Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
"To dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground that it is barred by the [s]tatute of [limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing prima facie that the time in which to sue has expired" ( savarese v Shatz, 273 AD2d 219, 220; see Swift v New York Med. Coll., 25 AD3d 686, 687). To make a prima facie showing, the defendant must establish, inter alia, when the petitioner's causes of action accrued ( see Swift v New York Med. Coll., 25 AD3d at 686).
Accepting the allegations in the petition as true and according the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83), the record establishes that there are triable issues of fact as to when the petitioner's causes of action accrued ( see Savasta v 470 Newport Assoc, 82 NY2d 763; Ben Zev v Merman, 73 NY2d 781; Swift v New York Med. Coll., 25 AD3d at 686; Jakacic v Jakacic, 279 AD2d 551). Thus, the appellant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to relief.
Moreover, the court properly rejected the appellant's contention that because the dispute is governed by a contract, the petitioner is precluded from asserting a cause of action to impose a constructive trust. On this record and at this early juncture in the litigation, the Surrogate's Court correctly declined to dismiss that cause of action ( cf. Old Salem Dev. Group v Town of Fishkill, 301 AD2d 639).