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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These two actions arose from a contract of indemnity executed by Michael B. Nazzaro in favor of National Surety Company. Nazzaro sought to have the company become surety on a bail bond for Frank McKenna, who was under arrest in Connecticut charged with larceny. Nazzaro paid a premium, executed an indemnity contract, and deposited $600 as collateral. The surety company attempted to post a $1,000 bail bond, but the court clerk in Connecticut refused to accept it, instead accepting the personal recognizance of Fitch D. Crandall, an officer of the surety company. McKenna was later defaulted, and the surety company paid $1,000 to discharge Crandall’s liability on the recognizance. The surety company sued Nazzaro to recover the difference between the $600 deposited and the $1,000 paid, plus counsel fees. In turn, Nazzaro sought to recover the $600 deposit. The cases were tried together in the Superior Court, where the judge refused Nazzaro’s requests for directed verdicts and ordered verdicts for the surety company in the first action and for Nazzaro in the second. Nazzaro took exceptions to these rulings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the surety company’s provision of a personal recognizance, rather than a bail bond, fulfilled its contractual obligation under the indemnity agreement to execute a bail bond for Frank McKenna.
  2. Whether the surety company is entitled to recover from Nazzaro indemnity for losses incurred due to the recognizance and subsequent payment discharging Crandall’s liability.
  3. Whether Blume, introduced by the surety company’s Boston agency, had authority to substitute a recognizance and a different surety in place of the bail bond and surety company originally contemplated.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commonwealth v. Gove, 151 Mass. 392 General interchangeability and related legal rules of "bail" and "recognizance" in statutes. Used to establish that although often treated similarly, bail bonds and recognizances are distinct in nature.
Lovejoy v. Isbell, 70 Conn. 557 Comparison of bail and recognizance obligations. Supported the court’s distinction between bail bonds and recognizances in the Connecticut context.
In re Brown, 35 Minn. 307 Legal treatment of bail and recognizance obligations. Reinforced the distinction between bail bonds and recognizances relevant to the case.
Swan v. United States, 3 Wyo. 150 Similar application of bail and recognizance laws. Helped clarify the intrinsic differences between bail bonds and recognizances.
Crane v. Keating, 13 Pick. 339 Definition and nature of recognizances. Used to explain the legal nature of a recognizance as an obligation of record.
Commonwealth v. M'Neill, 19 Pick. 127 Legal distinctions between bail bonds and recognizances. Supported the court’s differentiation between the two instruments.
Commonwealth v. Canada, 13 Pick. 86 Legal nature of recognizances and bail bonds. Further supported the court’s analysis of the instruments’ differences.
Warner v. Howard, 121 Mass. 82 Legal distinctions between sureties on bail bonds and recognizances. Used to illustrate possible differences in rights and liabilities of sureties.
People v. Kane, 4 Denio, 530 Legal treatment of recognizances. Supported the court’s explanation of recognizances as obligations of record.
State v. Dorr, 59 W. Va. 188 Distinctions between bail and recognizance obligations. Reinforced the differentiation between bail bonds and recognizances.
State v. Wilson, 175 S.W. Rep. 603 Legal principles regarding recognizances. Used to support the court’s analysis.
Merrill v. Prince, 7 Mass. 396 Differences in rights and liabilities of sureties on bail bonds and recognizances. Referenced to highlight distinctions in surety obligations.
Johnson v. Randall, 7 Mass. 340 Surety liability distinctions. Used to emphasize differences in surety obligations between bail bonds and recognizances.
Electric Welding Co. Ltd. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386 Requirement to introduce foreign law in evidence. Noted that the law of Connecticut regarding bail was not introduced, affecting the court’s ability to rule as a matter of law.
Bird v. Washburn, 10 Pick. 223 Construction of indemnity agreements contingent on bail obligations. Distinguished from the present case, as that agreement indemnified multiple parties and contingencies unlike the present contract.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the indemnity contract and the underlying transaction, focusing on whether the surety company fulfilled its contractual obligation to execute a bail bond. The contract explicitly contemplated the execution of a bail bond, but the bail bond was refused by the Connecticut court clerk and never became operative. Instead, the prisoner was released on a personal recognizance by Fitch D. Crandall, not the surety company. The court distinguished between bail bonds (contracts under seal requiring sureties) and recognizances (obligations of record entered before a court or magistrate). Although the terms are often used interchangeably in statutes, their legal nature and the surety’s liabilities differ. Because the recognizance was substituted for the bail bond and a different surety (Crandall) was involved, the surety company did not fulfill its express contractual obligation.

Further, the court noted that the law of Connecticut governing bail was not introduced at trial, preventing a ruling as a matter of law. There was also conflicting evidence about the authority of the agent Blume to substitute the recognizance and surety, making it a question for the jury. The court found that the surety company could not recover indemnity under the contract for a bail bond that was never accepted or executed.

Holding and Implications

The court sustained Nazzaro’s exceptions and reversed the directed verdict for the surety company.

This means that the surety company is not entitled as a matter of law to recover indemnity from Nazzaro for losses arising from the recognizance rather than a bail bond. The case must be submitted to the jury to determine factual issues such as Blume’s authority. The decision directly affects the parties by denying summary judgment to the surety company and allowing Nazzaro’s claims to proceed. No new broad legal precedent was established beyond applying established distinctions between bail bonds and recognizances and the requirement that contractual obligations be strictly performed as written.

NATIONAL SURETY COMPANY vs. MICHAEL B. NAZZARO. MICHAEL B. NAZZARO vs. NATIONAL SURETY COMPANY.

Contract, What constitutes, Performance and breach. Bail. Words, "Bail," "Recognizance."

No action can be maintained by a surety company upon a contract in writing to indemnify it against loss which it might incur by reason or in consequence of having executed a bail bond to secure the release of one under arrest in Connecticut, if it appears that the bail bond, when presented to the clerk of the court in Connecticut, was refused by him and that the prisoner, instead of being released by reason of the bond, was released upon the personal recognizance of an officer of the surety company.

Difference between a bail bond and a recognizance pointed out.

De COURCY, J.

These actions, based on an indemnity contract, arose out of the following transaction: Nazzaro applied at the Boston agency of the surety company to have it become surety on a bail bond to the State of Connecticut, in behalf of one Frank McKenna, who was under arrest in that State. He paid the premium, executed a contract of indemnity to protect the surety company against loss, and deposited with it as collateral security the sum of $600. The agent gave to Nazzaro a letter introducing one Blume to Fitch D. Crandall, the company's agent at New London, the letter stating that Blume was to arrange "details with you [Crandall] in connection with the execution of a bail bond in behalf of Frank McKenna."

The New York office of the surety company forwarded to Crandall a bail bond for $1,000, on which the company was surety. With Blume and an attorney employed by Blume as counsel for McKenna, Crandall went to the court house and presented the bail bond. The clerk of the court refused to accept it, but said he would accept the personal recognizance of Crandall. After some telephone communication with the company's New York office, Crandall recognized for the prisoner's appearance at court; and later the company executed a bond to indemnify him. McKenna was afterwards defaulted, and Crandall's liability on the recognizance was discharged by the check of the surety company for $1,000 paid to the prosecuting attorney.

The action of the National Surety Company was brought to recover the difference between the $600 deposited by Nazzaro and the $1,000 it paid in discharge of Crandall's liability, together with its counsel fees. Nazzaro seeks by his action to get back the $600 deposited by him as collateral security.

The instrument on which the surety company seeks to prevail is a comprehensive, carefully framed indemnity contract under seal, presumably prepared by the company. It plainly contemplates the signing of a "bail bond" by the company, as surety. It recites, "Whereas, the Company signed and executed said bond as such surety upon condition of the execution and delivery hereof. . . ." Nazzaro's obligation is expressly confined to indemnifying and saving harmless the company from its liability "upon said instrument," or in connection therewith. As matter of fact the bail bond which the company signed was not accepted, and never became operative. The release of McKenna was not obtained on a bail bond but on a recognizance. And the surety on the recognizance was not the surety company but Fitch D. Crandall.

The words "recognizance" and "bail" when used in statutes are often construed as interchangeable; and, speaking generally, like rules of law are applicable to both these kinds of obligation. See Commonwealth v. Gove, 151 Mass. 392; Lovejoy v. Isbell, 70 Conn. 557; In re Brown, 35 Minn. 307; Swan v. United States, 3 Wyo. 150. Nevertheless a bail bond and a recognizance are intrinsically different. In criminal cases a bail bond is a contract under seal, executed by the accused, and from its nature requiring sureties or bail to whose custody he is committed. A recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before some court or magistrate authorized to take it, with condition to do some particular act; and the prisoner is often allowed to obligate himself to answer to the charge. 6 C. J. 821, and notes. Crane v. Keating, 13 Pick. 339. Commonwealth v. M'Neill, 19 Pick. 127, Commonwealth v. Canada, 13 Pick. 86. Warner v. Howard, 121 Mass. 82. R. L. c. 217, §§ 65, 66, 77. St. 1912, c. 330. People v. Kane, 4 Denio, 530. State v. Dorr, 59 W. Va. 188. State v. Wilson, 175 S.W. Rep. 603. The rights and liabilities of the sureties in a bail bond and of sureties in a recognizance may be different. See Merrill v. Prince, 7 Mass. 396; Johnson v. Randall, 7 Mass. 340.

Without going further, we are of opinion that it could not be ruled as matter of law that by providing a recognizance to release McKenna the surety company had complied with its express obligation to execute a "bail bond," thereby entitling it to recover on Nazzaro's contract of indemnity. While apparently it is the practice in Massachusetts to use a recognizance, the law of Connecticut, where bail was to be given, was not introduced in evidence at the trial. See Electric Welding Co. Ltd. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386. And as there was conflicting evidence as to Blume's powers, it was for the jury to say whether he was the agent of Nazzaro, and was authorized to bind him by substituting a recognizance for a bail bond, and another surety for the surety company. In Bird v. Washburn, 10 Pick. 223, on which the surety company relies, the obscure agreement was construed as intended to indemnify both or either of the plaintiffs, according to the contingent event that both or either should become bail.

It follows that Nazzaro's exception in each case to the direction of a verdict for the surety company must be sustained; and it is

So ordered

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NATIONAL SURETY CO. v. NAZZARO
(May 20, 1919)