DUGLAS S. LANG, Justice.
On August 16, 2007, this Court issued its opinion in this case vacating the trial court's judgment and dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction. After requesting and receiving a fifteen-day extension of time to file its motion for rehearing, appellant OAIC timely filed its motion for rehearing on September 14, 2007. In its motion for rehearing, OAIC asserted four new arguments in support of its contention that OAIC is at least an unadmitted assignee in Stonegate:
1. AFC's obligation to provide a satisfactory securities opinion letter is a covenant, not a condition precedent, and AFC's failure (if any) to do so does not invalidate the assignment or undermine OAIC's standing to protect its investment;
2. Neither Georgia nor Texas law allows an anti-assignment provision to be enforced against an assignee of rights under these circumstances;
3. Whether a condition or covenant, the law excuses performance of an immaterial obligation if enforcement would result in forfeiture; and
4. AFC provided a proper securities opinion letter, and CAWC cannot deny OAIC standing by unreasonably withholding its approval.
OAIC contends its four new arguments "demonstrate that the Court's jurisdictional holding [that OAIC lacks standing] is in direct conflict with existing Texas and Georgia law." This opinion on motion for rehearing does not change the Court's opinion in this appeal. OAIC's motion for rehearing is denied.
The sole purpose of a motion for rehearing is to provide the court an opportunity to correct any errors on issues already presented. Wentworth v. Meyer, 839 S.W.2d 766, 778 (Tex. 1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring). "Rehearing is not an opportunity to test alternative arguments after finding other arguments unsuccessful." ICM Mortgage Corp. v. Jacob, 902 S.W.2d 527, 535 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied). A motion for rehearing does not afford a party an opportunity to raise new issues after the case has been briefed, argued, and decided on other grounds, unless the error is fundamental. See Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 150 S.W.3d 579, 591 n. 13 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. granted). Fundamental error exists "in those rare instances in which the record shows the court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the Constitution of Texas." Id. (quoting Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982)).
OAIC contends the four arguments asserted in its motion for rehearing "each affect the Court's holding that OAIC had no standing to protect its investment." Standing, as a component of subject matter jurisdiction, cannot be waived and "may thus be raised at any time." West Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 583 (Tex. 2003). See also Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993). However, the record in this case shows standing was raised first in appellees' original answer in the trial court. Further, in support of their argument that OAIC lacked standing to bring this action, appellees specifically asserted in the trial court and on appeal that as a "condition precedent" to the transfer of its interest, AFC was required to provide a securities opinion "satisfactory to the Partnership" pursuant to section 9.3(d) of the agreement.
OAIC responded to appellees' challenges to standing in the trial court and on appeal by asserting section 9.3(d) was not applicable to AFC's purported transfer of its interest to OAIC. Alternatively, OAIC contended that even if such an opinion were required, appellees had "defaulted" under the agreement prior to the date of the purported transfer and therefore were not entitled to vote respecting any such opinion. Finally, OAIC argued appellees were judicially estopped by their own admissions from denying OAIC is an unadmitted assignee.
Although OAIC asserts that the four arguments raised in its motion for rehearing "affect the Court's holding that OAIC had no standing," none of those four arguments was raised on appeal. Based on the record before us, we conclude the four arguments OAIC asserts for the first time in its motion for rehearing should have been raised in OAIC's original submission in this Court. See ICM Mortgage, 902 S.W.2d at 535 (rehearing is not an opportunity to test alternative arguments after finding other arguments unsuccessful). See also Continental Dredging, Inc. v. De-Kaizered, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 380, 400 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (argument contesting elements of claim should have been raised in original submission and not in motion for rehearing).
OAIC does not contend "the court lacked jurisdiction," nor does OAIC argue "the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the Constitution of Texas." See Pirtle, 629 S.W.2d at 920. See also Phifer v. Nacogdoches County Cent. Appraisal Dist., 45 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied) (new argument asserting lack of jurisdiction could be raised for first time in motion for rehearing). Accordingly, because we conclude the arguments asserted by OAIC for the first time in its motion for rehearing do not raise issues of fundamental error, we decline to address those arguments. See Tex. Mun. Power, 150 S.W.3d at 591 n. 13.
OAIC's motion for rehearing is denied.