Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The determination of a motion for leave to voluntarily discontinue an action without prejudice pursuant to CPLR 3217 (b) rests within the sound discretion of the court ( see Tucker v Tucker, 55 NY2d 378, 383). In the absence of special circumstances, such as prejudice to a substantial right of the defendant, or other improper consequences, a motion for a voluntary discontinuance should be granted ( see Mathias v Daily News, 301 AD2d 503; Urbonowicz v Yarinsky, 290 AD2d 922, 923; Great W. Bank v Terio, 200 AD2d 608). Additionally, it is within the court's discretion to allow a plaintiff to voluntarily discontinue an action in one venue to enable him or her to commence a second action for the same relief in another venue ( see Carter v Howland Hook Hous. Co., Inc., 19 AD3d 146; Urbonowicz v Yarinsky, supra; Ruderman v Brunn, 65 AD2d 771). As there was no showing of prejudice to the appellant, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion ( see Citibank v Nagrotsky, 239 AD2d 456).