Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt of assault in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt because, inter alia, the complainant did not sustain a "physical injury" within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00 (9). However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the jury's finding of physical injury ( see People v Terrero, 31 AD3d 672, lv denied 7 NY3d 852; People v Rambali, 27 AD3d 582; People v Clarke, 250 AD2d 619; People v Belk, 241 AD2d 552). Viewed in this light, we also find that the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant used a dangerous instrument during the incident ( see Penal Law § 10.00; People v Millett, 26 AD3d 345; People v Hallums, 157 AD2d 800, 801). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15).
The defendant's claim that the jury's verdict was repugnant since the jury convicted him of assault in the second degree while acquitting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees is unpreserved for appellate review, as he failed to raise this issue before the discharge of the jury ( see People v Satloff, 56 NY2d 745, 746; People v Bennette, 23 AD3d 489; People v Salazar, 16 AD3d 439). In any event, viewing the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury ( see People v Tucker, 55 NY2d 1, 7), the verdict was not repugnant since the acquittal on the counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees did not negate any of the elements of assault in the second degree ( see People v Cruz, 175 AD2d 212; People v Hudson, 163 AD2d 418; People v Garcia, 72 AD2d 356, 361, affd 52 NY2d 716).