Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes liability upon owners and contractors who fail to provide or erect safety devices necessary to give proper protection to workers exposed to elevation-related hazards ( see Misseritti v Mark TV Constr. Co., 86 NY2d 487, 490-491; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 500-501; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 513; Valensisi v Greens at Half Hollow, LLC, 33 AD3d 693, 695).
To prevail on a cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was injured during "the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure" (Labor Law § 240; Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 464; Mordkofsky v V.C.V. Dev. Corp., 76 NY2d 573, 576-577; Spaulding v S.H.S. Bay Ridge, 305 AD2d 400, 401). Once Labor Law § 240 (1) is shown to be applicable, in order to establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an owner, contractor, or their agent breached a duty under the statute, and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injury ( see Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555, 559; Woszczyna v BJW Assoc., 31 AD3d 754, 755; Lightfoot v State of New York, 245 AD2d 488, 489). A defendant cannot be held liable if the plaintiff's actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident ( see Cahill v Triborough Bridge Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39-40; Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of NY. City, 1 NY3d 280, 290; Marin v Levin Props., LP, 28 AD3d 525; Morin v Machnick Bldrs., 4 AD3d 668, 669).
Here, the parties failed to establish, prima facie, whether the injured plaintiff had access to properly placed and adequate safety devices ( see Marin v Levin Props., supra at 526; Palacios v Lake Carmel Fire Dept., Inc., 15 AD3d 461, 462-463; cf. Orellana v American Airlines, 300 AD2d 638). Moreover, the Supreme Court properly found that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the injured plaintiff's conduct in using a forklift to access the air conditioning unit was the sole proximate cause of his accident ( see Marin v Levin Props., supra; Cahill v Triborough Bridge Tunnel Auth., supra at 40; cf. Robinson v East Med. Ctr., LP, 6 NY3d 550). Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion, and that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action based on Labor Law § 240 (1), were properly denied.
The defendants' contention regarding the plaintiffs' Labor Law § 241 (6) claim is not properly before this Court, and their remaining contentions are without merit.