The intended meaning of the language used in a written instrument must control in its interpretation and enforcement, if it is susceptible of that meaning. A lease for five years of rear property on an alleyway which was likely to be built upon by third parties who owned it, provided that if a permanent interruption of the tenant's access by means of the alleyway "shall occur, or having previously occurred, shall continue, after two years from the date hereof," the tenant should nevertheless continue to hire the entire leased premises at a rental of $1,000 per year. The trial court found that the parties intended to express in the lease an agreement that the concession therein in favor of the tenant, because of the interruption of access, should not continue beyond the first two years of his term, and that for the last three years he should pay the prescribed rent for the entire building. Held that the language used was reasonably susceptible of that construction, and therefore the trial court did not err in refusing to reform the lease as prayed for by the defendant, nor in rendering judgment for the full amount of the plaintiff's claim.
PER CURIAM.
The court's finding as to the understanding and agreement of the parties intended by them to be expressed in the lease which they executed, is decisive of the correctness of the action of the court in the rendition of its judgment. The intended meaning of the language used in the lease must control in its interpretation and enforcement, if it is susceptible of that meaning. Upon the latter point there certainly can be no reasonable question. The court, therefore, did not err either in refusing to reform the lease as requested, or in rendering judgment for the plaintiffs for the full amount of their claim.