OPINION BY POPOVICH, J.:
¶ 1 The Commonwealth appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County directing a rape complainant to undergo a psychiatric examination for purposes of determining her competency to testify at trial. We affirm.
¶ 2 The facts of record establish that, at approximately 10:00 p.m. on the 13th day of October, 2005, C.U. (the complainant) and three friends decided to patronize Murray's bar in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. At the bar, C.U. met a co-worker ("J.K.") and Appellee Daryl Boich as the trio stood in a crowd assembled in front of the stage where a band was preparing to perform. As the evening wore on past midnight, C.U. and Appellee drank, danced, and conversed. When it was time to leave, C.U. could not locate her friends so she accepted a ride home from Appellee. C.U. walked to and sat in Appellee's vehicle, which was parked in Murray's lot. C.U. felt comfortable leaving with Appellee at that point and was told upon inquiry that he was separated and managed people's money for a living.
¶ 3 While the two sat in Appellee's Mercedes they began to kiss, but then C.U. became uncomfortable because Appellee was "getting a little pushy" by grabbing her breasts. C.U. told Appellee she wanted to go home. Appellee agreed but drove to a secluded spot adjacent to Murray's bar and forced C.U. to perform oral sex. Thereafter, C.U. found herself outside the vehicle, and Appellee was pulling off her jeans and panties. Appellee then forced C.U. to have sexual intercourse on the hood of his Mercedes. Despite the fact that C.U. told Appellee to stop, he refused and ceased only when her cell phone activated, and Appellee was advised her friends would contact the police if she did not answer. Appellee released C.U. and left the area. While making her way back to Murray's bar, C.U. contacted J.K. and told him what happened, but she did not go to the hospital or report the assault to police until the next day. Appellee was thereafter charged with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and two counts of sexual assault. Following a preliminary hearing, the district judge ruled that the Commonwealth had presented a prima facie case and held the matter for court. Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion requesting a psychiatric examination of C.U. on grounds that she was not competent to testify because her mental capacity to observe and remember the occurrences were substantially impaired by the ingestion of alcohol and/or prescribed drugs. After listening to the defense expert (Dr. Fischbein) postulate on the basis for the psychiatric examination, the trial court ruled:
While none of the factors relied upon by [Appellee], in isolation, establish a compelling need for an examination; considered together one is clearly warranted. This Court simply lacks sufficient expertise to understand and evaluate the physical/psychiatric affects and effects of ingestion of these substances by the alleged victim.
This evaluation and determination becomes more difficult given the alleged victim's acknowledged alcohol consumption. Dr. Fischbein's testimony establishes the ingestion of a combination of these constituent substances implicates a person's ability to perceive and recall. We cannot make a factual determination on the ultimate issue of testimonial competency unless we understand and appreciate the drugs' interaction and the extent to which they effected [
sic] the ability to accurately recall, [
sic] perceive and articulate the relevant sequence of events.
The record before us sufficiently demonstrates the alleged victim's inability to remember or recall relevant information at or near the time of the alleged assault. Indeed, the excerpts [from the preliminary hearing] referenced in [Appellee's] Exhibit 1 indicate her inability to recall information and events immediately prior to, during and shortly after the alleged sexual assault. The preliminary hearing testimony coupled with Dr. Fischbein's testimony implicate the alleged victim's testimonial competency. It is beyond argument, indeed the Commonwealth does not suggest otherwise, that the pharmacological combination of substance[s] referenced in this record produce impairment — the central consideration is to what extent.
The issue of the alleged victim's testimonial competency has been sufficiently raised and the [October 5, 2006,] hearing has indeed revealed the existence of a valid competency
concern. Expert testimony would greatly assist this Court in assessing the question of competency. This examination, narrowly tailored and focused on the specific issues outlined by Dr. Fischbein, in the presence of an Assistant District Attorney, a police prosecutor and a close relative, if desired by the alleged victim, is warranted.
Trial court opinion, 12/13/06, at 10-11 (footnote omitted). After the trial court granted the defense's omnibus pre-trial motion, the Commonwealth filed the present appeal and argues that: "The lower court erred in ordering the accuser in a sexual assault case to undergo an involuntary psychiatric evaluation without a compelling reason."
¶ 4 Preliminarily, we note that the order appealed is interlocutory but is appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Commonwealth v. Alston, 864 A.2d 539, 546 (Pa.Super. 2004) ( en banc) (order requiring victim to undergo a psychiatric examination is subject to review under collateral order exception); see also Commonwealth v. Shearer, 584 Pa. 134, 882 A.2d 462 (2005) (reversing Superior Court's order quashing Commonwealth's appeal of trial court's order requiring complainant to submit to psychiatric examination as Commonwealth's appeal proper via Pa.R.A.P. 313 under collateral order doctrine).
¶ 5 The question of a person's competency to be a witness is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. D.J.A., 800 A.2d 965 (Pa.Super. 2002) ( en banc). Furthermore, "the mental competency of every witness is presumed [. . .]." Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 352, 329 A.2d 258, 267 (1974). Lastly, incompetency does not follow from the fact that the witness is insane or mentally ill. Id. at 352, 329 A.2d at 267. As a result, a trial court does not have an obligation to order an investigation of a witness' competency unless the trial court has some doubt on the issue from having observed the witness. See Commonwealth v. Jennings, 446 Pa. 294, 304, 285 A.2d 143, 149 (1971); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 606 A.2d 939, 943 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 624, 620 A.2d 490 (1993).
¶ 6 When a trial court addresses the competency of a witness to testify, it must determine if the witness has the ability to: (1) perceive an event with a substantial degree of accuracy; (2) remember it; (3) communicate about it intelligibly; and (4) be mindful of the duty to tell the truth under oath. Commonwealth v. Goldblum, 498 Pa. 455, 465, 447 A.2d 234, 239 (1982). The core of the competency test is the ability to give a correct account of the matters that the witness has seen or heard. Ware, 459 Pa. at 353, 329 A.2d at 268. Stated otherwise,
A competency hearing concerns itself with the minimal capacity of the witness to communicate, to observe an event and understand the necessity to speak the truth. A competency hearing is not concerned with credibility. Credibility involves an assessment of whether or not what the witness says is true; that is a question for the fact finder. An allegation that the witness's memory of the event has been tainted raises a red flag regarding competency, not credibility. Where it can be demonstrated that a witness's memory has been affected so that their recall of events may not be dependable, Pennsylvania law charges the trial court with the responsibility to investigate the legitimacy of such an allegation.
Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 578 Pa. 641, 663, 855 A.2d 27, 40 (2003) ("
Delbridge I") (citations omitted).
¶ 7 In the present matter, we have more than the bare assertions of Appellee concerning C.U.'s failure to answer questions to suggest that she could not describe accurately the events relating to the sexual assault. We have a transcript of the preliminary hearing documenting C.U.'s responses to the defense's inquiry into her recollection of events attendant to the charges filed. Contrast Commonwealth v. Counterman, 553 Pa. 370, 393, 719 A.2d 284, 295 (1998) ("Counterman's bare assertions concerning Mrs. Counterman's intelligence and her slowness in responding to questions did not suggest that she could not accurately describe [ sic] the events leading up to the fire. Consequently, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Counterman's request for a competency examination of his wife.").
¶ 8 At the preliminary hearing, C.U. gave an account surrounding the alleged sexual assault which reflects upon her competency to recall the events surrounding the case. To explicate, on seventy-one occasions during cross-examination, C.U. stated she either did not remember or did not recall matters associated with the evening of October 13th and the early morning hours of October 14th; for example:
[Appellee's counsel:] Q. During the course of that evening, was there any sexual talk between you and [Appellee] when you were at the bar?
[Complainant:] A. Again, I can't remember what our conversation was.
Q. I'm not asking you to remember every piece of your conversation-
A. Right.
Q. — but you're claiming you were raped. Now, in the course of that night in that bar, are you telling me you can't remember if there was any conversation related to any sexual overtones?
A. I honestly cannot remember our conversation at the time.
Q. Relating to anything sexual?
A. Relating to anything.
Q. Sexual?
A. Anything.
Q. Anything?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So other than you saying hello to [Appellee] that night in the bar, you can't remember anything further in terms of your conversation with him?
A. No, I cannot. Inside the bar.
Q. Inside the bar we're talking about?
A. Correct.
* * * *
Q. And did you have any conversation with him up to his pants being unbuttoned?
A. I can't recall any.
Q. You can't recall anything?
A. I can't remember anything that was said, anything that he had said.
Q. And all of a sudden, the next thing you see is his pants were unbuttoned?
A. I saw them unbuttoned.
Q. At that point in time, up to that point in time, you don't remember him threatening you in anyway?
A. I can't remember anything. I mean I don't, I can't remember.
* * * *
Q. So, you see his zipper down and you see his penis out; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you see this; what, if anything, did you say to him?
A. Again, I can't remember words exchanged.
Q. You can't remember anything that was said?
A. No.
Q. You don't remember anything he even said to you either?
A. No.
N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 12/12/05, at 48-50, 85-86. Furthermore, C.U. did not remember whether she drank draft or bottled beer at Murray's bar or how she got out of Appellee's vehicle after performing oral sex, nor could she state where on her body Appellee picked her up to place her on the hood of his vehicle to have sex. Id. at 92-93, 96. Yet, she did admit drinking enough beer and whiskey to be "intoxicated," did recall taking prescription drugs, did kiss Appellee "passionately" in his vehicle, and did perform oral sex and sexual intercourse against her will. Id. at 54, 60-61, 74, 90, 100. C.U. attempted to minimize her memory loss by attributing it to the trauma of having been sexually assaulted by Appellee. Id. at 49-50. Dr. Fischbein, on the other hand, opined such selective memory loss was sufficient to warrant a psychiatric examination to analyze the root-cause for such an episodic event, especially given the negative impact (memory loss and/or black-outs) anti-depressant drugs could have upon a person when ingested in tandem with alcohol. N.T. Competency Hearing, 10/5/06, at 39-40. Toward that end, Dr. Fischbein stated that knowledge of the dosage C.U. was taking and why she was being given these drugs were imperative to diagnosis their influence on her competency to recall events post-ingestion. N.T. Competency Hearing, 10/5/06, at 7. Thus, proffered Dr. Fischbein, there was a need for a psychiatric examination to assess C.U.'s competency, which was predicated upon the expert's review of the complaint; the affidavit of probable cause attached to the police criminal complaint; Wilkes-Barre police department offense report; Wilkes-Barre police department supplemental reports; Pennsylvania State Police serology report; Wyoming Valley Healthcare emergency room records; interview of C.U.; interview of six witnesses; preliminary hearing transcript; and Appellee's omnibus pre-trial motion. Id. at 29.
¶ 9 Despite the expert's possession of the aforementioned data, he still was of the opinion that a psychiatric examination of C.U. was necessary; to-wit:
[Assistant District Attorney:]
Q. And with that knowledge [ — evidence in the transcript — ], you're still telling this Court that you feel there is a substantial need for [
sic] to you conduct this psychiatric examination on [C.U.]?
[Dr. Fischbein:]
A. Yes, because that would not negate other explanations for why she can't remember. It could be as simple as alcohol intoxication. It could be that, periodically, under severe stress, she may have a dissociative state where she goes blank, for a better term, a circuit breaker goes off; that can happen in certain personality makeups, or perhaps after what she perceived happen [
sic] in the car, she had a severe reaction and had a posttraumatic stress disorder and then blanked for that period of time.
So, there's many, many explanations. If she didn't take any Darvocet, it doesn't negate any of the other possibilities. It's just possibility.
Q. I believe that your testimony with regard to the need for this type of psychiatric examination is that the more history you can have, the more helpful it is to maximize your chance of being able to come to a conclusion on this issue; is that correct?
A. On the issue of why she can't remember certain events of that evening, yes, that's true.
* * * *
Q. Doctor, do you feel in your professional opinion that there is no other way to go about finding out a cause for the
blanks in [C.U.'s] memory other than forcing her to undergo an involuntary psychiatric exam?
A. Based on what I know, no, I can't. I can't.
N.T. Competency Hearing, 10/5/06, at 56-57, 61. ¶ 10 We find that the factors cited above if viewed in isolation would not justify an involuntary psychiatric examination, but when viewed as a whole, the events (documented selective memory loss) associated with the consumption of alcohol and prescription drugs coalesce to present a compelling reason to warrant a psychiatric examination. See N.T. Competency Hearing, 10/5/06, at 39-40 (Dr. Fischbein: "alcohol in large quantity, depending on how much was had, can cause an alcohol blackout or trouble remembering events while you're intoxicated. Mixing Darvocet with alcohol [. . .] can cause sedation. [. . .] You then add Lexapro to the picture [. . .] alcohol is depressogenic. It can make your depression worse or your anxiety. [. . .] Lexapro with alcohol can increase the intoxication."); see also Delbridge I, at 669, 855 A.2d at 43 ("In a competency hearing, the trial judge must determine the facts and reach a legal conclusion. It is thus the trial judge who must decide if expert testimony will advance a resolution of the question of competency on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, we will leave it to each individual jurist, subject to appropriate review, the decision of whether in any particular case [. . .] expert testimony would assist the court in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue during a competency hearing." (citation omitted)); Trial court opinion, 12/13/06, at 11 ("The issue of the alleged victim's testimonial competency has been sufficiently raised and the hearing has indeed revealed the existence of a valid competency concern. Expert testimony would greatly assist this Court in assessing the question of competency.").
¶ 11 Based on the aforesaid, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a psychiatric examination of C.U. under the particular facts of this case. See Delbridge I, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Marshall, 570 Pa. 545, 572, 810 A.2d 1211, 1227 (2002) (Appellant argued that the trial court's appointment of psychological testing was improper; the record did not support this representation of the facts, and, as such, the issue had no merit.).
We deem it prudent to point out that, the trial court directed that after the completion of the psychiatric examination, the preparation of the expert's written findings and opinion are to be submitted for its review within a timely fashion. After considering the findings of fact and opinion of the defense's expert, the trial court must then determine whether Appellee's burden to overcome the presumption of competency has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 580 Pa. 68, 74, 859 A.2d 1254, 1257-58 (2004) (" Delbridge II"). If Appellee fails to meet his burden of proof that C.U. is not competent to testify by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must find that she is competent to testify at trial about the events attendant to the charges filed. Delbridge II, at 73, 859 A.2d at 1257.
¶ 12 Order affirmed.
¶ 13 HUDOCK, J. files a Dissenting Statement.