Contrary to defendants' arguments, plaintiff's claims are not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel since the Civil Court proceedings in which she previously raised them were disposed of by stipulation ( Angel v Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., 39 AD3d 368, 371).
Defendants Chase and Finger are correct that plaintiffs cause of action for fraud is not adequately pleaded as against them. As to Chase, plaintiff alleges fraud by omission. However, "an omission does not constitute fraud unless there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties" ( SNS Bank v Citibank, 7 AD3d 352, 356). Plaintiff had no relationship with Chase.
As to Finger, the attorney who represented the purchaser in a transaction in which plaintiff sold her home but which she maintains was intended to be a refinancing of her home, plaintiff fails to allege that he made any representation, fraudulent or otherwise, to her ( National Westminster Bank v Weksel, 124 AD2d 144, 147, lv denied 70 NY2d 604).
Plaintiff's remaining causes of action against Chase are inadequately pleaded, barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, or rendered moot by the fact that defendant James Polite, who purchased plaintiffs home, paid the Chase mortgage in full prior to the commencement of this action.