Witness, Cross-examination, Direct examination. Practice, Civil, Control of cross-examination by judge. Charity. Corporation, Charitable.
Where, in an action of tort against a corporation for personal injuries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant in a wood yard operated by it, the defendant in its answer alleges that it is a charitable corporation and that the wood yard was operated by it in carrying out its charitable purposes, and at the trial the plaintiff calls as a witness the superintendent of the defendant, who was one of its incorporators, and makes inquiry as to the general management of the defendant's enterprises, the witness in cross-examination by counsel for the defendant may be permitted to state the purposes for which the wood yard was established and maintained.
And, where it does not appear that the superintendent, although an employee and a member of the corporation, had shown bias or prejudice in his testimony, the presiding judge was held properly to have ruled that the plaintiff, who had called him as a witness, should not be permitted to cross-examine him.
A charitable corporation, organized "for the purpose of assisting discharged prisoners and others," by furnishing them with a temporary home and employment, to lead honest and useful lives, which maintains for its purposes a lodging and boarding house called a Home, and a wood yard where employment is given to persons needing its help, who are paid something for their work and are given lodging, board and sometimes clothing, and the expenses of which corporation are paid in part from a sale of the wood from the wood yard, in part from the income from invested funds and in part from voluntary contributions, the corporation deriving no profit from its enterprises, cannot be held liable in an action of tort brought by an inmate of its Home and a worker in its wood yard for personal injuries received by him due to a defective condition of a wood chopping machine of which the defendant's superintendent knew or should have known.
BRALEY, J.
While the only evidence introduced by the defendant was a certified copy of its charter showing that it is a corporation organized under Pub. Sts. c. 115, § 4 for the purpose of assisting discharged prisoners and others by providing them "with a temporary home and employment, to lead honest and useful lives," the plaintiff called the superintendent of the Home, one of the incorporators as a witness. It is upon his evidence that the question of the defendant's liability must be decided.
The plaintiff having inquired as to the number of corporators and the general management of the Home in the reception, support and employment of inmates, the superintendent was properly permitted to state on cross-examination the purpose for which the wood yard where the plaintiff, an inmate, while at work with a chopping machine was injured, had been established and maintained. Hartnett v. Goddard, 176 Mass. 326, 331.
Nor is the ruling that the plaintiff could not cross-examine his own witness to prove that the defendant was not a charitable organization reviewable on exceptions where no bias or prejudice of the witness is shown. Jennings v. Rooney, 183 Mass. 577. Reed v. Mattapan Deposit Trust Co. 198 Mass. 306, 312.
It clearly appears from his uncontradicted testimony, that pursuant to the charter the Home maintained the wood yard to provide employment for the men, and to enable them "to save a little money so when they do get employment elsewhere they will have something to stay them over," and that, the income from invested funds and receipts from the wood yard being insufficient to meet expenses, the deficit is supplied by contributions from the public.
The wood yard having been operated as a part of the defendant's charitable work for the benefit of the inmates and not for commercial gain or profit, the verdict for the defendant was rightly ordered. Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, and cases cited. Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465. And whether there was evidence for the jury of the plaintiff's due care and the alleged negligence of the defendant need not be considered.
Exceptions overruled.