Ordered that the order of protection is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Kings County, for a new hearing and determination in accordance herewith; and it is further,
Ordered that the temporary order of protection dated November 30, 2005 is reinstated pending the new determination.
A party in a Family Court Act article 8 proceeding has the right to be represented by counsel ( see Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [ii]; Matter of Otto v Otto, 26 AD3d 498, 499). That party, however, can waive the right to counsel and opt for self-representation ( see People v Arroyo, 98 NY2d 101, 103; People v Smith, 92 NY2d 516, 520; People v Anderson, 125 AD2d 580, 581). Prior to permitting a party to proceed pro se, the court must determine that the decision to do so is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily ( see People v Arroyo, supra). To ascertain whether a party's waiver of counsel meets these requirements, the court must conduct a "searching inquiry" of that party ( People v Slaughter, 78 NY2d 485, 491). Although there is no "rigid formula" as to the questions the court of needs to ask for counsel waivers, there must be a showing that the party "was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel" ( People v Providence, 2 NY3d 579, 582-583 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Here, the Family Court failed to advise the husband of the risks of self-representation. As such, there was no knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel ( see People v Arroyo, supra; People v Smith, supra; Matter of Hassig v Hassig, 34 AD3d 1089; Matter of Rachel P., 286 AD2d 868). Accordingly, we reverse the order of protection and remit the matter to the Family Court, Kings County, for a new hearing and determination.
The husband's remaining contention is without merit.