WALTER SHAPERO, Bankruptcy Judge
Virginia Kozlowski ("Movant") has filed a motion on February 28, 2007, requesting a clarification of this Court's Opinion and Order of February 15, 2007 ("February 15, 2007 Opinion"), on Motions to (1) Reconsider; (2) Vacate/Set Aside and Award Sanctions; and (3) to hold Debtor and Jackson National Life Insurance in contempt ("Miscellaneous Motions"). The history and contextual framework of what is at issue is amply set forth in the February 15, 2007 Opinion. The Miscellaneous Motions were directed to, and revolved around, this Court's Order of June 23, 2006 ("Underlying Order"), which supplemented an earlier order of this Court of June 2, 2006, awarding fees to Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.
The Underlying Order supplemented the earlier fee award order, by the addition of the following language:
A sum of $11,000 shall be paid to the Applicant from the Debtor's available share of the proceeds of the sales of the Citrus Springs property, and the balance shall be paid by withdrawing said sum from the cash value of Jackson National Life Insurance policy #003-894-7970, or any other existing policy with sufficient cash.
The bankruptcy case had been dismissed on or about March 3, 2006, and Kozlowski, who was Debtor's primary creditor and adversary in the bankruptcy proceedings soon thereafter sought and obtained the appointment of a state court receiver over the property of the Debtor. In April and May 2006 prior to the entry of the Underlying Order, the state court allegedly entered orders relating to the Debtor's insurance policies and liens on those policies and possibly other matters.
Regardless of the exact nature or content of the state court's actions or orders, the quoted language in the Underlying Order of this Court was apparently seen as being somehow at odds with some of those state court actions, and as such some sort of impediment to the state court receiver's efforts to sell Debtor's real estate and/or realize the value of the insurance policies, presumably including the referred to Citrus Springs property and insurance policies. As one way of dealing with that state of affairs, the Miscellaneous Motions were filed in this Court seeking to essentially vacate or set aside the Underlying Order on various grounds and to obtain incidental other relief. By its February 15, 2007 Opinion, this Court denied all of the Miscellaneous Motions thus in effect leaving the Underlying Order in effect.
Meanwhile, it appears the state court receiver asked that court to approve sales of certain property of the Debtor. The state court, having been apprised of the February 15, 2007 Opinion of this Court, stated in essence that until he was advised otherwise, he was deferring action on the sales approvals, because his interpretation of the February 15, 2007 Opinion created the possibility that this Court was somehow thereby assuming jurisdiction over Debtor's property, thus possibly precluding or adversely affecting the state court's ability to act with reference thereto and/or creating a conflict between the two courts. Hence, Kozlowski's motion asking this Court to clarify and state that by its February 15, 2007 Opinion it was not seeking to exercise any jurisdiction over Debtor's property. Since what is sought is a clarification of what this Court said or meant, this Court decided that neither a hearing nor responsive pleadings were needed or appropriate.
First of all, it should be noted that the Underlying Order dealt with and covered only the property specifically referred to therein. Thus, in the case of any realty, that would involve only the Citrus Grove property. So it is hard to see how there can be any controversy over any sales of any realty other than that specifically named property insofar as the reach of that Order is concerned. Second, and more importantly, the specific language, meaning and effect, and this Court's intent, of the February 15, 2007 Opinion, was in essence to merely and only deny the motions to set aside or vacate the Underlying Order. That was all that was before this Court and that is what it acted upon, and it was not the intention (nor is it the desire) of this Court to somehow thereby assume "jursidiction" over any property of the Debtor. Whether or not it even could in light of the dismissal of the bankruptcy case is both problematic and not before this court in any event. This Court did clearly have jurisdiction over the fee matters it ruled upon after the dismissal of the bankruptcy case and specifically so ruled in its February 15, 2007 Opinion. That the effect of that Opinion is that the Underlying Order still stands does not mean that this Court thereby assumed any jurisdiction over either the property specified in that order, or indeed any other property of the Debtor. This Court did not mean, say, or intend that, and it should not be inferred. That February 15, 2007 Opinion says what it says, no more and no less. What rights, if any, to or in, any of Debtor's property, the Underlying Order (or any actions that Debtor's bankruptcy counsel might have taken pursuant thereto) gave to Debtor's bankruptcy counsel, or, how any such affects or interacts with whatever else is or was going on in the state court is up to that state court to decide and its appropriately invoked appellate process to review.
As a practical matter, it would appear that the core dispute is who is entitled to the proceeds of the sale or disposition of the property covered by the Underlying Order. In the Bankruptcy Court, at least, that kind of issue is normally and permissibly dealt with by way of allowing the sale or disposition to take place and transferring the conflicting claims in the property to the sale or disposition proceeds for later determination.
Movant shall present an order consistent with this opinion.