Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly determined that the defendants made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident ( see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345, 350; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957; Kearse v New York City Tr. Auth., 16 AD3d 45, 46). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury. The affirmation of the plaintiff's treating physician was without probative value in opposing the defendants' cross motion as it did not meet the requirements of CPLR 2106 ( see Liao v Festa, 18 AD3d 448, 449; Mezentseff v Ming Yat Lau, 284 AD2d 379, 379-380). The remaining medical submissions of the plaintiff, which amounted to unaffirmed reports of other medical personnel who treated the plaintiff, were equally without probative value ( see Hernandez v Taub, 19 AD3d 368; cf. Bycinthe v Kombos, 29 AD3d 845, 845). In the absence of objective evidence of injury, the plaintiff's self-serving affidavit was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury as a result of the subject accident ( see Ramirez v Parache, 31 AD3d 415, 416; Fisher v Williams, 289 AD2d 288, 289).
The plaintiff's remaining contention has been rendered academic in light of our determination.