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MADISON GARDENS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION v. ANN MARIE DUBOUZE.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE

JOHN P. MAIOCCO, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.

This matter is before the court on the plaintiff's motion to strike the special defenses on the grounds that they are legally insufficient because they allege facts inconsistent with the plaintiff's complaint and because they do not relate to the payment, discharge, release, satisfaction or invalidity of the lien.

On December 20, 2006, the plaintiff, Madison Gardens Condominium Association, Inc., commenced this action by service of process on the defendant, Ann Marie Dubouze. This action arises out of an attempt by a condominium association to foreclose on property owned by the defendant. In the sole count of the complaint the plaintiff alleges that they have a valid statutory lien on the property because the defendant failed to pay her yearly assessment in 2006, as well as a special assessment in 2006.

On December 22, 2006, the defendants filed an answer and asserted special defenses. On June 14, 2007, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the special defenses on the grounds that they allege facts that are inconsistent with the plaintiff's complaint; that they do not attack the making, validity or enforcement of the lien which is the subject of the foreclosure complaint and that they are not recognized defenses to this foreclosure action.

"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC. v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "If a motion to strike is directed to the entire complaint, the motion must fail if any of the plaintiff's claims is CT Page 18837 legally sufficient." Kovacs v. Kasper, 41 Conn.Sup. 225, 226, 565 A.2d 18 (1989).

The plaintiff moves to strike the special defenses on the grounds that they plead facts that are inconsistent with the complaint. The plaintiff also argues that the motion to strike should be granted because the special defenses do not relate to the payment, discharge, release, satisfaction, making, enforcement or invalidity of the lien.

The defendant argues that the motion to strike should be denied because her special defenses are legally sufficient.

"The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action . . . A valid special defense at law to a foreclosure proceeding must be legally sufficient and address the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage, the note or both . . . Where the plaintiff's conduct is inequitable, a court may withhold foreclosure on equitable considerations and principles." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fidelity Bank v. Krenisky, 72 Conn.App. 700, 705, 807 A.2d 968, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 915, 811 A.2d 1291 (2002). "[T]he traditional defenses available in a foreclosure action are payment, discharge, release, satisfaction or invalidity of lien . . . In recognition that a foreclosure action is an equitable proceeding, courts have [also] allowed mistake, accident, fraud, equitable estoppel, CUTPA, laches, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tender of deed in lieu of foreclosure and a refusal to agree to a favorable sale to a third party to be pleaded as special defenses . . . Other defenses which have been recognized are usury, unconscionability of interest rate, duress, coercion, material alteration, and lack of consideration . . . These special defenses have been recognized as valid special defenses where they were legally sufficient and addressed the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage and/or note . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) First Connecticut Capital Mortgage Fund v. Lighthouse Homes, L.L.C., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06 5004695 (August 10, 2007, Maiocco, J.T.R.). "Simply because the allegations concern events after the execution of the mortgage does not make the claims automatically meritless . . . Indeed, by definition, the `enforcement' of a mortgage may involve conduct occurring after the execution of the mortgage." Ocwen Federal Bank FSB v. Waller, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 03 0401138 (March 16, 2004, Stevens, J.).

Under the broad interpretation given to a pleading when it is subject CT Page 18838 to a motion to strike, the defendant's answer can be read to allege that she has paid the amounts due. She alleges that the common charges assessed to her have been "paid up" and one check was returned. Since payment has been established to be a valid special defense, the defendant's first special defense is legally sufficient.

The motion to strike is a motion to strike an entire pleading and, therefore, once one count of the pleading is legally sufficient the entire motion to strike must fail. Even if the pleading is interpreted to assert other special defenses, the court does not have to address any of them under this motion to strike because the special defense of payment is deemed to be legally sufficient.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike the special defenses is denied because the defendant has asserted a legally sufficient special defense of payment.

CT Page 18839

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MADISON GARDENS CONDO ASS'N. v. DUBOUZE, No. CV 07 500 61 52 (Nov. 1, 2007)
(Nov 1, 2007)