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Moses Pimental's Case — Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (May 19, 1920)

Factual and Procedural Background

The employee, Moses Pimental, was a cigar maker who had worked at his trade continually for fourteen or fifteen years. Early in 1918 he began to experience pain in the region at the back of his neck. In February or March of 1919 he consulted a physician who diagnosed "occupational neurosis." On May 2, 1919, he ceased working because of his condition.

The Industrial Accident Board found that the employee's neuralgic pain was induced by muscular action in rolling cigars for a number of years, concluded that this precipitated a personal injury which totally incapacitated him for work, and awarded compensation of $14 per week.

The insurer appealed the Board's decision. The appeal was heard in the Superior Court (Wait, J.), where a decree was entered in accordance with the Board's decision. The insurer then appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Counsel of record: G. Gleason for the insurer; P. L. Keenan for the employee. The opinion was delivered by Justice Crosby, with Rugg, C.J., and Braley, Pierce, and Jenney, JJ., present.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the employee's neuralgic pain "arose out of and in the course of" his employment so as to constitute a compensable personal injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act (St. 1911, c. 751, Part II, § 1).
  2. Whether an occupational disease (or a neuralgic condition attributed to posture and repetitive movement) qualifies as a "personal injury" compensable under the statute, or whether the Act excludes disease insofar as the employee's condition is characterized as disease rather than a discrete personal injury.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57 That a neurosis of the nerves supplying certain muscles resulting from posture causing pressure on the brachial plexus has not been held to be a personal injury; guidance on limits of compensable "personal injury." The Court held this case similar in many respects and governed by Maggelet's Case; relied on its principle to conclude that the employee's neuralgic pain could not be regarded as a personal injury arising from the employment.
McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497 Used to support the proposition that a condition arising during the course of employment cannot necessarily be found to have arisen from it (distinguishing disease/condition not peculiar to the employment). Cited for the reasonable inference that the neuralgic pain was not due to the occupation but to faulty posture from long work and would have been equally likely in other employments.
Donahue's Case, 226 Mass. 595 Similarly used to support the distinction between a condition arising during employment and one arising from employment. Used alongside McNicol to support the Court's conclusion that the condition, though arising during the course of employment, did not arise from it for purposes of compensation.
Hurle's Case, 217 Mass. 223 Example of cases where there was evidence of poisoning arising from work and thus treated as personal injury (poisoning regarded as in the nature of a personal injury). The Court distinguished those poisoning cases from the present case, explaining that their doctrine does not apply here and limiting those decisions to their facts.
Johnson's Case, 217 Mass. 388 Another poisoning case; cited for the proposition that poisoning may be in the nature of a personal injury but limited to the facts of that case. The Court stated Johnson's language is to be limited to its precise facts and is not authority supporting the employee's position here.
Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98 Also cited among poisoning/poisoning-like cases regarded as personal injuries. Distinguished from the instant case; the Court declined to extend the doctrine of those cases to encompass posture-induced neuralgic pain.
H. P. Hood Sons v. Maryland Casualty Co., 206 Mass. 223 Noted as authority that poisoning has generally been regarded as in the nature of a personal injury. Referenced to acknowledge the established view of poisoning cases, but the Court emphasized that those precedents do not justify extending compensation to the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded through these principal steps, based on the evidence and prior law as presented in the opinion:

  1. Review of factual findings and expert testimony:
    • The impartial physician (William J. Daly) described multiple anatomical and postural abnormalities (undeveloped left side, shortened left leg, sinuses from old pus processes, faulty posture in standing and sitting, distortion of the spinal column, malformation of the thoracic bone cage) that produced bony pressure on spinal nerves.
    • Daly testified that muscular loading incident to the rolling movements in cigar making brought about neuralgic pain more quickly than other occupations would have, and that the rolling movements were the movements which brought about the pain. He also testified that any sitting occupation could contribute to the brachial pain and that the condition could result independently of any particular occupation.
    • Another physician testified that he did not see how the occupation could produce the condition, described the condition as involving skin sensation and suggested a mental component rather than muscular injury.
  2. Evaluation of the Board's findings:
    • A single member and the Industrial Accident Board had found that the muscular action in rolling cigars for a number of years precipitated the neuralgic pain and constituted a personal injury that totally incapacitated the employee.
    • The Court acknowledged these factual findings but assessed them against the expert testimony the Board relied upon and the applicable legal standards set by prior cases.
  3. Application of legal standards and precedents:
    • The Court deemed this case similar to Maggelet's Case and followed its holding: neurosis or neuralgic conditions arising from posture and not clearly a distinct traumatic personal injury are not necessarily compensable as personal injuries under the statute.
    • Because the impartial physician himself testified that the condition could have resulted from any sitting or standing occupation or independently of occupation, the Court concluded the pain was not a "reasonably necessary result" of this employment nor a "personal injury peculiar to it."
    • The Court found insufficient evidence to establish that the employee had neurosis (an occupational disease) or another disease attributable specifically to the employment, and cited McNicol's and Donahue's Cases for the proposition that a condition arising during employment is not necessarily caused by it.
  4. Distinction from poisoning and similar cases:
    • The Court contrasted the present case with prior decisions (Hurle's, Johnson's, Doherty's, and H. P. Hood Sons) where poisoning arising from work was treated as personal injury; it explained that those cases rest on different facts and cannot be extended to posture-induced neuralgic pain.
    • The Johnson opinion's language was explicitly limited to its own facts and not applicable to expand the Act's scope here.
  5. Statutory construction point:
    • The Court noted that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be construed liberally but cautioned against extending it beyond reasonable interpretation. It observed that the Act, in terms and by reference to St. 1913, c. 813, § 12, does not in terms include "disease" as such, and stated that pain is not disease, nor is disease resulting in pain per se a personal injury under the statute.
  6. Conclusion of analysis:
    • Given the impartial physician's testimony that the condition could arise from other occupations or independently, the Court concluded the neuralgic pain could not be found to have arisen from the employment in the requisite legal sense, and therefore the Board's award was not sustainble.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The decree in favor of the employee was reversed, and a decree was entered in favor of the insurer.

Implications (as discussed by the Court):

  • The direct legal effect is that the employee is not entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the neuralgic pain at issue on the evidence before the Court; the insurer prevails.
  • The Court reaffirmed that conditions attributable to posture or conditions that could arise independently of a particular employment are not necessarily compensable as "personal injuries" under the statute. The Court distinguished occupational poisoning (which prior cases have treated as a personal injury) from posture-induced neuralgic pain and declined to extend the Act to the latter.
  • The opinion emphasizes that, while the Act should be liberally construed, it should not be extended beyond cases reasonably within its scope; the Court did not treat the decision as establishing a novel expansion of the statute.

Disposition: "So ordered." The decree was reversed and judgment entered for the insurer.

MOSES PIMENTAL'S CASE.

Workmen's Compesation Act, Injuries to which act applies. Proximate Cause.

Incapacity of a cigar maker, caused by neuralgic pain which, in a proceeding under the workmen's compensation act, an impartial physician testified was likely to be caused by any other occupation and could result independently of any occupation or from any sitting or standing occupation, and which, upon evidence including that of the impartial physician, the Industrial Accident Board found was induced by muscular action in rolling cigars, while it properly may be found to have arisen during the course of the employee's employment, cannot be found to have arisen from it in such a sense as to entitle him to compensation under the workmen's compensation act.

An occupational disease is not a personal injury, arising out of and in the course of employment, compensation for which may be awarded under St. 1911, c. 751, Part II, § 1.

CROSBY, J.

The employee is a cigar maker and worked continually at his trade for fourteen or fifteen years. Early in the year 1918 he began to have pain in the region of the back of his neck, and in February or March, 1919, he consulted a physician who told him that he had occupational neurosis. On May 2, 1919, he was obliged to give up his work.

William J. Daly, the impartial physician, testified that the employee had "an undeveloped left side; a shortened left leg with sinuses from old pus processes about the left buttock and the anterior surface of the hip; . . . faulty posture both in standing and sitting; . . . distortion of the spinal column . . . [the result] of faulty posture, and . . . a malformation of the thoracic bone cage;" that "all this distortion and malformation had the effect of producing bony pressure on the spinal nerves . . . so that when the loading upon this region, incident upon muscular action in rolling cigars, took place, after a number of years, it produced neuralgic pain. . . . In consequence of his working and using the movements he did his work as a cigar maker was a certain consequence of causing his condition. In the first place, he sits faulty; his left buttock being undeveloped, his left pelvis sags. He does not sit evenly on the buttocks. In that way he crowds the vertebra unevenly in the other parts of the spine, so that any sitting occupation could contribute to the brachial pain. . . . In a man with no asymmetry, who was in a fair state of nutrition, this condition probably never would develop. . . . The particular movements which produce this condition are the rolling process at the end of the making of a cigar, whereby a weight of the forearm, arm, and some of the shoulder and shoulder girdle are brought down upon the cigar in order to make a firm wrapper." He further testified he "was of the opinion that if the employee had a sitting down job where there was no muscular loading or tension, as in the rolling process, he might have supported the condition of his spine for years longer without trouble. He believed that the upset factor in the thing was the muscular tension and the loading incidental upon the rolling movements; . . . that the employee's condition would come on or did come on quicker because he rolled cigars than it would have had he worked at any other sitting down occupation. . . . He thought that the rolling movements are the movements which brought about the pain. . . . This employee has not neuritis." Further, "He thought that if the employee assumed a different posture by putting a pad under his left hip, and by raising the table at which he worked, he would go along 'all right.' " "In his opinion, any sitting occupation is likely to cause the neuralgic pain which this employee experienced in the region of his neck. If he sat for eight hours a day in his home reading a book 'with his hip in that position, in any position,' he would be likely to have the same sort of a pressure in that brachial region as he had while sitting at work. If he sat in a chair at his home over a period of fourteen years, reading a book every day, he might get from that the neuralgic pain which he experienced in March of 1919."

Another physician testified that he had examined the employee and that "he did not see how his occupation could produce his condition. This employee's occupation involved chiefly the use of his arms, and his arms were free from all trouble. . . . This employee's condition is not in the muscles; it is in the skin, as far as he could determine . . . that occupational neurosis is due to the action of muscles used in the occupation. . . . He was of the opinion that there was a mental situation in this case. . . . He attributed this employee's condition to a combination of a mental attitude and a skin sensation."

The single member found that "while there was an underlying and pre-existing condition, following hip disease, it was the muscular action in rolling cigars for a number of years which precipitated the neuralgic pain and brought into being the personal injury which totally incapacitated the employee for work;" and that "Finally, as a result of the effect of the muscular movements required by his employment in making cigars, acting upon his particular condition of health, neuralgic pain, a personal injury under this act, developed. The employee's total incapacity for work is due to that personal injury and will continue for a period which is not now determinable." He also found that the employee was entitled to compensation under the act. On the same evidence the Industrial Accident Board adopted the findings and rulings of the single member.

The case at bar is similar in many respects to Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, and is governed by it. While the board found that the neuralgic pain was induced by muscular action in rolling cigars for a number of years, the impartial physician testified that any other occupation was likely to cause the pain from which the employee suffered, and that this condition could result independently of any occupation, and could come from any sitting or standing occupation; in view of this, together with all the other evidence, we are of opinion that the pain could not have been found to have been a reasonably necessary result of the employment, and cannot be said to have been a personal injury peculiar to it.

We are also of opinion that there was no sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the employee had neurosis, — a disease with which cigar makers are sometimes afflicted, — and the impartial physician so testified; nor is there evidence that he had any disease, the reasonable inference being that the neuralgic pain was not due to his occupation but was rather the result of faulty posture brought about by long and laborious work, a condition which would have been equally liable to arise in whatever employment he might have been engaged, or if not employed at all. McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497. Donahue's Case, 226 Mass. 595. Although the condition arose during the course of the employment, it cannot be found to have arisen from it. "A nervous condition dependent upon poor posture of the body in our opinion does not constitute a commonly known and well recognized personal injury consequent upon employment. . . . But personal injury and disease are not synonymous. They are different in meaning. One does not include the other." Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 61, 62.

If it could be held that the employee was suffering from an occupational disease, still the workmen's compensation act does not in terms include disease. See St. 1913, c. 813, § 12. It cannot be held to cover disease contracted by employees in the course of and arising out of their employment. Pain is not disease, nor is disease resulting in pain a personal injury.

In Hurle's Case, 217 Mass. 223, Johnson's Case, 217 Mass. 388, and Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98, there was evidence that the employee was suffering from poisoning arising from the performance of his work. Poisoning has generally been regarded as in the nature of a personal injury, H. P. Hood Sons v. Maryland Casualty Co. 206 Mass. 223, but the doctrine of those cases which dealt with disabilities in the nature of personal injuries cannot be held to apply to the present case. The language in the opinion in Johnson's Case, supra, is to be limited to the precise facts in that case and is not an authority in favor of the contention of the employee in the case at bar.

While the act should be construed liberally, it should not be extended to cases which cannot reasonably be interpreted as within its scope. The statement in Maggelet's Case, supra, at page 61, that "No case has gone so far as to hold that a 'neurosis of the nerves' supplying certain muscles, resulting from a posture which causes the employee 'to bend forward with shoulders forward' so as to induce 'pressure on the brachial plexus' is a. personal injury," applies in principle to the case at bar, although the employee is not suffering from neurosis, and notwithstanding the finding of the board that as a result of the muscular movements required in rolling cigars acting upon his particular condition, neuralgic pain developed.

It follows that the decree must be reversed and a decree entered in favor of the insurer.

So ordered.

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PIMENTAL'S CASE
(May 19, 1920)