Quan Le Huynh appeals the district court's denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. We omit a summary of the relevant facts as they are known by the parties.
Huynh argues that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on involuntary manslaughter deprived him of due process. We disagree. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), we cannot grant Huynh's habeas petition "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits" in the California state court proceedings unless the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Although the Supreme Court in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980), held that the Due Process Clause entitles a defendant to an instruction on a lesser-included offense in a capital case, there is no "clearly established" Supreme Court law that requires giving a lesser-included offense instruction on involuntary manslaughter in a non-capital case. See Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000); Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 819 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Thus, we cannot say that the California Court of Appeal "`unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'" We are foreclosed from granting habeas relief on this claim.
Huynh argues the trial court also violated his right to due process when it permitted the prosecution to cross-examine a witness about his knowledge of Huynh's prior convictions. Again, we disagree. "We have no authority to review alleged violations of a state's evidentiary rules in a federal habeas proceeding." Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). We may only consider "whether the admission of evidence rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process." Id. "[A] trial court's ruling does not violate due process unless the evidence is `of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.'" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The California Court of Appeal upheld the admission of evidence of Huynh's prior convictions, finding it relevant to the witness's credibility. More significantly, any prejudicial value the evidence may have had was undermined by Huynh's detailed testimony regarding the circumstances of his prior criminal activity. The admission of this evidence was not so prejudicial as to have denied Huynh a fair trial, and he is not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim.
AFFIRMED.