Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the appellant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability in action No. 1 is granted.
These actions arise out of a two-vehicle collision involving a vehicle operated by Marlene Campbell, the plaintiff in action No. 1, in which Mary Denton, the plaintiff in action No. 2, was a passenger, and a police car operated by Police Officer Mark Buono, a defendant in action No. 1.
"A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle" ( Ayach v Ghazal, 25 AD3d 742, 743, quoting Russ v Investech Sec, 6 AD3d 602) and imposes a duty on that operator to provide a non-negligent explanation for the collision ( see Carhuayano v JR Hacking, 28 AD3d 413; Ayach v Ghazal, supra; Briceno v Milbry, 16 AD3d 448; Niyazov v Bradford, 13 AD3d 501; Russ v Investech Sec, supra; Chepel v Meyers, 306 AD2d 235; Leal v Wolff, 224 AD2d 392).
Campbell submitted evidence that her vehicle was stopped at the time it was struck in the rear by the police vehicle, establishing a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. In response, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). "A claim that the driver of the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence" ( Ayach v Ghazal, supra at 743 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Belitsis v Airborne Express Frgt. Corp., 306 AD2d 507; Dickie v Pei Xiang Shi, 304 AD2d 786). Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying Campbell's motion in action No. 1 for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants in that action.