Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
A driver who fails to yield the right-of-way after stopping at a stop sign controlling traffic is in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 (a) and is negligent as a matter of law ( see Odumbo v Perera, 27 AD3d 709; Friedberg v Citiwide Auto Leasing, Inc., 22 AD3d 522, 523; McNamara v Fishkowitz, 18 AD3d 721, 722; Nolan v Mizrahi, 12 AD3d 430; Ishak v Guzman, 12 AD3d 409; Meretskaya v Logozzo, 2 AD3d 599). A driver is required to "see that which through proper use of [his or her] senses [he or she] should have seen" ( Bongiovi v Hoffman, 18 AD3d 686, 687 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bolta v Lohan, 242 AD2d 356), and a driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the other motorist will obey the traffic law requiring him or her to yield ( see Platt v Wolman, 29 AD3d 663; Dileo v Barreca, 16 AD3d 366, 367-368; Morgan v Hachmann, 9 AD3d 400).
The defendant established, prima facie, his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff driver, who was faced with a stop sign at the intersection of a parking lot exit and Route 25, negligently entered the intersection without yielding the right-of-way, and that this was the sole proximate cause of the accident ( see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 [a]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Bongiovi v Hoffman, supra; Breslin v Rudden, 291 AD2d 471, 472). Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted ( see Laino v Lucchese, 35 AD3d 672; Platt v Wolman, supra; Moore v Bremer, 280 AD2d 729).