abuse program called "Project Turnabout" at 861 Main Street in Weymouth, Massachusetts. Spectrum expects to operate the program pursuant to a contract with the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, which requires Spectrum to open the program by March 1, 2007. The Weymouth facility has 16,000 square feet, not all of which will be used at this stage, it will be staffed by 3-4 professionals and contain rooms housing thirty disabled residents, as well as a classroom and other educational facilities. As a condition of their enrollment in the program, the residents are not permitted to have cars. The facility currently has approximately thirty-two parking spaces.
Spectrum currently operates the program in Westborough, Massachusetts, but seeks to relocate to the facility in Weymouth.
Spectrum is in the process of renovating and constructing the new facility and expects to meet the Department of Public Health's March 1, 2007 deadline.
Apparently not entirely amenable to the project's new location, the Town of Weymouth's Building Inspector, Jeffrey Richards, informed Spectrum by letter dated October 23, 2006 that eighty parking spaces would be required under the Town ordinances and that Spectrum must obtain "a special permit . . . for the approval of the less than required amount of parking" under Town of Weymouth Zoning Ordinance § 120-74, Subsection (K). See Letter of Mr. Richards to Spectrum dated October 23, 2006, Farris Aff., Ex. A.
Apparently, Spectrum had been granted an initial building permit allowing it to commence renovation and/or construction of the facility. While it is not entirely clear from the record, Spectrum appears able to continue construction "while [the] parking issue is being reviewed." Farris Aff., Ex. D, Letter from Town Solicitor George Lane to Spectrum dated November 1, 2006 at 2. In any event, it does not appear from the record that a stop-work order has been issued by the Town.
Spectrum now seeks temporary emergency relief, which appears to amount to either a declaratory judgment or an order to grant the permit. In either event, the relief sought is dispositive of the entire case. Given the brief notice to defendants and the sparsity of the record, such a result is premature. Nonetheless, it may be helpful to rehearse the law.
II. Discussion
Here, plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits. Plaintiffs argue that they are not required to create additional parking spaces and that the Town's attempt to so require is pretextual, predicated on hostility to use of the property as a substance abuse facility. The Town denies this, and instead argues that more parking spaces are required and that plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief should be denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Plaintiffs allege that the Town's attempt to require Spectrum to create additional parking spaces violates federal antidiscrimination statutes, including the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq. Because I conclude that the Town's interpretation of Town Ordinance § 120-74 is erroneous, I need not decide the question of the Town's alleged improper motivation, if any, at this time.
In particular, defendants argue that plaintiffs should first be required to file an application to the Zoning Board of Appeals for an expedited hearing and decision.
The Town cites Town Zoning Ordinance § 120-74, Subsection (K) as the basis for its requirement that Spectrum create 80 parking spaces. That subsection states, in pertinent part:
Off-street parking spaces shall be provided in accordance with the following minimum requirements: (K) Offices: one space for each 200 square feet of gross floor area, excluding basement storage area.
Farris Aff. Ex. A (Town of Weymouth Zoning Ordinance § 120-74, Subsection (K)).
Significantly, Town Zoning Ordinance § 120-74 does not expressly regulate treatment facilities as such. The conclusion that the Weymouth facility — a treatment facility — is an "office" under subsection K is clearly arbitrary. See Zoning Ordinance § 120-74 Subsection (G) (requiring one space for each guest room in motels, hotels and lodging houses; Spectrum would be required to have 30 parking spaces; Subsection (J) (requiring one space for each two beds in nursing homes and rest homes; Spectrum would be required to have 15 parking spaces); and Subsection (M) (requiring one space for each employee for schools; and for day cares, one space for each employee, plus one space for each six clients of licensed capacity for day cares; requiring Spectrum to have 4 parking spaces and at least 10 parking spaces, respectively).
Moreover, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3 (the "Dover Amendment") expressly prohibits zoning ordinances or bylaws from "regulat[ing] or restrict[ing] the use of land or structures . . . for educational purposes on land owned or leased . . . by a nonprofit educational corporation." While courts have held that a municipality may adopt and apply "reasonable regulations" to land under the Dover Amendment, see Trustees of Tufts College v. Medford, 415 Mass. 753, 757 (1993), it is clear that the application of a facially inapplicable town ordinance here does not constitute the application of "reasonable regulations" contemplated by the Amendment.
The statute provides, in pertinent part: "No zoning ordinance or by-law . . . shall . . . regulate or restrict the use of land or structures for religious purposes or for educational purposes . . . by a nonprofit educational corporation; provided, however, that such land or structures may be subject to reasonable regulations concerning . . . parking and building coverage requirements." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 3 (1990 ed.).
Defendants cite Trustees of Tufts College v. Medford, 415 Mass. 753 (1993), for the proposition that it may require Spectrum to build additional spaces or obtain a special permit. In that case, Tufts brought an action challenging the application of, inter alia, parking requirements of a town zoning ordinance to several of its construction projects. The trial court held that the town ordinance could not be applied to Tufts, as an educational institution, under the Dover Amendment. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, and held that "the requirements of the local zoning law, if otherwise reasonable, would apply." Id. at 761. The SJC concluded that Tufts would be required to comply with the parking ordinance, requiring it to construct one parking space for each 750 square feet of new construction. Id. at 762. In that case, however, there was no question that the town ordinances in question (Medford Town Zoning Ordinances § 5.3, § 10.2 and § 10.24) applied to Tufts. Here, it is clear that the Weymouth Town Zoning Ordinance, § 120-74, Subsection (K) (pertaining to "offices"), is inapplicable to Spectrum.
In addition, Plaintiffs contend that in the absence of this court's grant of injunctive relief, Spectrum will not be able to complete work on the property in time to open the program at the Weymouth facility by March 1, 2007, and will therefore lose its contract with the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, causing it significant financial difficulties as well as harm to its enrollees.
The Town does not contest that Spectrum will lose its contract and thereby suffer perhaps irreparable harm, but instead suggests that Spectrum renegotiate its contract with the Department of Public Health or otherwise seek an extension. Spectrum is contractually obligated to open its program by March 1, 2007, and that, absent relief, it will be unable to do so.
Finally, the public interest is not adversely affected by the lack of additional and unnecessary parking spaces at the Weymouth facility, as there will be more than enough spaces. The property currently has 32 parking spaces; there will be 4 staff members; none of the enrollees is permitted to have a car and visitors are infrequent. In addition, the public interest weighs in favor of allowing substance abuse programs to operate. Moreover, I noted that the public has a strong interest in the non-arbitrary enforcement of local law.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, plaintiffs appear likely to prevail on the merits. Given that the relief plaintiff requests is dispositive of the merits in this case, and that plaintiff is apparently able to continue its construction, it is not appropriate to grant emergency injunctive relief. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendant shall inform the court and counsel within five days of this decision whether it is inclined to continue to insist that Spectrum obtain a special permit to build with fewer than the required number of parking spaces. If it so chooses, then the court will establish a schedule for speedy resolution of the case on the merits. In the interim the motion for emergency injunctive relief is denied without prejudice.