WILLIAMS v. STATE

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Docket Number

No. A07A1072.

Attorney(S)

Stacy D. Barnett, for appellant. Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, Lara A. Snow, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Judges

Herbert E. Phipps

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Jason Williams was tried in Cherokee Superior Court and convicted of two offenses: cruelty to children in the first degree and reckless conduct. For the cruelty conviction he received "often years imprisonment" followed by ten years probation (as stated in the opinion), and for the reckless conduct conviction he received a concurrent sentence of 12 months imprisonment. The convictions arose from injuries sustained by Williams's eleven-month-old son, D.W., who suffered extensive burns after gaining access to extremely hot bath water while Williams was home with his two children. The state alleged, in part, that Williams wilfully deprived the child of necessary sustenance by failing to provide medical attention for the burn injuries, and alternatively, that he maliciously caused cruel and excessive physical and mental pain by failing promptly to provide medical attention and treatment. Williams appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the cruelty conviction and asserting error in the sentencing process. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Williams's conviction for cruelty to children in the first degree (OCGA § 16-5-70), given the statutory alternatives for that offense.
Whether the jury's failure to convict Williams of aggravated battery (and conviction instead of the lesser included offense of reckless conduct) precluded the trial court from considering evidence suggesting intentional conduct when imposing sentence, thus requiring resentencing.
Whether the trial court erred by considering a presentence report in aggravation of punishment when portions of the report adverse to Williams had not been disclosed to the defense prior to the sentencing hearing (under the pre-2005 version of OCGA § 17-10-2(a)).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Williams's) Arguments

He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for cruelty to children in the first degree.
He argued that because the jury acquitted him of aggravated battery and convicted only on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct, the jury necessarily found he did not intentionally inflict the burns, and thus the case should be remanded for resentencing because the trial court commented that there was substantial evidence of intentional conduct.
He asserted that the trial court erred by considering a presentence report in aggravation when adverse information in the report had not been disclosed to the defense before sentencing, contrary to prior Georgia law (former OCGA § 17-10-2(a)).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's (the State's) separate arguments beyond the court's summary of the evidence and its legal analysis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Caby v. State, 249 Ga. 32 (287 SE2d 200) (1982)	Interpreted "sustenance" in OCGA § 16-5-70(a) to mean only "that necessary food and drink which is sufficient to support life and maintain health" (rejected vagueness challenge to "necessary sustenance").	The court relied on Caby to conclude that "sustenance" does not extend to medical care, so an allegation of deprivation of medical care cannot by itself sustain a § 16-5-70(a) charge based on "necessary sustenance."
State v. Lawrence, 262 Ga. 714 (425 SE2d 280) (1993)	Refused to expand the definition of "necessary sustenance" in the cruelty statute to include non-food items (e.g., oxygen) in the context of a deprivation charge arising from setting a fire.	The court cited Lawrence to support the proposition that the word "sustenance" should not be expanded to cover medical care or other non-food items when adjudicating a § 16-5-70(a) deprivation claim.
Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392 (627 SE2d 579) (2006)	For OCGA § 16-5-70(b), malice "imports the absence of all elements of justification or excuse and the presence of an actual intent to cause the particular harm produced, or the wanton and wilful doing of an act with an awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result."	The court used Delacruz's definition of malice to explain the mens rea required under § 16-5-70(b) and to evaluate whether the evidence could support a finding that Williams "maliciously caused" cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)	Standards for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence—evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.	The court invoked Jackson v. Virginia as the governing standard for its sufficiency-of-the-evidence review and applied that standard in affirming the conviction under § 16-5-70(b).
Blake v. State, 273 Ga. 447 (542 SE2d 492) (2001)	Referenced in the context of whether a sentencing court may consider certain evidence despite a jury verdict; cited as a comparison point.	The court cited Blake for comparison when rejecting Williams's argument that the jury's verdict on aggravated battery barred the court from considering evidence of intentional conduct at sentencing.
Denny v. State, 226 Ga. App. 432 (486 SE2d 417) (1997)	Cited in relation to the court's consideration (or non-consideration) of a presentence report and sentencing procedure.	The court cited Denny in support of its conclusion that no error occurred in sentencing because the record contained no indication the court relied on the presentence report's contents when imposing sentence.
Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610 (44 SE2d 174) (1947)	Cited (via a treatise) for the proposition that when an indictment alleges alternative means of committing a crime, conviction may be sustained if proof supports any of the alternatives.	The court relied on the authority cited (including Jones) to explain that because Williams's indictment alleged cruelty under both OCGA § 16-5-70(a) and (b), the jury could convict based on proof of either statutory alternative.
Southern Express Co. v. State, 1 Ga. App. 700 (58 SE 67) (1907)	Also cited (via a treatise) for the doctrine that an indictment alleging alternative means permits conviction on proof of any alleged alternative.	The court relied on the same line of authority to support the legal principle permitting conviction on any of the charged alternatives in the indictment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps tied closely to the statutory text and the evidence presented at trial.

Statutory framework: The court began by reciting OCGA § 16-5-70(a) and (b), emphasizing that the statute provides two alternative ways to commit cruelty to children in the first degree—(a) wilful deprivation of necessary sustenance so that a child's health or well-being is jeopardized, and (b) maliciously causing cruel or excessive physical or mental pain to a child.
Meaning of "sustenance": Relying on precedent (Caby and Lawrence), the court explained that "sustenance" in § 16-5-70(a) has been interpreted to mean food and drink sufficient to support life and maintain health and does not encompass medical care. Accordingly, the portion of the indictment alleging deprivation of medical attention as "sustenance" could not alone sustain a conviction under subsection (a).
Malice under subsection (b): The court adopted the Delacruz formulation of malice for § 16-5-70(b)—either an actual intent to cause the particular harm or the wanton and willful doing of an act with awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result.
Indictment charging alternatives and proof: Because Williams's indictment charged both alternatives (a and b), the court observed that conviction could be sustained if the state proved the offense under either statutory theory. The court relied on authorities (cited via a treatise) supporting the principle that an indictment alleging alternative means permits conviction on proof of any one alternative.
Sufficiency of evidence: Applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict), the court summarized the evidence that supported a finding of malice under § 16-5-70(b): Williams was alone with his two children; D.W. suffered extensive burns after accessing extremely hot bath water; Williams delayed calling for emergency medical assistance for over an hour because he feared getting into trouble; Williams gave materially inconsistent statements about how the injuries occurred; and medical experts testified that the child's injuries could not have occurred in the manner Williams described. The court concluded this evidence authorized a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams maliciously caused cruel and excessive physical and mental pain by failing promptly to provide medical attention and treatment.
Sentencing and impact of the jury's verdict on aggravated battery: The court rejected Williams's contention that the jury's acquittal on aggravated battery (and conviction only of reckless conduct) necessarily established that he did not intentionally inflict the burns and thus precluded the trial court from considering evidence of intentional conduct in sentencing. The court reasoned (1) the jury verdict did not necessarily reflect a finding of no intent to inflict the burns; (2) even a jury finding that the state had not proved intentional infliction beyond a reasonable doubt does not bar the sentencing court from considering evidence supporting an intentional finding for sentencing purposes; and (3) the sentencing court in fact based its sentence on its determination that the delay in seeking medical attention—rather than the burning itself—was intentional.
Presentence report claim: Williams argued the court erred by relying on a presentence report when adverse information in it had not been provided to the defense before sentencing, as required under former OCGA § 17-10-2(a). The court examined the sentencing hearing transcript and found no indication that it relied on the contents of the report in imposing sentence. Comments by the court at the hearing on Williams's motion for a new trial corroborated that the court did not consider the report's contents. Therefore, the court concluded no error was shown.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

Implications:

The Court of Appeals upheld Williams's conviction for cruelty to children in the first degree and his concurrent conviction for reckless conduct, affirming the sentences imposed by the trial court.
The court clarified that where an indictment charges alternative statutory theories of an offense (here, OCGA § 16-5-70(a) and (b)), the state may sustain a conviction by proving any of the alleged alternatives; because "sustenance" does not encompass medical care, the conviction in this case rested on proof of malicious conduct under subsection (b).
The court confirmed that a sentencing court may consider evidence of intentional conduct for sentencing purposes even if a jury did not convict on a greater offense that would require a higher mens rea, and that a sentencing court's comments about evidence of intent do not automatically require resentencing when the sentencing record demonstrates the basis for the sentence.
No new legal precedent was announced beyond application of existing statutory interpretation and sufficiency standards; the decision affirms the trial court's application of controlling authority and its sentencing discretion as reflected in the record.

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WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.

PHIPPS, Judge.

Jason Williams was convicted of cruelty to children in the first degree and reckless conduct. For the first conviction, he was given a sentence often years imprisonment followed by ten years probation. For the second, he was given a concurrent sentence of 12 months imprisonment. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that the court erred in considering certain matters in sentencing. Finding neither evidentiary insufficiency nor error in sentencing, we affirm.

1. Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of cruelty to children in the first degree.

Under OCGA § 16-5-70 (a), "[a] parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of or having immediate charge or custody of a child under the age of 18 commits the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree when such person willfully deprives the child of necessary sustenance to the extent that the child's health or well-being is jeopardized." In addition, under OCGA § 16-5-70 (b), "[a]ny person commits the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree when such person maliciously causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain." Therefore, under OCGA § 16-5-70 (a) and (b), cruelty to children in the first degree can be committed in two alternative ways.

The defendants in Caby v. State challenged the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-5-70 (a) based on vagueness in the phrase "necessary sustenance." That challenge was rejected because, within the context of this statute, the word "sustenance" had been interpreted to mean only "`that necessary food and drink which is sufficient to support life and maintain health.'" In State v. Lawrence, an indictment charged the defendants with cruelty to children by depriving their child of necessary sustenance, to wit: oxygen, by setting fire to a residence. Refusing to expand the definition of "necessary sustenance" as used in the cruelty to children statute, Lawrence affirmed the trial court's dismissal of that charge.

249 Ga. 32 ( 287 SE2d 200) (1982).

Id. at 33 (1) (a) (citations omitted).

262 Ga. 714 ( 425 SE2d 280) (1993).

For purposes of OCGA § 16-5-70 (b), malice "imports the absence of all elements of justification or excuse and the presence of an actual intent to cause the particular harm produced, or the wanton and wilful doing of an act with an awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result."

Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 395 (3) ( 627 SE2d 579) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Williams was charged with one count of cruelty to children in the first degree based on essentially two sets of allegations. In part, the indictment alleged that Williams had wilfully deprived his child, D. W, of necessary sustenance by failing to provide medical attention for burn injuries which the child had suffered while in Williams's care, to the extent that the child's health and well-being were jeopardized. Under decisions such as Caby and Lawrence, however, "sustenance" would not include medical care. But the indictment additionally alleged that Williams had maliciously caused the child cruel and excessive physical and mental pain by failing to promptly provide medical attention and treatment to him. Williams was thus charged with one count of cruelty to children in the ways set forth in both OCGA § 16-5-70 (a) and (b). Under these circumstances, Williams could be convicted of cruelty to children in the first degree by proof that he committed the crime in either way alleged in the indictment.

Williams was also charged with aggravated battery, based on allegations that he had maliciously caused bodily harm to the child by seriously disfiguring his body and by rendering various members of his body useless by burning him in hot water. The jury did not find Williams guilty of aggravated battery but found him guilty of reckless conduct as a lesser included offense.

See Daniel's Georgia Criminal Trial Practice, § 13-15, p. 544 (2007 ed.), citing Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610, 614-615 (4) ( 44 SE2d 174) (1947), and Southern Express Co. v. State, 1 Ga. App. 700 ( 58 SE 67) (1907).

The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to support the verdict, was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams maliciously caused the child cruel and excessive physical and mental pain by failing to promptly provide medical attention and treatment to him. The evidence in this regard showed that Williams and Nycole Hillebrandt were the parents of eleven-month-old D. W. and his six-week-old younger brother. On the day in question, Williams was left home alone with his two sons after Hillebrandt went to work that morning. After Williams had run extremely hot bath water for himself later in the day, D. W. somehow got into the tub and received extensive burns causing serious injuries. Upon discovering the child's injuries, Williams delayed calling for emergency medical assistance for over an hour because he was afraid that he would get into trouble because the child was injured while in his care. Williams gave materially inconsistent statements to a number of people as to the circumstances surrounding the child's injuries, and medical experts testified on behalf of the state that the child's injuries could not have occurred in the way described by Williams. We find this evidence sufficient to support Williams's conviction of cruelty to children in the first degree.

See generally Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Williams suggests that because the jury did not find him guilty of aggravated battery, its verdict on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct constituted a finding that he did not intentionally inflict the burn injuries on the child. Williams contends that this case should, therefore, be remanded for resentencing, because the court commented at the sentencing hearing that there was a substantial and significant amount of evidence that Williams had acted intentionally. We find no merit in this contention for several reasons.

See n. 5, supra.

To begin with, we do not interpret the jury verdict as necessarily reflecting a finding that Williams did not intentionally inflict the burn injuries on the child. And even a jury finding that the state had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams had intentionally inflicted the burn injuries would not have precluded the court from considering, for sentencing purposes, evidence in support of a finding that he had acted intentionally in that regard. Moreover, additional comments by the court at the hearing on Williams's motion for new trial show that it ultimately based its sentence on its determination that the delay in seeking medical attention rather than the burning itself was intentional. We thus find no cause for resentencing.

Compare Blake v. State, 273 Ga. 447, 449-450 (4) ( 542 SE2d 492) (2001).

3. Williams charges the trial court with error in considering a presentence report in aggravation of punishment, because information in the report adverse to him was not made known to the defense before the hearing so as to give him an opportunity for explanation or rebuttal as previously required by Georgia law.

See former OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) (prior to its 2005 amendment).

But the transcript of the sentencing hearing contains no indication that the court relied on the contents of the report in imposing Williams's sentence. And comments made by the court at the hearing on Williams's motion for new trial show that it did not in fact consider the contents of the report. Therefore, no error has been shown. Judgment affirmed. Johnson, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur.

See Denny v. State, 226 Ga. App. 432, 436 (13) ( 486 SE2d 417) (1997).