Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In order to vacate their default in answering the complaint, the appellants were required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their failure to serve an answer, and a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Forward Door of N.Y., Inc. v Forlader, 41 AD3d 535; Piton v Cribb, 38 AD3d 741; Fekete v Camp Skwere, 16 AD3d 544, 545). Although a court has the discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005), a conclusory, undetailed, and uncorroborated claim of law office failure does not amount to a reasonable excuse ( see Matter of ELRAC, Inc. v Holder, 31 AD3d 636; Matter of Denton v City of Mount Vernon, 30 AD3d 600; McClaren v Bell Atl., 30 AD3d 569; Solomon v Ramlall, 18 AD3d 461). Here, the appellants' uncorroborated and inadequately-explained excuse for failing to answer did not constitute a reasonable excuse. In fact, the record supports the conclusion that the appellants purposely embarked upon a course of "willful default and neglect" ( Santiago v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 10 AD3d 393, 394; Kolajo v City of New York, 248 AD2d 512; Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568, 569). Moreover, the appellants' claim that their attorney apparently made an erroneous assumption regarding the need to answer the complaint does not constitute a valid excuse ( see Everything Yogurt v Toscano, 232 AD2d 604; Awad v Severino, 122 AD2d 242; see also Rodriguez v Ng, 23 AD3d 450). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion.