Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The compliance conference order dated September 25, 2003 directing the plaintiff to file a note of issue on or before January 21, 2004 and warning that failure to comply would result in the dismissal of the action had the same effect as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 ( see Hoffman v Kessler, 28 AD3d 718; CS Realty, Inc. v Soloff, 22 AD3d 515; Vinikour v Jamaica Hosp., 2 AD3d 518). The order was signed by counsel for both parties. The plaintiff failed to comply with this order either by timely serving and filing a note of issue or by moving to extend the period for doing so, and the action was properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216 ( see Hoffman v Kessler, supra).
To vacate the dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3216, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default and a meritorious cause of action ( see Betty v City of New York, 12 AD3d 472, 473; Wechsler v First Unum Life Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 340, 341). While the court may accept law office failure that is not willful or deliberate as a reasonable excuse ( see Reyes v Ross, 289 AD2d 554; Flomenhaft v Baron, 281 AD2d 389), conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions of law office failure are insufficient ( see Werbin v Locicero, 287 AD2d 617), and a pattern of willful default and neglect will not be excused ( see Wechsler v First Unum Life Ins. Co., supra at 341; Wynne v Wagner, 262 AD2d 556; Campenni v Ridgecroft Estates Owners, 261 AD2d 496).
The plaintiff failed to demonstrate what steps, if any, he took to conduct further discovery during the four-month period before the January 21, 2004 deadline for filing a note of issue. The assertion by the plaintiff's attorney that the delay in conducting discovery was due to a calendar error did not adequately explain his failure to conduct further discovery or his over one-year delay in moving to vacate the default ( see Wechsler v First Unum Life Ins. Co., supra; Williams v Pratt Inst., 212 AD2d 692). Furthermore, the excuses proffered by the plaintiff's attorney for the first time in reply were not properly before the court ( see CPLR 2214; Parkin v Ederer, 27 AD3d 633). Accordingly, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion, inter alia, in effect, to vacate the dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3216.