Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
CPLR 3216 is "extremely forgiving" ( Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 499, 503) in that it "never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiffs action based on the plaintiff's unreasonable neglect to proceed" ( Davis v Goodsell, 6 AD3d 382, 383; see CPLR 3216 [a], [e]; Di Simone v Good Samaritan Hosp., 100 NY2d 632, 633; Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., supra at 504-505; Goldblum v Franklin Munson Fire Dist., 27 AD3d 694). While the statute prohibits the Supreme Court from dismissing an action based on neglect to proceed whenever the plaintiff has shown a justifiable excuse for the delay in the prosecution of the action and a meritorious cause of action ( see CPLR 3216 [e]; Di Simone v Good Samaritan Hosp., supra), such a dual showing is not strictly necessary to avoid dismissal of the action ( see Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., supra at 503-505; Davis v Goodsell, supra at 383-384).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in excusing the plaintiff's failure to comply with the 90-day notice, since, inter alia, the plaintiff did not intend to abandon her action and the appellants demanded additional discovery subsequent to the filing of the 90-day demand ( see Goldblum v Franklin Munson Fire Dist., supra; Davis v Goodsell, supra at 384; Matter of Simmons v McSimmons, Inc., 261 AD2d 547; Markarian v Hundert, 180 AD2d 780; Martinisi v Cornwall Hosp., Ill AD2d 549 [1991]).