HOWARD, Presiding Judge.
¶ 1 The University Officials moved this court for reconsideration of our June 28, 2007 opinion in this case, claiming we had improperly applied the definition of when a claim accrues for purposes of the notice of claim statute, A.R.S. § 12-821.01, to the statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-821, in determining whether Dube's defamation claims were time-barred. They note that § 12-821.01(B) provides that its definition of accrual is "[fjor purposes of this section." Further, the University Officials correctly assert that, in Stulce v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement Power District, 197 Ariz. 87, ¶¶ 10-11, 3 P.3d 1007, 1010 (App. 1999), Division One of this court stated that courts had applied the common law discovery rule to the statute of limitations in § 12-821 and that the legislature enacted § 12-821.01(B) to insert the discovery rule into the notice of claim statute, thereby keeping the accrual definition for purposes of the notice of claim and the filing of the action consistent. But the University Officials claim that a different common law accrual definition applies to defamation actions, under Clark v. AiResearch Manufacturing Co. of Arizona, 138 Ariz. 240, 673 P.2d 984 (App. 1983). They contend that this court has altered the accrual date for defamation actions against public entities or public employees.
¶ 2 The University Officials contend that the phrase "[fjor purposes of this section" in § 12-821.01(B) means that subsection B's definition of accrual for the filing of a notice of claim should not apply to § 12-821, the statute of limitation governing filing of the complaint. The court in Stulce suggested that the common law discovery rule would apply in determining when a cause of action accrued for purposes of § 12-821's limitation period. 197 Ariz. 87, ¶ 10, 3 P.3d at 1010. The court further stated in Stulce that the legislature's objective in enacting § 12-821.01(B) was to ensure that the accrual date for purposes of the notice of claim, § 12-821.01, and filing the action, § 12-821, were the same. 197 Ariz. 87, ¶ 11, 3 P.3d at 1010. Therefore, the definition of accrual in § 12-821.01(B) should apply to both. Indeed, any interpretation that resulted in different accrual dates for each filing would violate the legislative intent as recounted in Stulce and would be confusing. And, as the University Officials acknowledge, this court has used the definition of accrual in § 12-821.01(B), the notice of claim statute, in discussing accrual for purposes of filing the action. See Long v. City of Glendale, 208 Ariz. 319, ¶¶ 7, 9, 93 P.3d 519, 525 (App. 2004). Therefore, we reject the University Officials' attempt to draw a distinction between the definition of accrual for the filing of the notice of claim and the filing of the action.
¶ 3 Rather, we adopt a straightforward interpretation consistent with legislative intent. "`The primary rule of statutory construction is to find and give effect to legislative intent.'" Lavidas v. Smith, 195 Ariz. 250, ¶ 8, 987 P.2d 212, 214 (App. 1999), quoting Mail Boxes, Etc., U.S.A. v. Indus. Comm'n, 181 Ariz. 119, 121, 888 P.2d 777, 779 (1995). "A statute's language is `the best and most reliable index' of its meaning." Trust v. County of Yuma, 205 Ariz. 272, ¶ 11, 69 P.3d 510, 512 (App. 2003), quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991). "If the language is clear, the court must `apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation,' unless application of the plain meaning would lead to impossible or absurd results." Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003), quoting Hayes v. Cont 7 Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994).
¶ 4 Section 12-821.01(B) states: "For purposes of this section, a cause of action accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage." As noted in Stulce, the legislature thereby adopted the general definition of the common law discovery rule for purposes of the notice of claim. 197 Ariz. 87, ¶¶ 10-11, 3 P.3d at 1010. It did not incorporate any special requirements for defamation actions and nothing suggests additional requirements were even considered. Therefore, we reject the University Officials' request that we interject into the statute a concept the legislature did not intend.
¶ 5 Having concluded that the legislature intended the same discovery rule to apply to both the filing of the notice of claim and the filing of the complaint against public entities or employees, Stulce, 197 Ariz. 87, ¶ 11, 3 P.3d at 1010, and having further concluded that we cannot inject any special defamation discovery rule into the general discovery rule adopted by the legislature for the filing of a notice of claim, we must conclude that applying the general discovery rule from § 12-821.01 (B) to the time period for the filing of the action fulfills the legislature's intent, as evidenced by its words.
¶ 6 Moreover, applying the statutory accrual definition will not lead to absurd results. Generally, a cause of action for defamation accrues on the date of the defamatory publication. Lim v. Superior Court, 126 Ariz. 481, 482, 616 P.2d 941, 942 (App. 1980). But in Clark, Division One of this court framed the question it was to decide as follows: "whether the cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run upon publication of the defamatory statements or not until their publication was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered by Clark." 138 Ariz. at 241, 673 P.2d at 985. The court then held that the discovery rule applies to those cases in which the defamatory statement is "published in a manner in which it is peculiarly likely to be concealed from the plaintiff, such as in a confidential memorandum or a credit report." Id. at 242, 673 P.2d at 986. But the court did not apply the discovery rule in that case because there was nothing "particularly secretive" about the allegedly defamatory communications and Clark had long had reason to believe that AiResearch personnel had been saying negative things about him. Id. at 242-43, 673 P.2d at 986-87.
¶ 7 Although the court in Clark used "confidential memorand[a] " and "credit report[s] " as examples of the types of "particularly secretive" communications that would trigger application of the discovery rule, id. at 242-43, 673 P.2d at 986-87, it did not suggest that list was exhaustive. Instead, it decided the discovery rule applies to appropriate defamation cases and referred generally to "those situations in which the defamation is published in a manner in which it is peculiarly likely to be concealed from the plaintiff." Id. at 242, 673 P.2d at 986. And the words the court used in framing the issue — "discovered or reasonably should have been discovered," id. at 241, 673 P.2d at 985 — do not differ materially from the traditional phrasing of the general discovery rule. See, e.g., Gust, Rosenfeld Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 588, 898 P.2d 964, 966 (1995) ("Under the `discovery rule,' a plaintiff's cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know the facts underlying the cause.").
¶ 8 Other states have reached similar results applying the discovery rule, slightly differently phrased, to defamation cases. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court extensively reviewed case law from other jurisdictions in deciding to apply the discovery rule where the defendant had written allegedly defamatory letters and had instructed the recipient only to disseminate the information in the letters to certain parties, none of which was the plaintiff. Digital Design Group, Inc. v. Info. Builders, Inc., 24 P.3d 834, ¶¶ 20-21, n. 7 (Okla. 2001). The court noted that the cases tend to apply the rule "when the publication is likely to be concealed from the plaintiff or published in a secretive manner which would make it unlikely to come to the attention of the injured party." Id. ¶ 20.
¶ 9 Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applied to allegedly defamatory information published in a credit report. See Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun Bradstreet, Inc., 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ill. 1975). The court there distinguished between claims against those who produce credit reports and claims against media defendants, where "the person commented on, if only in his role as a member of the public, has had access to . . . [the] published information." Id.; see also Manguso v. Oceanside Unified Sch. Dist, 152 Cal. Rptr. 27, 28, 31 (App. 1979) (discovery rule applied where allegedly defamatory material in letter placed in teacher's confidential personnel file); White v. Gurnsey, 618 P.2d 975, 978 (Or.Ct.App. 1980) (discovery rule applied where allegedly defamatory material in confidential memorandum that "was not of the type that plaintiff would be presumed to have known about, even in the exercise of reasonable diligence"); Wheeler v. Methodist Ho sp., 95 S.W.3d 628, 636 (Tex.App. 2002) ("[T] he discovery rule applies to a defamation claim if the matter is not public knowledge.").
¶ 10 We conclude that the difference between the current interpretation of the common law discovery rule as applied to defamation cases and as applied to other cases is more semantic than substantive. The general common law discovery rule, as adopted in § 12-821.01(B), states the triggering event from the point of view of the plaintiff — whether he knew or should have known the underlying facts of the action. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, ¶ 29, 955 P.2d 951, 960 (1998). But the defamation discovery rule has sometimes been stated from the point of view of the defendant — whether the defamatory content was published in a secretive manner such that it would be likely to be concealed from the injured party. See Clark, 138 Ariz. at 242, 673 P.2d at 986.
¶ 11 In this case, and in most cases, the result would be the same regardless of which view is applied. The letters were published in a manner not likely to come to Dube's attention and Dube did not have actual or constructive knowledge concerning them on the date they were published. Therefore, applying the general discovery rule as adopted by the legislature in § 12-821.01(B) to the question of when the defamation claims accrued for purposes of § 12-821 will not lead to an absurd result. ¶ 12 Finally, we reject the University Officials' claim that our interpretation will lead to confusion. Dube's actual or constructive knowledge of the publication triggers accrual for purposes of the filing of both a notice of claim and a complaint against public entities or public employees. The application of the discovery rule in a defamation case against a private individual is not before us, although, as stated in Clark, the discovery rule can apply to those cases. 138 Ariz. at 242, 673 P.2d at 986. Therefore, our opinion does not create any confusion with regard to those cases either. For all of these reasons, the University Officials' motion for reconsideration is denied.
¶ 13 Additionally, on the court's own motion, paragraph 26 of the opinion is supplemented as follows. Dube initially sued Desai in September 2004, and, during discovery, successfully moved to amend his complaint to add the University Officials in February 2006, seventeen months later. The University Officials' motion to dismiss followed. Therefore, this is not a typical situation in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss follows closely on the heels of the filing of the initial complaint. Yet Dube failed to plead any facts showing the University Officials entered into a common design with Desai to interfere with Dube's employment prospects. Furthermore, he failed to allege a protectable business expectancy, although those facts are completely within his own control.
¶ 14 Even under liberal notice pleading rules, a "plaintiffs obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle [ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007), quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (alteration in Bell Atlantic Corp.). In Bell Atlantic Corp., the Supreme Court specifically rejected an interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., that would allow "a wholly conclusory statement of claim . . . [to] survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some `set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery." Bell Atl. Corp., ___ U.S. at ___, 127 S. Ct. at 1968, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957) (alteration in Bell Atlantic Corp.); see also Johnson Int'l, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 466, ¶ 19, 967 P.2d 607, 611 (App. 1998) (on motion to dismiss, facts alleged accepted as true, but legal conclusions may be disregarded). Dube's tortious interference claim therefore fails.
________________________________ JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Presiding Judge
CONCURRING:
________________________________ JOHN PELANDER, Chief Judge
________________________________ GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Judge