Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, his waiver of his right to counsel was unequivocal, and was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made ( see People v Providence, 2 NY3d 579; People v Savage, 29 AD3d 1022). The trial court undertook a sufficiently searching inquiry of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right to counsel were impressed upon him ( see People v Providence, supra; People v Savage, supra).
The defendant's claim that the judge who presided at his trial and sentencing should have recused herself is without merit. Since no basis for disqualification pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14 was presented, it was up to the conscience and discretion of the judge to decide whether or not to recuse herself ( see People v Daly, 20 AD3d 542; People v Hines, 260 AD2d 646). Based upon the record before us, we conclude that the judge properly declined to recuse herself.
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.