Ordered that the appeal from the order of October 19, 2004 is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents, appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action ( see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248). The issue raised on the appeal from the order is brought up for review and has been considered on the appeal from the judgment ( see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
The appellant never argued in the Supreme Court that its agreement with Cammarasana Bilello, Esqs. (hereinafter the agreement), entitled it to 25% of the total legal fees in connection with representation of Gabriel Barrios and Jorge Lema. Instead, the appellant asked the Supreme Court to apportion fees on a quantum meruit basis, rather than based upon the agreement. Thus, the appellant failed to preserve for appellate review its sole claim on appeal that it was entitled to 25% of the total legal fees under the agreement ( see Hildreth-Henry v Henry, 27 AD3d 419, 420; Gomez v Bicknell, 302 AD2d 107, 115; Miller v Village of Wappingers Falls, 289 AD2d 209, 210).
In any event, the Supreme Court properly declined to fix the fee on the basis of quantum meruit because the appellant had not elected that manner of compensation when it was discharged ( see Matter of Cohen v Grainger, Tesoriero Bell, 81 NY2d 655, 659-660; cf. Connelly v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 292 AD2d 332, 333). In addition, the appellant's current claim in which it seeks to bind law firms that were not parties to its arrangement with Cammarasana Bilello, Esqs., is without merit ( see Schapiro v Madera, 243 AD 637, 637-638; see also Black Car Livery Ins., Inc. v HW Brokerage, Inc., 28 AD3d 595, 595-596).