Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion is denied.
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence against the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision ( see Niyazov v Bradford, 13 AD3d 501; Russ v Investech Sec, 6 AD3d 602; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635). "One of several nonnegligent explanations for a rear-end collision is a sudden stop of the lead vehicle" ( Chepel v Meyers, 306 AD2d 235, 237; see Carhuayano v J R Hacking, 28 AD3d 413; Gaeta v Carter, 6 AD3d 576; Purcell v Axelsen, 286 AD2d 379).
The plaintiffs met their burden by submitting evidence sufficient to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability ( see Emil Norsic Son, Inc. v L.P. Transp., Inc., 30 AD3d 368; Neidereger v Misuraca, 27 AD3d 537; David v New York City Bd. of Educ, 19 AD3d 639; Rainford v Sung S. Han, 18 AD3d 638). In opposition, the defendants raised a triable issue of fact. The defendants' assertion that the injured plaintiff made a sudden stop and failed to give proper signals, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163, contradicted the injured plaintiffs contention and, if believed, provided a nonnegligent explanation for the rear-end collision ( see Simpson v Eastman, 300 AD2d 647; Maschka v Newman, 262 AD2d 615; Artis v Jamaica Buses, 262 AD2d 511).