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Docket Number

No. 215, 2006.

Attorney(S)

Kevin M. Howard, Enquire, Young, Malmberg Howard, Dover, Delaware, for appellant. Philip T. Edwards, Esquire (argued) and Roger D. Landon, Esquire, Murphy, Spadaro Landon, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee, Johnathan Parsell.

Judges

Randy J. Holland

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Kristyn Pipher v. Johnathan Parsell (Supreme Court of Delaware, June 19, 2007)

Factual and Procedural Background

The events giving rise to this appeal occurred on March 20, 2002. Three sixteen-year-olds — Johnathan Parsell (driver), Kristyn Pipher (sitting in the middle), and Johnene Beisel (passenger seat) — were traveling south on Delaware Route 1 in Parsell's pickup truck. While traveling at 55 mph, Beisel unexpectedly grabbed the steering wheel, causing the truck to veer onto the shoulder. Parsell regained control and did not take any preventive action at that time. Approximately thirty seconds later, Beisel again yanked the steering wheel, causing the truck to leave the roadway, slide down an embankment, and strike a tree. Pipher was injured in the collision.

Pipher sued (with Beisel also a defendant). The Superior Court entered judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) in favor of Parsell, concluding that, as a matter of law, Parsell was not negligent and had no duty to act after the first grabbing of the wheel. Pipher appealed. This Court corrected the caption sua sponte and considered only Parsell as the subject of the appeal.

The opinion notes that Pipher was awarded $70,150 in damages against Beisel, but that Beisel was not located before, during, or after trial.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Superior Court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law for Parsell by concluding that Parsell was not negligent as a matter of law.
Whether, after a passenger first grabbed a steering wheel, the driver had a duty to take reasonable steps (e.g., admonish the passenger, pull over, require the passenger to move) to prevent a foreseeable recurrence that could cause injury to another passenger.
Whether the foreseeability of the passenger's repeat conduct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries were questions for the jury rather than questions of law for the court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Pipher's) Arguments

Once Beisel grabbed the steering wheel initially, Parsell was on notice that a dangerous situation could recur.
After obtaining such notice, Parsell had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect his passengers from that risk (to admonish, stop and remove the risk, or otherwise control the passenger).
Parsell was negligent in continuing to drive without attempting to remove or address the risk posed by Beisel, and this negligence proximately caused Pipher's injuries.

Appellee's / Trial Court's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

The trial judge ruled that, as a matter of law, a driver could reasonably assume that a passenger who grabbed the wheel once would not do so again, and therefore Parsell had no duty to take further action after the first incident.
The trial court concluded there was no negligence in failing to discharge or admonish the dangerous passenger, and that such failures could not be considered proximate causes of Pipher's injuries (i.e., JMOL for Parsell was appropriate).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
New Haverford P'ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 798 (Del. 2001)	Sets forth the elements of negligence: duty, breach, and proximate cause.	The Court cited this case for the basic negligence framework to evaluate whether Pipher established a prima facie case and whether submission to a jury was required.
Eustice v. Rupert, 460 A.2d 507, 509 (Del. 1983)	Explains that a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case or if, under no reasonable view of the evidence, a jury could find for the plaintiff.	The Court relied on this standard in assessing whether the Superior Court properly granted JMOL for Parsell.
Fritz v. Yeager, 790 A.2d 469, 471 (Del. 2002)	Defines duty: liability requires a legal obligation — a duty — to protect the plaintiff; whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court. Also notes appellate review is de novo.	Used to explain that whether a duty exists is a legal question but that factual issues (foreseeability, proximate cause) remain for the jury; guided the Court's review de novo of the legal issue.
Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 235 (Del. Ch. 1990)	Holds that a driver owes a duty of care to passengers because it is foreseeable passengers may be injured if the driver, through inattention or otherwise, involves the car in a collision.	The Court cited this authority to support the general principle that drivers owe passengers a duty of care relevant to the question presented.
Wagner v. Shanks, 194 A.2d 701, 708 (Del. 1963)	Holds that a minor operating a vehicle is held to the same standard of care as an adult motorist.	The Court invoked this precedent to confirm that Parsell (a minor driver) is held to the same standard of care as an adult in assessing negligence.
Clayton v. Bartoszewski, 198 A.2d 692, 695 (Del. 1964)	States that a passenger has the right to assume the driver will exercise reasonable care and is under no duty to supervise the driver absent knowledge the driver is unfit or incompetent.	The Court cited this principle to frame the correlative expectation of passenger reliance, which informs the duty analysis.
Bessette v. Humiston, 157 A.2d 468 (Vt. 1960)	Holds a driver was liable where a passenger, known to be "playful" and having repeatedly tried to shake hands with the driver, seized the driver's arm and caused an accident; knowledge of prior behavior should have forecast the peril.	The Court used Bessette as an analogous authority to illustrate situations where a driver's knowledge of a passenger's prior dangerous or persistently disruptive conduct could make subsequent interference foreseeable and impose a duty to attempt prevention.
Brown v. Mobley, 488 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. App. 1997) (cited for comparison)	Contrasting authority indicating no evidence that the eventual conduct of an intoxicated passenger should have been anticipated.	Cited in the opinion as a contrasting case to show that foreseeability is a factual inquiry that may or may not support driver liability depending on the evidence.
Robinson v. Butler, 33 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. 1948)	Example authority for the general proposition that where a passenger's actions causing an accident are not foreseeable, the driver is not negligent.	Used as an illustrative precedent supporting the proposition that foreseeability is decisive in attributing negligence to the driver.
Linde v. Emmick, 61 P.2d 338 (Cal. App. 1936)	Listed among authorities addressing driver responsibility when passenger conduct interferes with safe operation.	Cited as additional authority in the survey of cases where failure to prevent foreseeable passenger conduct may constitute breach of duty.
Duphily v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 830 (Del. 1995)	Supports the proposition that issues of foreseeability and proximate cause are factual determinations for the jury.	The Court relied on this authority in concluding that foreseeability of the passenger's repeat conduct and proximate cause were factual questions that should have been submitted to the jury.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with the standard legal framework for negligence: a plaintiff must show duty, breach, and proximate cause. It reiterated that a defendant is entitled to JMOL only if the plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case or if no reasonable view of the evidence could sustain a verdict for the plaintiff. The Court emphasized that while the existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court, issues of foreseeability and proximate cause are factual matters for the jury.

The Court surveyed controlling Delaware authority establishing (1) drivers owe a duty of care to passengers because passenger injury is foreseeable if the driver involves the car in a collision, and (2) minors driving are held to the same standard of care as adults. The Court also noted precedent that passengers have the right to assume reasonable care by the driver absent knowledge the driver is unfit.

Applying the facts of this case, the Court observed that after the first unsanctioned grabbing of the wheel, Parsell acknowledged awareness that Beisel had engaged in dangerous behavior and that the conduct had put him "on his guard." Parsell admitted at trial that he could have taken steps to prevent repeat conduct (admonishing Beisel, pulling over and moving her to the back seat, or threatening to remove her from the vehicle). Pipher's testimony suggested that Parsell and Beisel laughed after the first incident and that Parsell's reaction may have contributed to a second grabbing of the wheel.

The Court concluded that given those facts, reasonable jurors could differ on whether Parsell breached a duty to protect his passengers by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent a repeat of the dangerous conduct, whether the repeat conduct was foreseeable, and whether Parsell's alleged inaction was a proximate cause of Pipher's injuries. Because those were factual determinations, the Court held they should have been submitted to the jury rather than decided as a matter of law by the trial judge.

Holding and Implications

REVERSED and REMANDED.

Holding: The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Superior Court's judgment as a matter of law for the defendant, concluding that the questions of whether Parsell breached a duty to Pipher, whether Beisel's repeat conduct was foreseeable, and whether Parsell's actions (or inaction) were the proximate cause of Pipher's injuries were factual questions for the jury.

Direct consequences: The Superior Court's JMOL in favor of Parsell is vacated. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, which contemplates submission of the contested factual issues (breach, foreseeability, proximate cause) to a jury.

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing Delaware principles regarding duty, foreseeability, and the role of the jury. The Court did not announce a new legal rule; it concluded that, on the particular facts presented, the matters at issue were for the jury rather than for disposition by JMOL.

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Kristyn PIPHER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Johnathan PARSELL, Defendant Below, Appellee. Johnathan Parsell is the only defendant who is the subject of this appeal. This Court corrected the caption of the proceeding sua sponte.

HOLLAND, Justice.

The plaintiff-appellant, Kristyn Pipher ("Pipher"), appeals from the Superior Court's judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant-appellee, Johnathan Parsell ("Parsell"). Pipher argues that the Superior Court erred when it ruled that, as a matter of law, Parsell was not negligent. We agree and hold that the issue of Parsell's negligence should have been submitted to the jury.

Facts

On March 20, 2002, around 6 p.m., Pipher, Parsell and Johnene Beisel ("Beisel"), also a defendant, were traveling south on Delaware Route 1 near Lewes, Delaware, in Parsell's pickup truck. All three were sitting on the front seat. Parsell was driving, Pipher was sitting in the middle, and Beisel was in the passenger seat next to the door. They were all sixteen-years-old at the time.

Pipher was awarded $70,150.00 in damages against Beisel. However, Beisel was not located before, during, or after trial.

As they were traveling at 55 mph, Beisel unexpectedly "grabbed the steering wheel causing the truck to veer off onto the shoulder of the road." Parsell testified that Beisel's conduct caused him both shock and surprise. Although Beisel's conduct prompted him to be on his guard, Parsell further testified that he did not expect Beisel to grab the wheel again. Nevertheless, his recognition of how serious Beisel's conduct was, shows he was aware that he now had someone in his car who had engaged in dangerous behavior.

Parsell testified that he did nothing in response to Beisel's initial action. Approximately thirty seconds later, Beisel again yanked the steering wheel, causing Parsell's truck to leave the roadway, slide down an embankment and strike a tree. Pipher was injured as a result of the collision.

Pipher's testimony at trial was for the most part consistent with Parsell's testimony. Pipher recalled that the three occupants in the vehicle were talking back and forth and that the mood was light as they drove south on Route 1. She also testified that after Beisel yanked the steering wheel for the first time, Parsell was able to regain control of the truck. According to Pipher, despite the dangerous nature of the conduct, Parsell and Beisel just laughed about it like it was a joke. Pipher testified she felt that Beisel grabbed the steering wheel a second time because Parsell "laughed it off' the first time.

At trial, Parsell acknowledged that he could have taken different steps to try to prevent Beisel from grabbing the steering wheel a second time. First, Parsell acknowledged, he could have admonished Beisel not to touch the steering wheel again. Second, he acknowledged that he could have pulled over to the side of the road and required Beisel to get into the back seat. Third, Parsell acknowledged that he could have warned Beisel that he would put her out of the vehicle.

The trial judge concluded that, as a matter of law, Parsell had no duty to do anything after Beisel yanked the wheel the first time because it would be reasonable for the driver to assume that it would not happen again. The trial judge also ruled that (1) there was no negligence in failing to discharge the dangerous passenger and (2) that failing to admonish the dangerous passenger was not negligence and could not be considered a proximate cause of Pipher's injuries.

Standard of Review

In order to establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that "defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care; defendant breached that duty; and defendant's breach was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury." The defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of negligence, or under no reasonable view of the evidence could a jury find in favor of the plaintiff. Disputed issues of foreseeability and proximate cause involve factual determinations that must be submitted to a jury.

New Haverford P'ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 798 (Del. 2001).

Eustice v. Rupert, 460 A.2d 507, 509 (Del. 1983).

"To be held liable in negligence, a defendant must have been under a legal obligation — a duty — to protect the plaintiff from the risk of harm which caused his injuries." This Court has recognized that "whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined by the court." If no duty exists, "a trial court is authorized to grant judgment as a matter of law." On appeal, questions of law are reviewed de novo.

Fritz v. Yeager, 790 A.2d 469, 471 (Del. 2002).

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Id. (citing Del.Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50).

Duty of Driver

A "driver owes a duty of care to her [or his] passengers because it is foreseeable that they may be injured if, through inattention or otherwise, the driver involves the car she [or he] is operating in a collision." Almost forty-five years ago, this Court held that a minor who operates a motor vehicle on the highways of Delaware will be held to the same standard of care and "must accord his [or her] own passengers the same diligence and protection which is required of an adult motorist under similar circumstances." The following year, this Court recognized an important correlative principle: "One riding as a passenger in a motor vehicle . . . has the right to assume that the driver will exercise reasonable cure and caution and is under no duty to supervise the driving . . . in the absence of knowledge that the driver is unfit or incompetent to drive."

Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 235 (Del.Ch. 1990).

Wagner v. Shanks, 194 A.2d 701, 708 (Del. 1963).

Clayton v. Bartoszewski, 198 A.2d 692, 695 Del.1964).

Pipher argues that after Beisel grabbed the steering wheel initially, Parsell was on notice that a dangerous situation could reoccur in the track. Pipher further argues that once Parsell had notice of a possibly dangerous situation, he had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect his passengers from that harm. Finally, Pipher concludes that Parsell was negligent when he kept driving without attempting to remove, or at least address, that risk.

In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Vermont held a driver was liable for damages resulting from the passenger seizing the driver's arm. In that case, a drunken passenger known for being a "playful fellow," and having previously attempted to shake hands with the driver of the vehicle over the course of fifteen minutes, then seized the arm of the driver, causing the vehicle to collide with a farm wagon. The Vermont Court held that the knowledge the passenger was "a playful fellow" and had in the course of the ride "persisted in trying to shake hands" with the driver "should have forecast the peril of an accident to an operator of reasonable prudence and vigilance." In such cases, the driver is expected to make a reasonable attempt to prevent the passenger from taking such actions again.

Bessette v. Humiston, 121 Vt. 325, 157 A.2d 468 (1960).

Id. at 470. Compare Brown v. Mobley, 227 Ga.App. 140, 488 S.E.2d 710 (1997) (no evidence that eventual conduct of intoxicated passenger should have been anticipated).

In general, where the actions of a passenger that cause an accident are not foreseeable, there is no negligence attributable to the driver. But, when actions of a passenger that interfere with the driver's safe operation of the motor vehicle are foreseeable, the failure to prevent such conduct may be a breach of the driver's duty to either other passengers or to the public. Under the circumstances of this case, a reasonable jury could find that Parsell breached his duty to protect Pipher from Beisel by preventing Beisel from grabbing the steering wheel a second time.

See, e.g., Robinson v. Butler, 226 Minn. 491, 33 N.W.2d 821 (1948).

Wagner v. Shanks, 194 A.2d 701 (Del. 1963); Bessette v. Humiston, 121 Vt. 325, 157 A.2d 468 (1960). See also Linde v. Emmick, 16 Cal.App.2d 676, 61 P.2d 338 (1936).

Conclusion

The issue of Parsell's alleged breach of duty to Pipher, the foreseeability of Beisel's repeat conduct, and the proximate cause of Pipher's injuries were all factual determinations that should have been submitted to the jury. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court, that was entered as a matter of law, is reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Duphily v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 830 (Del. 1995).

PIPHER v. PARSELL