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Docket Number

No. (AC 26720).

Attorney(S)

Renee C. Redman, with whom, on the brief, were Jennifer C. Vickery, Lenora M. Lapidus, pro hac vice, and Emily J. Martin, pro hac vice, for the appellant (plaintiff). Richard D. Haviland, for the appellee (defendant).

Acts

The Public Health And Welfare — Civil Rights — Public Accommodations — Prohibition Against Discrimination Or Segregation In Places Of Public Accommodation

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Sam Corcoran v. German Social Society Frohsinn, Inc., No. AC 26720 (Conn. App. Ct. Mar. 6, 2007)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Sam Corcoran, alleged that the defendant, German Social Society Frohsinn, Inc., denied her membership on the basis of her gender. She filed an administrative complaint with Connecticut's Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities on July 6, 2000, alleging that the defendant was a "public accommodation" and that its refusal to admit women as members violated General Statutes § 46a-64. After obtaining a release of jurisdiction from the commission in June 2002, the plaintiff commenced the present litigation under General Statutes § 46a-100. The operative complaint pleaded two counts under § 46a-64 (addressing different time periods), seeking an injunction to require the defendant to admit her as a member and damages.

A court trial was held in February 2005. In a memorandum of decision dated June 1, 2005, the trial court concluded that the defendant was not a public accommodation within the meaning of § 46a-64 (a) and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard in determining whether the defendant was a "place of public accommodation" under General Statutes § 46a-64 (a).
Whether the trial court's finding as to the defendant's selectivity of membership was clearly erroneous. (Note: this claim was not decided by the Appellate Court because the first issue was dispositive.)

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff)

The trial court improperly applied a test developed in federal case law (specifically the test used in United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, which interprets 42 U.S.C. § 2000a) rather than the test articulated by the Connecticut Supreme Court in interpreting § 46a-64.
The plaintiff also contended (briefly) that the issue of freedom of intimate association was not relevant and was not properly before the court; she conceded the trial court did not analyze that issue and the Appellate Court treated the contention as abandoned.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the defendant's specific legal arguments in opposition beyond the trial court's conclusion that the defendant was not a public accommodation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287 (1987)	Articulates Connecticut Supreme Court's test for whether an entity is a "public accommodation" under § 46a-64: coverage depends on "the extent to which a particular establishment has maintained a private relationship with its own constituency or a general relationship with the public at large" and that "once such an organization has determined to eschew selectivity... it may not discriminate among the general public."	The Appellate Court held that the Quinnipiac Council definition is the clearly applicable state-law test and that the trial court should have applied this test in determining whether the defendant was a public accommodation under § 46a-64 (a).
United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1990)	Provides a multi-factor test used in federal cases (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a and the "private club" exemption) to evaluate whether an organization is effectively private: factors include genuine selectivity of membership, membership control over operations, history, use of facilities by nonmembers, purpose, advertising for members, profit/nonprofit status, and formalities (bylaws, meetings, membership cards).	The Appellate Court concluded the trial court improperly relied solely on the Lansdowne test (a federal framework) rather than applying the Quinnipiac Council state-law test. The court held Lansdowne factors may be considered only insofar as they illuminate whether an establishment has "determined to eschew selectivity" or has a private relationship vs. a general relationship with the public.
Hartford Courant Co. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 261 Conn. 86 (2002)	States that review of whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard is plenary.	The Appellate Court invoked this precedent to state that its review of the legal standard applied by the trial court was plenary.
Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148 (1998)	Example of Connecticut appellate courts looking to federal law for guidance when construing state antidiscrimination statutes analogous to federal counterparts.	The Appellate Court cited Brittell to acknowledge that federal jurisprudence can be persuasive but cautioned that state law can be broader and that federal law does not necessarily define the bounds of state antidiscrimination protection.
Zlokower v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 200 Conn. 261 (1986)	Another example where Connecticut courts consulted federal law in interpreting state antidiscrimination statutes (fair housing context).	Used to support the proposition that federal law may inform but does not control state statutory interpretation.
Commission on Human Rights Opportunities v. Savin Rock Condominium Assn., Inc., 273 Conn. 373 (2005)	Explains that federal law can define the beginning, not the end, of Connecticut's approach and that Connecticut statutes have sometimes been interpreted more broadly to provide greater protections.	Cited to emphasize the principle that Connecticut's public accommodation statute may be broader than its federal analog and to support reliance on state precedent (Quinnipiac Council) over a purely federal test.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Appellate Court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, relying only on the reasoning stated in the opinion:

Standard of review: The Appellate Court began by stating that review is plenary because the issue is whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in deciding whether the defendant was a public accommodation (citing Hartford Courant Co.).
Identification of the trial court's approach: The Appellate Court observed that the trial court evaluated the defendant under a test articulated in United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, a federal test used in determining the private club exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. The Lansdowne test examines multiple factors such as selectivity of membership, membership control, history, use of facilities by nonmembers, advertising, profit status, and formalities.
Assessment of the appropriateness of the federal test: The Appellate Court acknowledged that Connecticut courts sometimes look to federal case law for guidance when state and federal antidiscrimination statutes are similar. However, it emphasized that Connecticut's public accommodation statute, § 46a-64 (a) (1), differs from the federal statute and that Connecticut's jurisprudence has at times provided broader protections.
Invocation of state precedent: The court identified Quinnipiac Council as articulating the relevant state-law considerations: an entity's coverage under § 46a-64 (a) depends on "the extent to which a particular establishment has maintained a private relationship with its own constituency or a general relationship with the public at large," and that an organization that has "determined to eschew selectivity" may not discriminate among the general public.
Legal error: The Appellate Court concluded the trial court committed legal error by applying Lansdowne's federal factors as the controlling test rather than applying the Quinnipiac Council framework. Although the court recognized similarities between the Lansdowne factors and the Quinnipiac test, it held they are not identical and that federal law does not define the outer bounds of the state statute.
Permissible role of federal factors: The Appellate Court clarified that the Lansdowne factors are relevant only to the extent they help determine whether an establishment "has determined to eschew selectivity" or whether it maintains a private constituency relationship versus a general public relationship. In other words, Lansdowne factors may be considered only insofar as they bear on the overarching Quinnipiac test.
Disposition: Because the trial court's analysis was not constrained by the state-law test and instead evaluated the plaintiff's claims solely within a federal framework, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment that the defendant was not a public accommodation and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. (Posture note at the beginning of the opinion: "Reversed; new trial.")

Implications: The court held that the trial court committed legal error by applying a federal multi-factor test (Lansdowne Swim Club) as the controlling standard for whether an entity is a public accommodation under Connecticut's § 46a-64 (a). The Appellate Court directed that the appropriate state-law standard is that articulated in Quinnipiac Council, which focuses on whether an entity maintains a private relationship with its own constituency or a general relationship with the public and whether it has "determined to eschew selectivity." The opinion clarifies that federal factors may be consulted only insofar as they inform the state-law inquiry, and it remands the matter for further proceedings applying the proper state-law test.

The opinion does not state or announce any novel rule superseding Quinnipiac Council; rather, it applies and enforces that state precedent and instructs lower courts on the proper analytical framework to use when deciding whether an entity is a public accommodation under § 46a-64 (a).

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SAM CORCORAN v. GERMAN SOCIAL SOCIETY FROHSINN, INC.

Syllabus The plaintiff, who had been denied membership in the defendant social club on the basis of her gender, sought an injunction requiring the defendant to admit her as a full member and to recover damages pursuant to the statute (§ 46a-64 [a]) that makes it a discriminatory practice to deny any person full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation on the basis of, among other things, gender. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that it was not a public accommodation within the meaning of § 46a-64 (a), from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standard in evaluating whether the defendant was a public accommodation; in evaluating the plaintiffs claims and determining whether the defendant was a public accommodation, the court failed to apply or even acknowledge the clearly applicable definition of a public accommodation articulated by our Supreme Court in a case addressing the contours of § 46a-64 and, instead, improperly utilized a test developed in federal case law to determine whether the defendant was a public accommodation.

Opinion

ROGERS, J.

The plaintiff, Sam Corcoran, appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant, German Social Society Frohsinn, Inc., on the plaintiffs complaint alleging gender discrimination by a public accommodation in violation of General Statutes § 46a-64. She claims on appeal that (1) the court failed to apply the proper legal standard in evaluating whether the defendant was a public accommodation and (2) the court's finding as to the defendant's selectivity of membership was clearly erroneous. We agree with the plaintiffs first claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

General Statutes § 46a-64 (a) provides in relevant part that "[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, lawful source of income, mental retardation, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
"`Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement `"is defined in General Statutes § 46a-63 (1) as "any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent. . . ."

The plaintiff also argues, in cursory fashion, that the issue of freedom of intimate association was not relevant to the case and was not properly before the court but concedes that the court did not analyze that issue or base its decision thereon. Consequently, we deem this claim abandoned.

Because our resolution of the plaintiffs first claim is dispositive, we need not address her second claim.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the appeal. On July 6, 2000, the plaintiff filed a complaint with Connecticut's commission on human rights and opportunities (commission), alleging that the defendant, which she claimed was a public accommodation, had discriminated against her, on the basis of her gender, by denying her membership. Because her claim was still pending in June, 2002, the plaintiff sought, and obtained, a release of jurisdiction from the commission. See General Statutes § 46a-101. Thereafter, she commenced the present litigation. See General Statutes § 46a-100. In the operative complaint, the plaintiff raised allegations similar to those in her complaint to the commission, namely, that the defendant social establishment was a public accommodation, and, therefore, its policy of not admitting women as members was an illegal discriminatory practice in violation of § 46a-64. The plaintiffs complaint sounded in two counts, each brought pursuant to § 46a-64 but addressing different time periods. She sought an injunction requiring the defendant to admit her as a member and damages.

A court trial was held in February, 2005, at which testimony and evidence were presented. In a memorandum of decision dated June 1, 2005, the court concluded that the defendant was not a public accommodation within the meaning of § 46a-64 (a) and, accordingly, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. This appeal followed.

The plaintiff argues that in evaluating her claims, the court improperly utilized a test developed in federal case law concerning 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to determine whether the defendant was a public accommodation, rather than a test articulated by our Supreme Court in reference to § 46a-64. We agree.

Section 2000a (a) of title 42 of the United States Code provides that "[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."
Section 2000a (b) of title 42 of the United States Code defines public accommodations as the following, if their "operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by [them] is supported by State action:
"(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;
"(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;
"(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
"(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment."

We begin by noting the applicable standard of review. Because this issue requires us to determine whether the court applied the correct legal standard in deciding whether the defendant was a public accommodation, our review is plenary. See Hartford Courant Co. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 261 Conn. 86, 96-97, 801 A.2d 759 (2002).

After making certain factual findings concerning the activities of the defendant, the court analyzed whether the defendant was a "public accommodation" by applying a test articulated in United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Sup. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1990). The test was used in that case to determine whether the defendant swimming pool facility fell within the "private club" exemption of the federal statutes forbidding discrimination in public accommodations. The court considered the following factors in making that determination: "1. The genuine selectivity of the group in the admission of its members. . . . 2. The membership's control over the operations of the establishment. . . . 3. The history of the organization. . . . 4. The use of the facilities by nonmembers. . . . 5. The purpose of the club's existence. . . . 6. Whether the club advertises for members. . . . 7. Whether the club is profit or nonprofit [and] 8. The formalities observed by the club, e.g., bylaws, meetings, membership cards." (Citations omitted.) Id., 796-97.

Section 2000a (e) of title 42 of the United States Code provides in relevant part that "[t]he provisions of [title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b). . . ." See footnote 4.

It is true that Connecticut's appellate courts, in construing state antidiscrimination statutes that have similar federal counterparts, have looked to federal case law for guidance, even though the federal and state statutes may differ somewhat. See, e.g., Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148, 164, 717 A.2d 1254 (1998) (employment discrimination); Zlokower v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 200 Conn. 261, 264-65, 510 A.2d 985 (1986) (fair housing). It also has been recognized, however, that "under certain circumstances, federal law defines the beginning and not the end of our approach to the subject. . . . Consequently, on occasion, we have interpreted our statutes even more broadly than their counterparts, to provide even greater protections to our citizens, especially in the area of civil rights." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights Opportunities v. Savin Rock Condominium Assn., Inc., 273 Conn. 373, 386 n. 11, 870 A.2d 457 (2005).

Our research has not uncovered any case indicating that the protections afforded by § 46a-64 (a) (1) were intended to be limited to those provided by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (a). To the contrary, our Supreme Court has observed that since their inception, "our public accommodation statutes have repeatedly been amended to expand the categories of enterprises that are covered and the conduct that is deemed discriminatory." Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 296, 528 A.2d 352 (1987). For example, in 1953, the statute was amended to eliminate the "laundry list approach" utilized in the federal statute to enumerate covered entities, and the legislature "substituted the general definition of `place of public accommodation' that is the precursor of [§ 46a-64 (a) (1)]." Id., 296-97; see also footnotes 1, 4. More importantly, unlike the federal statute, "our statute does not . . . expressly exclude private clubs or organizations." Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, supra, 298.

Our Supreme Court articulated the relevant considerations for evaluating whether an entity is a "public accommodation" as follows: "Although no private organization is duty-bound to offer its services and facilities to all comers, once such an organization has determined to eschew selectivity, under our statute it may not discriminate among the general public." Id., 299. Accordingly, "coverage under [§ 46a-64 (a)] depends, in each case, upon the extent to which a particular establishment has maintained a private relationship with its own constituency or a general relationship with the public at large." Id., 300.

Although there are similarities between the Lansdowne Swim Club factors and the test for determining whether an organization is a public accommodation under § 46a-64 (a), we are not convinced that the two inquiries are identical. Consequently, we conclude that the court committed legal error in applying the test articulated in Lansdowne Swim Club rather than that stated in Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc.

By so holding, we do not intend to intimate that the factors articulated in Lansdowne Swim Club are wholly irrelevant to the question of whether a party is a public accommodation under § 46a-64 (a). As we have recognized, jurisprudence concerning federal antidiscrimination statutory counterparts often is helpful in evaluating state antidiscrimination statutory claims, albeit at times, as only a starting point. Here, however, the court did not apply or even acknowledge the clearly applicable definition of a public accommodation articulated by our Supreme Court in a case addressing the contours of § 46a-64 but, instead, evaluated the plaintiffs claims solely within the federal framework.

We believe that the Lansdowne Swim Club factors are relevant only to the extent they tend to demonstrate that an establishment "has determined to eschew selectivity," or to indicate whether that establishment "has maintained a private relationship with its own constituency or a general relationship with the public at large." Id., 299-300. We expect that under different factual scenarios, the relevance of a particular factor could vary. In short, a court may consider the Landsdowne Swim Club factors but only insofar as they pertain to the overarching test for a public accommodation stated in Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. Because the court's analysis was not so constrained, we conclude that it was improper.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

CORCORAN v. GERMAN SOCIAL SOC. FROHSINN, INC